Porter v. Madrid State Bank
| Decision Date | 10 June 1912 |
| Citation | 136 N.W. 666,155 Iowa 617 |
| Parties | AMY PORTER, Appellant, v. MADRID STATE BANK |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Boone District Court.--HON. C. G. LEE, Judge.
ACTION to recover back $ 259.44 with interest, as the amount overpaid in the discharge of a note. There was a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount claimed, and she appeals from the ruling of the court sustaining a motion for a new trial.
Affirmed.
Stevens Fry & Stevens, for appellant.
Harpel & Cedarquist, for appellee.
Many grounds for new trial were alleged in plaintiff's motion but the court recited in its rulings sustaining the motion that it did so as to the first and second grounds thereof, and these are the only grounds which need be considered. They are, first, "that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence"; and, second, "that the verdict is a result of a failure on the part of the jury to comprehend and understand the evidence, and is one that no reasonable man understanding and comprehending the evidence would agree to as just and correct."
I. It is conceded for appellant that this court on appeal is reluctant to interfere with the exercise of a discretion by the trial court in granting a new trial, but it is claimed that where there is such conflict in the evidence as to take the case to the jury--that is, where the evidence is such that a directed verdict would not be warranted--the granting of a new trial on account of insufficiency of the evidence is necessarily erroneous. We do not so understand the numerous rulings of this court sustaining the lower court in the granting of new trials. On the other hand, it has been specifically decided that, although the evidence is conflicting and the case was properly submitted to the jury, the court may, in the exercise of a sound discretion and on reasonable grounds of belief that an erroneous verdict has been reached, grant a new trial in order that the facts may be passed upon by another jury. It does not necessarily follow that the court might persist in granting new trials, and thus defeat recovery by a party who is able to satisfy successive juries that he is entitled to a verdict. We might reasonably hold that it was an abuse of discretion to set aside a second verdict to the same effect on the same evidence. Some force may reasonably be given to the concurrence of two or more juries in reaching the same result. See Grimmelman v. Union Pacific R. Co., 101 Iowa 74, 70 N.W. 90; Slocum v. Knosby, 80 Iowa 368, 45 N.W. 877, and cases there cited. The rule which affects the exercise of discretion on the part of this court in interfering with concurring verdicts should be taken into account by the trial court in granting a new trial under similar circumstances.
But we have repeatedly held that we will not interfere with the action of the lower court in granting a new trial where there is reasonable ground to believe that an unjust result has been reached which may be obviated on a trial to another jury. Bottineau Land & Loan Co. v. Hintze, 150 Iowa 646, 125 N.W. 842; Brooks v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 115 Iowa 588, 88 N.W. 1089; Hill v. Denslinger, 61 Iowa 240, 12 N.W. 808; Moran v. Harris, 63 Iowa 390, 19 N.W. 278; Engs v. Priest, 65 Iowa 232, 21 N.W. 580; Holman v. Omaha & C. B. R. & B. Co., 110 Iowa 485, 81 N.W. 704.
As against the clear expression of the views of this court on the subject, counsel for appellant rely solely on the case of Hensley v. Davidson Bros. Co., 135 Iowa 106, 112 N.W. 227, but we find nothing in the views expressed in that case by the majority of the court to indicate that there was any intention to override the rule so often announced in previous cases. The effect of the holding of the court in that case was that, after this court has on appeal overruled the lower court in deciding that under the evidence a verdict for a party should not have been directed, the lower court should not on its own motion set aside a verdict against such party on substantially the same evidence. The majority of the court was of the opinion that, when its view as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict had been expressed, the lower court on a second trial of the case should not have disregarded such expression of view by setting aside on its own motion a verdict on the same evidence.
II. As the only question to be determined on this appeal is whether the lower court erred in granting a new trial in view of the evidence presented in the record, we have occasion to state such evidence and our conclusion based thereon only in sufficient detail as may be necessary to justify our conclusions in that respect, without attempting to say whether, if we think a new trial was properly granted, the trial court ought to have directed a verdict for the defendant.
The controversy related to the payment of a note for $ 1,000, due in five years, bearing six percent annual interest, dated January 8, 1902, payable to the defendant bank, and signed by Eva A. Graves and W. P. Graves. There was a stipulation on the note that the makers have the option after three years of paying $ 100, or a multiple thereof, on any interest paying day. This note was secured by a mortgage on a tract of land, which tract was purchased by plaintiff from W. P. Graves, one of the signers of the note, in December, 1906; plaintiff assuming the payment of the mortgage. On the note there were regular indorsements of interest payments annually until and including January 8, 1908, which are not questioned. The remaining indorsement on the note showed payment on January 8, 1909, of interest to that date and $ 300 on the principal. When, in January, 1910, plaintiff, through her agent, undertook to pay off the balance of the note in full, the bank insisted had $ 700 with accrued interest on that amount was due, the aggregate amount claimed being $ 742, while plaintiff insisted that only about $ 482 of principal and interest remained unpaid. Plaintiff paid the amount demanded; the defendant agreeing to repay whatever was unlawfully exacted. This suit is to recover the amount of the alleged overpayment.
Plaintiff and her brother, C. E. Porter, both unmarried, resided on a farm near the town of Madrid, and it would appear from the testimony in this case that C. E. Porter was in the habit of transacting business at the defendant bank for the plaintiff and also for himself. During the two years preceding the final payment of the note of plaintiff to which this controversy relates, C. E. Porter was indebted to the bank on at least two notes given in his own name, one for $ 640, the other for $ 1,400; and it will assist in the proper understanding of the facts hereafter set out if we state that the substantial controversy is as to whether C. E. Porter paid $ 560 on his sister's note on July 30, 1908, for which no credit was indorsed on that note, or whether on that date he paid his own note of $ 640 with some accrued interest, which note is in evidence showing the bank's cancellation stamp as of that date, although, as C. E. Porter insisted, he, in fact, paid this note of his own on a date in September following.
Briefly the testimony of plaintiff and her brother, each corroborating the other as to all material facts, was that on July 30, 1908, plaintiff gave to her brother about $ 310 in cash with...
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