Porter v. Bd. of Ret. of the Orange Cnty. Employees' Ret. Sys.
Decision Date | 26 November 2013 |
Docket Number | G047507 |
Citation | 222 Cal.App.4th 335,165 Cal.Rptr.3d 510 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Mary PORTER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BOARD OF RETIREMENT OF the ORANGE COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Defendant and Appellant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
See 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Agency and Employment, § 319.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gregory H. Lewis, Judge. Request for judicial notice. Judgment affirmed. Request for judicial notice granted. (Super.Ct. No. 03CC10643)
David H. Lantzer for Defendant and Appellant.
Faunce, Singer & Oatman, Edward L. Faunce, Fallbrook, and Larry J. Roberts for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This is the third appeal involving payment of disability retirement to plaintiff Mary Porter by defendant Board of Retirement of the Orange County Employees' Retirement System. As with the previous two, this appeal deals with the effective date of plaintiff's disability retirement under of Government Code section 31724 ( ). It arises out of an amended judgment ordering defendant to find plaintiff entitled to disability retirement from the day following her last day of regular employment, “without any offset for sick leave or workers' compensation temporary disability payments....”
Defendant contends the trial court erred in relying on section 31646.1 to find workers' compensation benefits did not qualify as “compensation” within the meaning of section 31724's statement that a disabled worker's retirement becomes “effective on the expiration date of any leave of absence with compensation to which he shall become entitled under the provisions of Division 4 (commencing with Section 3201) of the Labor Code” and asserts a variety of reasons why the contrary conclusion is correct. Finding none of these arguments persuasive, we grant plaintiff's request for judicial notice of portions of section 31724's legislative history and affirm the judgment.
We incorporate some of facts from Porter v. Board of Retirement of the Orange County Employees' Retirement System (June 18, 2008, G038450) (nonpub. opn.) ( Porter 2 ) and insert facts relating to this particular appeal where relevant.
( Porter 2, supra, G038450.) We dismissed the appeal as premature.
Upon remand, the trial court entered a second amended judgment noting defendant's concession during oral argument “that the only type of payment that it seeks to have [plaintiff] repay is temporary disability.” It then returned the matter to defendant to determine when and how much plaintiff received in temporary disability benefits, and plaintiff's “ability to repay these benefits.” Defendant adopted the hearing officer's findings that plaintiff received “workers' compensation temporary total disability payments between February 23, 2000 and June 21, 2000” and that she did not believe she could repay that amount.
Plaintiff filed a motion in the superior court seeking to have her disability retirement deemed effective date as of the day after she last received regular compensation, not when her workers' compensation temporary disability pay expired. She argued she had not been on a “leave of absence with compensation” as required by section 31724 because she was not a safety employee who would be entitled to full salary for a year with contributions made to her retirement plan under Labor Code section 4850. To help define “compensation” as used in section 31724, she cited section 31646.1, which, among other things, describes an uncompensated leave of absence as one in which the employee receives temporary disability benefits. Plaintiff asserted her temporary disability payments could not be deemed a “leave of absence with compensation” in light of section 31646.1.
The court agreed, reasoning section 31646.1's reference “to an ‘uncompensated leave of absence ... for which the member receives temporary disability benefits' ... supports a finding that ‘temporary disability benefits' do not qualify as ‘compensation.’ ” It entered a third amended judgment ordering defendant to set aside its decision denying plaintiff an earlier retirement date and to find her entitled to disability retirement from February 15, 2000, the day following her last day of regular employment, with no “offsets for sick leave or workers' compensation temporary disability payments.”
Under section 31724, the retirement of a permanently disabled member of the retirement system shall be “effective on the expiration date of any leave of absence with compensation to which he shall become entitled under the provisions of Division 4 (commencing with Section 3201) of the Labor Code or effective on the occasion of the member's consent to retirement prior to the expiration of such leave of absence with compensation....” (Italics added.) The parties disagree about the meaning of the italicized language, with defendant asserting its plain meaning requires plaintiff's disability retirement to begin after her workers' compensation benefits expired on June 22, 2000 and plaintiff responding that the phrase applies only to “leaves that expressly provide for compensation, e.g., the leave granted public safety officers pursuant to section 4850[, subdivision] (a) of the Labor Code....”
“ ” (Rodarte v. Orange County Fire Authority (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 19, 22, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 475.) “Any ambiguity or uncertainty in the meaning of pension legislation must be resolved in favor of the pensioner, but such construction must be consistent with the clear language and purpose of the statute.” (Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v. Board of Retirement (1997) 16 Cal.4th 483, 490, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 304, 940 P.2d 891.)
Defendant contends the plain meaning of the phrase “leave of absence with compensation” in section 31724 shows it applies to plaintiff because “compensation” is defined broadly under Division 4 of the Labor Code ( ) to include workers' compensation benefits (see Lab.Code, § 3207 [] ) and the ordinary meaning of “ ‘leave of absence’ ” is “ ‘permission to be absent from duty or employment.’ ” We disagree.
Nothing in section 31724 indicates the above definition of “compensation” is the one to be used in determining “the expiration date of any leave of absence with compensation to which he shall become entitled under the provisions of Division 4 (commencing with Section 3201) of the Labor Code....” Section 31724 does not so state. For example, it does not read “any leave of absence in which the member receives compensation under the workers' compensation act.” Nor does it say “any leave of absence in which the member receives compensation as defined under Division 4 of the Labor Code.” Rather, it limits the “leave of absence with compensation” to one to which the member “shall become entitled” under Division 4 of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial