Porter v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.
| Decision Date | 03 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 5–12–0464.,5–12–0464. |
| Citation | 382 Ill.Dec. 98,2014 IL App (5th) 120464,12 N.E.3d 98 |
| Parties | Michael PORTER, as Special Administrator of the Estates of Tina Porter, Deceased, and Allaysa Porter, Deceased, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
¶ 1 This is a wrongful death action brought against the Illinois Central Railroad Company (Illinois Central) by Michael Porter, as special administrator of the estates of Tina Porter, deceased, and Allaysa Porter, deceased. The decedents died as a result of a collision between the motor vehicle in which they were traveling and an Illinois Central freight train on November 20, 2006, at a crossing in the Village of Marissa (the Village).
¶ 2 At the time of the collision, the railroad crossing was equipped only with luminous flashing light signals. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant was negligent in failing to equip the railroad crossing with automatic gates. The defendant responds that, because the flashing light signals had been installed pursuant to the approval and order of the Illinois Commerce Commission, statute dictates that they must be deemed adequate and appropriate and the railroad cannot be found negligent for having failed to install gates.
¶ 3 The case comes before us pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). The circuit court certified the following two questions for our review:
¶ 4 We will address these questions in reverse order, answering the second question first. Because a question certified by the circuit court to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 must involve only a question of law, our review is de novo. Tri–Power Resources, Inc. v. City of Carlyle, 2012 IL App (5th) 110075, ¶ 9, 359 Ill.Dec. 781, 967 N.E.2d 811.
¶ 5 Under subchapter 7 of the Illinois Commercial Transportation Law (the Act) ( 625 ILCS 5/18c–7101 et seq. (West 2008)), the Illinois Commerce Commission (the Commission) has exclusive jurisdiction over all rail carrier operations in the state. Pursuant to that jurisdiction, the Commission has exclusive power to set safety requirements for railway track, facilities, and equipment. 625 ILCS 5/18c–7401 (West 2008). Section 18c–7401(3) provides as follows:
" (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/18c–7401(3) (West 2008).
¶ 6 Our supreme court has definitively held that this statutory section establishes that, once the Commission has investigated a crossing and has approved the installation of a luminous flashing signal, then the installation of that device shall be deemed adequate and appropriate and a conclusive legal presumption is created which prevents a plaintiff from arguing that the railroad should have installed other warning devices. See Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill.2d 107, 121, 208 Ill.Dec. 662, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995) ; Chandler v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 207 Ill.2d 331, 342, 278 Ill.Dec. 340, 798 N.E.2d 724 (2003).
¶ 7 On July 10, 1962, pursuant to power vested in it by section 18c–7401(3), the Commission had entered an order approving the presence of only luminous flashing light signals at the railroad crossing in question. The plaintiff does not dispute that the Commission made the requisite investigation and gave its approval pursuant to section 18c–7401(3) in 1962. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the railroad crossing in question was equipped with luminous flashing light signals and that the signals were working properly at the time of the collision. Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that the defendant had a duty to use reasonable care to install automatic gates at the crossing in addition to the luminous flashing light signals and that it breached this duty, resulting in the deaths of the decedents.
¶ 8 The plaintiff premises his argument on the fact that, prior to the collision, at the request of the citizens of the Village, the Commission had investigated the crossing and determined that it did meet the minimum requirements for adding automatic gates. While the Commission had not taken formal action on this determination at the time of the collision, it had made its determination known by way of a letter from Michael Stead, Rail Safety Program Administrator, to a local congressman dated August 15, 2005. The letter indicated that the proposed improvements were scheduled to be installed in fiscal year 2010 and that the Commission would contact the Village and the defendant railroad as fiscal year 2010 approached. The defendant railroad received a copy of this letter. In the meantime, the flashing light signals installed pursuant to the 1962 approval and order of the Commission would remain.
¶ 9 The accident occurred on November 20, 2006. Immediately thereafter, the Commission, through Michael Stead, its Rail Safety Program Administrator, notified the local congressman that it was working with the Village and the defendant railroad to expedite a project to install automatic gates at the crossing. In that letter, the Commission, through Stead, advised that it anticipated that:
According to Stead, the railroad had no authority to install the automatic gates without an order of the Commission. Such an order was entered by the Commission on August 29, 2007.
¶ 10 The plaintiff argues that Stead's letter of August 15, 2005, stating that the crossing met the minimum requirements for installation of automatic gates, somehow revoked the Commission's 1962 order approving the installation of luminous flashing light signals at the crossing and, because they were no longer "approved," they could no longer be deemed "adequate and appropriate." The plaintiff argues that Stead's letter of August 15, 2005, indicates that the Commission had "approved" the installation of automatic gates at the crossing and the presumption of adequacy and appropriateness no longer applied to the luminous flashing lights. We reject the plaintiff's argument.
¶ 11 The parties argue at length in their briefs about whether Commission "approval" of protective devices requires an "order" of the Commission. The plaintiff argues that Commission approval and an order are two different things and that, despite the absence of an "order" requiring the installation of automatic gates at the crossing, the Commission had "approved" the installation of automatic gates as indicated by Stead's letter of August 15, 2005. We understand the plaintiff's argument to be that "approval" by the Commission of the automatic gates somehow revoked the Commission's "approval" of the already installed luminous flashing light signals, thereby removing the statutory presumption that the signals were "adequate and appropriate."
¶ 12 We find no need to discuss the difference between a Commission "order" and Commission "approval." The statutory language establishing the presumption speaks in terms of protective devices "installed" at grade crossings, which have been approved by the Commission. It seems to us that the key word here is "installed." Once installed pursuant to Commission approval, the protective devices retain the presumption of adequacy and appropriateness until they are replaced. They do not lose the presumption simply because a future change has been approved or ordered by the Commission. Our interpretation of the statute is consistent with the statutory scheme and with existing case law.
¶ 13 In Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill.2d 107, 208 Ill.Dec. 662, 649 N.E.2d 1323 (1995), our supreme court discussed the language of section 18c–7401(3) of the Act which provides that installed and approved luminous flashing signal devices at grade crossings shall be deemed adequate and appropriate. The court stated:
(Emphasis added.) Espinoza, 165 Ill.2d at 121, 208 Ill.Dec. 662, 649...
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