Porter v. City of Riverside

• Decision Date: 06 May 1968
• Citation: 68 Cal.Rptr. 313,261 Cal.App.2d 832
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Earl W. PORTER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF RIVERSIDE, a Municipal corporation, Daniel R. O'Connor, Controller of the City of Riverside and Harold Brewer, Treasurer of the City of Riverside, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 8676.

Page 313

68 Cal.Rptr. 313

261 Cal.App.2d 832

Earl W. PORTER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF RIVERSIDE, a Municipal corporation, Daniel R. O'Connor, Controller of the City of Riverside and Harold Brewer, Treasurer of the City of Riverside, Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 8676.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

May 6, 1968.

[261 Cal.App.2d 833] John Woodhead, City Attorney, O'Melveny & Myers and Howard J. Deards, Los Angeles, for defendants and appellants.

Henry W. Coil, Sr., Riverside, amicus curiae in behalf of defendants and appellants.

[261 Cal.App.2d 834] Thompson & Colegate and Michael R. Raftery, Riverside, for plaintiff and respondent.

OPINION

KERRIGAN, Acting Presiding Justice.

The Charter of the City of Riverside was prepared by a Board of Freeholders, adopted by the electors, approved by the Legislature, and became effective in April 1953. The Charter provision relating to councilmen's expenses reads as follows:

'Sec. 402. Compensation; reimbursement for expenses.

'The members of the city council shall receive No compensation for their services As such, but shall receive reimbursement on order of the city council for council-authorized traveling and other expenses when on official duty. In addition, each member shall receive such amount as may be fixed by ordinance, which amount shall be deemed to be reimbursement of other out-of-pocket expenditures and costs imposed upon him in serving as a city councilman.' (Emphasis supplied).

In May 1953, the council held its inaugural meeting and adopted an ordinance fixing each councilman's expense allowance in the sum of $200 per month. Therafter, in July 1955, the council adopted Ordinance No. 2226, which increased the councilmen's expense allowance to $250 monthly. Ten years later, in August 1965, the council passed Ordinance No. 3300, which recited that the councilmen's original expense allowance was $200; that it was thereafter increased to $250 monthly; that inflation and greater demands on councilmen had resulted in an increase in out-of-pocket expenses; that the sum of $350 per month represented reasonable costs expenditures incurred by councilmen; that the expense allowance be increased to $350 monthly; and that the $350 'be paid monthly without presentation of any claim.'

In September 1965 the plaintiff filed this action, and the allegations of the complaint may be briefly summarized in the following manner: that Ordinance No. 3300 requires the payment to each councilman of $350 monthly 'as purported reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses without presentation of any claim, voucher, proof of payment of proof of authorization of such expenses by the council'; that such payment 'as reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses not shown to be expended is, in fact, payment of compensation as prohibited by the Riverside City Charter'; that such payment will increase the burden of taxation in an unlawful manner; to wit, the payment of compensation to each City Councilman in direct violation of the Charter provisions of the City of Riverside.' No allegations were contained in the complaint attacking the Council's finding that the amount of out-of-pocket expenditures were at least $350 as being so unreasonable as to constitute arbitrary action or constructive fraud. Nor was there an allegation that the council acted in bad faith with improper motives in that $350 per month was in excess of actual expenses. Thus, the attack on the ordinance was based on the premise that section 402 of the Charter was violated in the event the $350 additional allowance authorized by Ordinance No. 3300 was paid without requiring the presentation of itemized claims and vouchers showing actual expenditures. The complaint prayed that the city be restrained from paying the $350 per month to the councilmen 'as reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses without requiring proof of the nature of said * * * expenses, the amount thereof, and that they are actually incurred * * *.'

Defendants filed a general and special demurrer to the complaint. The demurrer was overruled and defendants answered.

During trial, the court permitted the introduction of evidence at plaintiff's counsel's request as to the actual monthly expenses incurred by members of the city council. The seven councilmen's expenses ranged from $150 to $555. From the evidence thus presented, the trial court determined that the $350 allowance fixed in Ordinance No. 3300 was 'in excess of the actual and allowable out-of-pocket expenses and costs * * *' incurred 'and does * * * include compensation for services rendered by the City Councilmen * * *.' Judgment was therefore rendered in favor of the plaintiff wherein it was decreed: (1) Riverside City Ordinance No. 3300 was invalid in its entirety as violative of section 402 of the Riverside City Charter; (2) Ordinance No. 2226 (the prior ordinance authorizing $250 per month allowance) was valid and binding; and (3) defendants be restrained from paying the members of the City Council $350 per month pursuant to Ordinacne No. 3300, 'but that said injunction shall not, and does not, restrain or enjoin defendants from paying to the members of said City Council the sums provided by said Ordinance No. 2226 or any other sum provided to be paid by any subsequent amendment of said Ordinance No. 2226 or any subsequent ordinance of the City of Riverside. * * *'

Defendants' assault on the judgment is stated in varying forms, which may be categorized in the following manner: (1) The complaint fails to state a cause of action; (2) the findings went beyond the issues framed by the pleadings; (3) the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of evidence relating to the councilmen's actual expenses; (4) insufficiency of the evidence to support the findings; and (5) the action is barred by reason of plaintiff's laches, unclean hands, and political motives.

Stated simply, the sole, crucial issue on appeal is whether Ordinance No. 3300 is valid under section 402 of the Charter.

An ordinance stands in the same relationship to a city charter as does a statute to the constitution of the state. Thus, charter provisions constitute the organic law or local constitution of the city. (In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 82, 88 P. 270, 17 L.R.A.,N.S., 1092; Dalton v. Lelande, 22 Cal.App. 481, 487, 135 P. 54.) The same presumptions that favor the constitutionality of state legislative enactments apply also to ordinances. (11 Cal.Jur.2d, Const.Law, § 74, pp. 407--408.) Every presumption is in favor of constitutionality and the invalidity of a legislative act must be clear before it can be declared unconstitutional. (35 Cal.Jur.2d, Mun.Corp., § 416, p. 223.) The action of the Legislature will be upheld by the courts unless beyond its powers, 'or its judgment or discretion is being fraudulently or corruptly exercised.' (Nickerson v. County of San Bernardino, 179 Cal. 518, 522--523, 177 P. 465, 467; Wine v. Boyar, 220 Cal.App.2d 375, 381--382, 33 Cal.Rptr. 787.)

When the right to enact a law depends upon the existence of a fact, the passage of the act implies, and the conclusive presumption is, that the Legislature performed its duty and ascertained the existence of the fact before enacting and approving the law--a decision which the courts have no right to question or review. (Robins v. County of Los Angeles, 248 Cal.App.2d 1, 6, 56 Cal.Rptr. 853; Taylor v. Cole, 201 Cal. 327, 336--337, 257 P. 40; Smith v. Mathews, 155 Cal. 752, 756, 103 P. 199.) Not only must the legislative act be reviewed in the light of every presumption favorable to its constitutionality, but the court must limit itself to a consideration of such matters as appear on the face of the enactment (Alameda etc. Water Conservation Dist. v. Stanley, 121 Cal.App.2d 308, 315, 263 P.2d 632; People ex rel. Chapman v. Sacramento Drainage Dist., 155 Cal. 373, 386, 103 P. 207), together with those facts which are matters of judicial cognizance. (Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Hamilton, 177 Cal. 119, 125, 169 P. 1028; City of Ojai v. Chaffee, 60 Cal.App.2d 54, 61, 140 P.2d 116...