Porter v. First Nat. Bank

• Decision Date: 06 December 1928
• Parties: PORTER, Tax Collector v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF PANAMA CITY.[*]
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

119 So. 130

96 Fla. 740

PORTER, Tax Collector v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF PANAMA CITY.^[*]

Florida Supreme Court

December 6, 1928

En Banc.

Suit between C. T. Porter, as Tax Collector of Bay County, and the First National Bank of Panama City. Decree for the latter and former appeals.

Reversed.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Bay County; Ira A Hutchison, judge.

COUNSEL

Fred H Davis, Atty Gen., and H. E. Carter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

J. M. Sapp, of Panama City, for appellee.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

This appeal is from a decree perpetually enjoining the tax collector of Bay county from collecting taxes levied for the years 1925 and 1926 upon the capital stock of a national bank. The court held that, under the provisions of section 1, art. 9, of the Constitution of Florida, as amended in 1924, intangible property was not assessable in 1925 and 1926 at a higher rate than 5 mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation, and that, as no statute authorizes such a special levy on intangible property as distinguished from tangible property, the levy is invalid, the capital stock of the bank being held to be intangible property.

The constitutional provision as amended is as follows:

Section 1. 'The Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation (except that it may provide for special rate or rates on intangible property, but such special rate or rates shall not exceed five mills on the dollar of the assessed valuation of such intangible property, which special rate or rates, of the taxes collected therefrom, may be apportioned by the Legislature, and shall be exclusive of all other State, County, district and municipal taxes;) and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes.'

The language contained in the parenthesis was incorporated in the organic section by adoption at the general election in November, 1924.

Prior to the amendment, the organic law required 'a uniform and equal rate of taxation' upon 'all property, both real and personal, excepting such property as may be exempted by law for municipal, educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes'; no distinction being made by the laws of the state between tangible and intangible property for taxation purposes. 'All public stocks or shares in all incorporated or unincorporated companies' are by the statute classed as 'personal property,' and made subject to taxation as other personal property and real property. Section 696, Revised General Statutes 1920; section 896, Compiled General Laws 1927.

The amendment of section 1, art. 9, became 'a part of the Constitution,' upon its being adopted at the general election in November, 1924, section 1, art. 17; Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 34 Fla. 500, 16 So. 410; but the effect and operation of the amendment depend upon its terms and purposes. Manifestly the amendment incorporated in section 1 of article 9, is intended to operate, upon appropriate legislation duly enacted, as an exception to the organic general rule of uniformity and equality in the rate of taxation. The amendment gives the Legislature permission to make an exception to the general rule of uniformity and equality as to the rate of taxation on all property not exempt from taxation, by providing for special tax rates 'on intangible property,' and commands that 'such special rate...