Regan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.

• Decision Date: 21 March 1944
• Docket Number: No. 27439.,27439.
• Citation: 54 N.E.2d 210,386 Ill. 284
• Parties: REGAN v. KROGER GROCERY & BAKING CO. (BROWN, Administrator of Office of Price Administration, Intervener).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

386 Ill. 284

54 N.E.2d 210

REGAN

v.KROGER GROCERY & BAKING CO. (BROWN, Administrator of Office of Price Administration, Intervener).

No. 27439.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 21, 1944.

Action by Charles H. Regan against the Kroger Grocery & Baking Company to recover under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 statutory damages by reason of sale to plaintiff by defendant allegedly in excess of ceiling prices. Prentiss M. Brown, Administrator of Office of Price Administration, intervened. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

THOMPSON, J., dissenting.Appeal from Municipal Court of Chicago; Oscar S. Caplan, judge.

Henry J. & Charles Aaron, of Chicago (Franklin Raber, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Alex Elson, John F. Manierre, Milton M. Hermann, and Robert B. Johnstone, all of Chicago (Fleming James, Jr., and David London, both of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for appellee.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the municipal court of Chicago. Certain constitutional questions are raised with reference to the validity of an act of Congress, known as the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.

Charles H. Regan brought the suit, as plaintiff, under said act. In his verified statement of claim, he alleged that on November 19, 1942, he purchased from appellant, the Kroger Grocery & Baking Company, at its retail store in Oak Park, two cans of Campbell's Condensed Asparagus Soup, for which it demanded and collected from him twenty-five cents; that on December11, 1942, he also purchased from appellant, at the same store, two like cans for which the appellant demanded and collected the sum of twenty-five cents; that these charges were in excess of the ceiling price fixed under said act. He further alleged that on December 14, 1942, he purchased three cans of Campbell's Condensed Asparagus Soup, for which the defendant demanded and collected thirty-eight cents, which was alleged to be in excess of the ceiling price. It was further alleged that the ceiling price for said commodities, established for the store at which they were purchased, under the General Maximum Price Regulation, effective May 18, 1942, was one can for ten cents, two cans for twenty cents and three cans for twenty-nine cents. He alleged that each of said purchases constituted a separate and distinct violation of section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 925(e); that he was entitled to recover for each alleged violation the sum of $50, or treble the amount by which the consideration exceeded the maximum price, whichever was greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs. He demanded the sum of $150, plus attorney's fees and costs.

Appellant appeared and filed three separate affidavits of defense. The first defense, after admitting the maximum ceiling prices fixed, as alleged in the statement of claim, denied that the sales were made and the overcharges demanded and collected, as alleged; it denied that each of the alleged sales was a separate and distinct violation of the Emergency Price Control Act and denied that plaintiff was entitled to judgment. The affidavit of defense further alleged that if such sales were made, at the prices alleged, they were made by its agents or employees, without its knowledge, approval or consent. It set out somewhat in detail the steps it had taken and the instructions which it had given to its store managers and other employees with reference to compliance with the maximum ceiling prices fixed under the act.

The second defense alleged that the plaintiff's cause of action arose under the penalty provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act; that the remedies sought by plaintiff were penal in character; that the courts of Illinois were without jurisdiction to impose a penalty under any law of the United States or of any foreign state or sovereignty, and that such jurisdiction could not be conferred on the courts of this State by congressional enactment.

The third defense alleged that the Emergency Price Control Act is unconstitutional and, in so far as it seeks to control and limit sales of commodities between a retail dealer and consumer in local or intrastate transactions, constitutes an infringement on a power reserved to the States; that it was not a measure necessary to the successful prosecution of the war, within the meaning of the war powers of Congress. It further alleged that the act was invalid because it limits the power of the courts upon which the act attempts to confer jurisdiction to adjudicate controversies arising thereunder, thereby depriving the defendant of the right to interpose all available defenses in such suits and, consequently, deprives the defendant of its property without due process of law.

Thereafter, Prentiss M. Brown, Administrator of the Office of Price Administration, appeared and filed a motion for leave to intervene. He alleged that he was interested in the subject matter of the action and that his interest would be affected by the judgment of the court in said suit; that he desired to intervene as a party pursuant to section 205(d) of the Emergency Price Control Act, section 25 of the Civil Practice Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, c. 110, § 149, and rule 20 of the municipal court. He was granted leave to intervene. He thereupon filed a motion to strike the second and third defenses filed by appellant.

The motion to strike these defenses was based on the ground that such defenses were substantially insufficient in law and presented no defense to the action. It was alleged that the municipal court had jurisdiction by virtue of the Municipal Court Act and that said action was not an action for the recovery of a penalty. He further averred that the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 was a valid and constitutional exercise, by the Congress of the United States, of the war powers conferred upon it by section 8 of article I of the Federal constitution.

Upon a hearing this motion was sustained and the second and third defenses were stricken by the trial court. The cause was thereafter tried on the statement of claim and the first defense, and evidence heard in support thereof. The court found appellant guilty of two violations of the Emergency Price Control Act in making the sales on November 19 and December 11, 1942, as alleged in the complaint. Appellant was found not guilty as to the sale alleged to have been made on December 14, 1942. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against appellant, based on the sales of November 19 and December 11, for $100 damages and $20 attorney's fees. Appellant has perfected a direct appeal to this court because of the constitutional questions involved.

The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 901, et seq., contains several sections. Section 1(a), 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 901(a), declares an emergency. In so far as here material that section reads as follows:

‘It is hereby declared to be in the interest of the national defense and security and necessary to the effective prosecution of the present war, and the purposes of this Act are, to stabilize prices and to prevent speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal increases in prices and rents; to eliminate and prevent profiteering, hoarding, manipulation, speculation, and other disruptive practices resulting from abnormal market conditions or scarcities caused by or contributing to the national emergency; to assure that defense appropriations are not dissipated by excessive prices; to protect persons with relatively fixed and limited incomes, consumers, wage earners, investors, and persons dependent on life insurance, annuities, and pensions, from undue impairment of their standard of living; to prevent hardships to persons engaged in business, to schools, universities, and other institutions, and to the Federal, State, and local governments, which would result from abnormal increases in prices; to assist in securing adequate production of commodities and facilities; to prevent a post emergency collapse of values; to stabilize agricultural prices in the manner provided in section 3 * * *; and to permit voluntary cooperation between the Government and producers, processors, and others to accomplish the aforesaid purposes.’

Section 2, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 902, provides for the appointment of a Price Administrator and provides for processes and procedure to be following in fixing maximum prices of certain commodities, referred to in the act.

Section 202 confers power upon the Administrator to make investigations for the purpose of obtaining information concerning the practices of those engaged in certain businesses, within the meaning of the act. 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 922.

Section 203 provides certain procedures and remedies for the enforcement of the act. 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 923.

Section 204(c) creates an Emergency Court and defines its jurisdiction and powers. 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 924(c).

Section 205(c) prescribes the jurisdiction of courts, other than the Emergency Court, as follows: ‘The district courts shall have jurisdiction of criminal proceedings for violations of section 4 of this Act * * *, and, concurrently with the State and Territorial courts, of all other proceedings under section 205 of this Act.’ 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 925(c).

Section 205(d) provides that the Administrator may intervene in any suit or action, brought in any court, under the act.

Section 205(e) provides, in part: ‘If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, the person who buys such commodity for use or consumption other than in the course of trade or business may bring an action either for $50 or treble the amount by which the consideration exceeded the applicable maximum price, whichever is the greater, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court. * * * Any suit or action under...