Porter v. City of Dall.
| Decision Date | 03 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:20-CV-0999-B |
| Parties | LATOYA K. PORTER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF DALLAS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court is Plaintiff Latoya Porter's Motion to Remand for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. 23). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion and REMANDS this case to the 14th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas.
This is an employment discrimination case brought by Plaintiff Latoya Porter ("Porter") against Defendant City of Dallas ("the City") concerning a series of the City's actions that Porter alleges were "motivated by retaliatory/discriminatory intent." Doc. 19, Second Am. Compl., ¶ 5. Specifically, this case concerns the termination of Porter's employment with the Dallas Police Department ("the DPD"). See generally id. Porter initially brought this action against the City and the DPD in Texas state court on October 25, 2019. See generally Doc. 1-3, Original Pet. On its face, Porter's "state court petition made no reference to federal claims[.]" Doc. 23, Pl.'s Mot., 2; seegenerally Doc. 1-3. Original Pet.; Doc. 1-26, Am. Pet. However, the City removed the case to this Court "on April 22, 2020, after obtaining interrogatory responses referencing federal claims." Doc. 23, Pl.'s Mot., 2; see generally Doc. 1, Notice of Removal. In the time since the case was removed, this Court has issued some standard case-management orders, including a status report order (Doc. 8), scheduling order (Doc. 10), and mediation order (Doc. 12). The Court also issued a four-page memorandum opinion and order denying Porter's motion to remand, which was brought on procedural grounds (timeliness). Doc. 7, Mem. Op. & Order, 2-3.
On November 25, 2020, the DPD filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, invoking sovereign immunity. Doc. 13, DPD's Mot., 3-4. Porter never responded to DPD's motion due to an illness that abruptly forced Porter's counsel to retire from the practice of law. See Doc. 15, Pl.'s Mot. to Withdraw & Substitute Counsel, 1; Doc. 23, Pl.'s Mot., 2. After Porter obtained new counsel, and with leave of the Court and Defendants, Porter filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 19). Porter's Second Amended Complaint dismissed the DPD as a party and removed any federal claims, asserting only claims under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. See generally Doc. 19, Second Am. Compl. This rendered the DPD's motion for judgment on the pleadings moot. Doc. 20, Elec. Order.
On April 2, 2021, Porter filed this motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See generally Doc. 23, Pl.'s Mot. The City filed its response (Doc. 33) on April 28, 2021, and Porter filed a reply (Doc. 35) in support of her motion on May 12, 2021. Porter's motion is ripe for review.
"District courts enjoy wide discretion in determining whether to retain supplementaljurisdiction over a state claim once all federal claims are dismissed." Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993). In determining whether to maintain jurisdiction over the remaining state claims, "courts should exercise their discretion in a way that best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 456 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)). The Court must also consider the statutory factors set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), namely, "(1) whether the state claims raise novel or complex issues of state law; (2) whether the state claims substantially predominate over the federal claims; (3) whether the federal claims have been dismissed; and (4) whether there are exceptional circumstances or other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction." Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). In the usual case, once all federal claims have been dismissed from an action, these factors counsel in favor of remanding the remaining state-law claims. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) .
After considering the common-law and statutory factors, the Court finds that remand is proper in this case.
In deciding whether to maintain jurisdiction over remaining state claims in this case, the Court first considers the four common-law factors set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Carnegie-Mellon: (1) judicial economy, (2) convenience, (3) fairness, and (4) comity. 484 U.S. at357; see Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159. These factors favor remanding this case.
"Judicial economy favors remand when 'at the time the federal claims were deleted hardly any federal judicial resources, let alone a significant amount of resources, had been devoted to the district court's consideration of the Texas state-law claims (or to any claims).'" Marshall v. MarOpCo, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 562, 572 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (quoting Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159).
The City argues that judicial economy weighs against remand because the "parties agreed on a mediator, submitted joint status reports, engaged in motion practice and discovery, and this Court has issued multiple orders . . . ." Doc. 33, Def.'s Resp., 9. The City further argues this case is akin to Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2008)—wherein the Fifth Circuit held that judicial economy favored maintaining jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims—because "the present case has been pending before this Court for a year." Doc. 33, Def.'s Resp., 9. However, the City appears to disregard that while the Fifth Circuit noted that the case "had been pending for well over a year," it also based its holding on the facts that "the discovery deadline had passed, . . . the parties had fully briefed [a] motion for summary judgment[,] . . . [and] [t]he trial court ha[d] 'substantial familiarity with the merits of the case[.]'" Mendoza, 532 F.3d 347 (quoting Parker, 972 F.2d at 587). Due to the combination of these facts, the Fifth Circuit found "it was reasonable to conclude that 'further proceedings in the district court would prevent redundancy and conserve scarce judicial resources.'" Id. (quoting Batiste v. Island Records, Inc., 179 F.3d 217, 228 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Though the present case has been pending in federal court for over a year, the Court agrees with Porter that "this case is still at an early stage," as all the activity that has taken place has been "procedural rather than substantive." Doc. 23, Pl.'s Mot., 2. This Court is not "intimately familiar"with the merits of the case, as it has not had an occasion to consider the claims or defenses of the parties. See Hicks v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 564 F. App'x 747, 748 (5th Cir. 2014) ). The discovery deadline has not yet passed, and the Court has not involved itself with discovery issues. See Doc. 27, Am. Scheduling Order. "[H]ardly any federal judicial resources . . . ha[ve] been devoted to the Court's consideration of" Porter's claims, see Marshall, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 572, and there is no reason to conclude that "further proceedings in the district court would prevent redundancy and conserve scarce judicial resources." Mendoza, 532 F.3d at 347 (quoting Batiste, 179 F.3d at 227). Thus, the Court finds that this factor favors remand.
The convenience factor in this case is neutral, as neither forum is meaningfully more convenient than the other. In considering convenience, the Fifth Circuit contemplates the relative locations of the parties, witnesses, and evidence to the forums. See Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160. And as Porter points out, the "federal and state courts are . . . located within a few blocks of one another in downtown Dallas." Doc. 23, Pl.'s Mot., 4. Thus, in regard to location, there is no difference in convenience. Insofar as the City argues that remand would be inconvenient because "discovery is underway, a scheduling order is in place, and trial is scheduled," Doc. 33, Def.'s Resp., 9, the Court finds that such inconvenience is trivial. Indeed, "remand would not . . . cause[] any financial inconvenience to the parties because they [will] not have . . . to duplicate any of their previous efforts or expenses" beyond the negligible task of rescheduling. Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160. Accordingly, the Court finds that any difference in convenience between federal and state court is insignificant and that this factor is neutral.
In considering fairness, the City argues that "[r]emand may open the door for [Porter] to reassert federal claims, leaving no removal available to the City." Doc. 33, Def.'s Resp., 10. It adds that "[r]emand would further delay a trial on the merits, as the Dallas County district courts are already facing a backlog in jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic" and that the City has already "dedicated significant resources to pursuing its defense in federal court." Id. Despite the City's concerns, however, it is "certainly fair to have . . . purely Texas state law claims heard in Texas state court, and there is nothing to indicate that either party would [be] prejudiced by a remand to Texas state court." Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160 (citation omitted).
The City's allegations of unfairness are unavailing. As discussed, this case is at an early stage, and the Court is thus skeptical of the City's assertion that it has "dedicated significant resources to pursuing its defense in federal court." Doc. 33, Def.'s Resp., 10. Nonetheless, as also discussed, the majority of the City's alleged expenses will not have to be duplicated, and remand will therefore not entail any unfairness in that regard. And the Court does...
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