Porter v. Clarke

• Citation: 923 F.3d 348
• Decision Date: 03 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. 18-6257,18-6257
• Parties: Thomas PORTER; Anthony Bernard Juniper; Mark Lawlor, Plaintiffs - Appellees, and Ricky Gray; Ivan Teleguz, Plaintiffs, v. Harold W. CLARKE; David Zook, Defendants - Appellants. American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Incorporated; The Rutherford Institute; Professors and Practitioners of Psychiatry and Psychology, Amici Supporting Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

923 F.3d 348

Thomas PORTER; Anthony Bernard Juniper; Mark Lawlor, Plaintiffs - Appellees,andRicky Gray; Ivan Teleguz, Plaintiffs,

v. Harold W. CLARKE; David Zook, Defendants - Appellants.American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Incorporated; The Rutherford Institute; Professors and Practitioners of Psychiatry and Psychology, Amici Supporting Appellee.

No. 18-6257

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: December 13, 2018

Decided: May 3, 2019

Amended: May 6, 2019

ARGUED: Matthew Robert McGuire, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Catherine Emily Stetson, HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, Victoria N. Pearson, Deputy Attorney General, Margaret Hoehl O’Shea, Assistant Attorney General, Toby J. Heytens, Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Kathryn M. Ali, Yuri Fuchs, Elizabeth C. Lockwood, W. David Maxwell, Ryan J. Stephenson, HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP, Washington, D.C.; Victor M. Glasberg, VICTOR M. GLASBERG & ASSOC., Alexandria, Virginia; Steven D. Rosenfield, Jeffrey E. Fogel, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellees. David W. DeBruin, Washington, D.C., Jeffrey A. Atteberry, JENNER & BLOCK LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amici American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Virginia, Inc. and The Rutherford Institute. Eden Heilman, Claire Guthrie Gastañaga, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF VIRGINIA, INC., Richmond, Virginia, for Amicus American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Virginia, Inc. John W. Whitehead, Doug R. McKusick, THE RUTHERFORD INSTITUTE, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Amicus The Rutherford Institute. Daniel M. Greenfield, Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER SCHOOL OF LAW, Chicago, Illinois, for Amici Curiae Professors and Practitioners of Psychiatry and Psychology.

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Judge King joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting opinion.

WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Defendants Harold W. Clarke, in his official capacity as director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, and David Zook, in his official capacity as warden of Virginia’s Sussex I State Prison (collectively, "State Defendants"), appeal a decision by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia holding that conditions of confinement on Virginia’s death row violated the Eighth Amendment and enjoining reinstatement of those conditions. The district court held that the death row inmates’ long-term detention in conditions amounting to solitary confinement created a "substantial risk" of psychological and emotional harm and that State Defendants were "deliberately indifferent" to that risk. See Porter v. Clarke , 290 F.Supp.3d 518, 530–33 (E.D. Va. 2018). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

Plaintiffs Thomas Porter, Anthony Juniper, and Mark Lawlor (collectively, "Plaintiffs") are housed on Virginia’s death row at Sussex I State Prison ("Sussex Prison"). Death row consists of two tiers, with each tier holding twenty-two cells and three showers. Porter , 290 F.Supp.3d at 522. Each death row inmate is housed in a separate cell, and no inmates are housed in adjacent cells. Each cell is 71 square feet—approximately one-half the size of a parking space—and has a 10.5-foot-high ceiling. Cells contain a bed, a small desk adjacent to the bed, and a commode/sink combination. Each cell has a window that is 5 inches high by 41.5 inches long, which is covered by a wire mesh that allows natural light to pass through into the cell. Each cell’s door is made of solid steel, includes a tray slot that is bolted shut when not in use, and a "rectangular in-set window that allow[s] inmates to look outside their cell into the pod." Id. at 523.

In November 2014—when Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit—two documents governed Plaintiffs’ conditions of confinement on death row: Virginia Department of Corrections ("Corrections Department") Operating Procedure 460A, effective March 2010, and the Sussex Prison Institutional Rules and Regulations for Offenders, effective February 2010. These procedures and regulations allowed death row inmates one hour of outdoor recreation five days a week, and a ten-minute shower three days a week. During their outdoor recreation, inmates were confined to individual enclosures with concrete floors and enclosed by a steel and wire mesh cage. Each enclosure measured 7.9 feet wide by 20 feet long—approximately the size of a parking space—and 10 feet high. Id. None of the enclosures had exercise equipment. Inmates could not simultaneously use adjacent recreation enclosures.

Under the governing procedures and regulations, cells on death row were always lit: during the day, cells were illuminated by a main light mounted on the wall, and at night a low-level night light provided illumination for security and safety purposes. Inmates housed on death row could keep a television and compact disc player in their cell and borrow approved publications and library materials to read. Additionally, inmates could request and use wireless telephones any day of the week between 8:00 a.m. and 9:30 p.m.

The governing regulations and procedures allowed death row inmates to have noncontact visitation on weekends and state holidays. Inmates also could request contact visitation with immediate family members in "extreme circumstances" once every six months, which request the warden had unconstrained discretion to grant or deny. J.A. 997. In practice, the warden would grant a request for contact visitation only when an inmate was approaching "death." J.A. 997. Additionally, inmates had limited contact with prison staff. Corrections officers made rounds through the death row pod to perform security checks on inmates every thirty minutes and could—and sometimes would—speak with inmates to see if they needed assistance or had requests. Medical personnel and nurses also made rounds through the pod twice a day to provide inmates with medication. And death row inmates received visits from a mental-health practitioner at least once a week, and case counselors made rounds through the pod once a day.

Two inmates housed on death row, Plaintiff Porter and former Plaintiff Ricky Gray,¹ were allowed out of their cells to perform institutional jobs. "Other than these limited out-of-cell interactions, death row inmates were generally not permitted to leave their cells." Porter , 290 F.Supp.3d at 523. "In particular, they were denied access to any form of congregate recreation, either indoor or outdoor; they were not allowed to eat meals outside of their cells; and they could not participate in congregate religious services or prison programming." Id. Due to these restrictions, death row inmates spent between 23 and 24 hours per day in their cells. Id. at 528.

In November 2014, Plaintiffs filed suit against Clarke, in his official capacity as director of the Corrections Department, and Keith Davis, who, at that time, served as warden of Sussex Prison. Plaintiffs alleged that the then-existing conditions of confinement on Virginia’s death row violated the Eighth Amendment and sought injunctive and declaratory relief.

On February 21, 2018, the district court awarded summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor on their Eighth Amendment claim. Porter , 290 F.Supp.3d at 533. In reaching that conclusion, the district court held that, under the undisputed evidence, the conditions of confinement on Virginia’s death row—particularly inmates’ prolonged periods of isolation—"created, at the least, a significant risk of substantial psychological or emotional harm." Id. at 532. The district court further held that, under the undisputed evidence, that State Defendants were "deliberate[ly] indifferen[t]" to that risk of harm. Id. at 533. The district court awarded Plaintiffs injunctive and declaratory relief, concluding that such relief was available under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") and was necessary because there "exist[ed] some cognizable danger of recurrent violation." Id. at 534–42 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co. , 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953) ). State Defendants timely appealed.

II.

On appeal, State Defendants argue that the district court erred (A) in awarding summary judgment to Plaintiffs on their Eighth Amendment claim and (B) in awarding Plaintiffs injunctive relief. We address each argument in turn.

A.

At the outset, State Defendants argue that the district court erred in awarding Plaintiffs summary judgment on their Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim. Summary judgment is proper when there are no material disputes of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This Court reviews de novo a district court’s award of summary judgment. United States v. Ancient Coin Collectors Guild , 899 F.3d 295, 312 (4th Cir. 2018).

The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments," U.S. Const. amend. VIII, applies to claims by prisoners against corrections officials challenging conditions of confinement. See Scinto v. Stansberry , 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to ‘provide humane conditions of confinement ... [and] ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care." (quoting Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) )); Williams v. Benjamin , 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). Whether an inmate’s conditions of confinement amount to "cruel and unusual punishment" must be measured against "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles , 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2...