Porter v. Mapleton Electric Light Co.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1921
• Citation: 183 N.W. 803,191 Iowa 1031
• Parties: EARL D. PORTER, Appellee, v. MAPLETON ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY et al., Appellants
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

183 N.W. 803

191 Iowa 1031

EARL D. PORTER, Appellee, v. MAPLETON ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

June 25, 1921

Appeal from Monona District Court.--W. G. SEARS, Judge.

ACTION to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant company while plaintiff was in its employ. Defendant pleaded that both plaintiff and defendant were working under the terms and provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law of Iowa, and that, therefore the district court had no jurisdiction of the parties or the subject-matter. This defense was overruled, and cause submitted to the jury. Verdict finding for plaintiff in the sum of $ 4,500, and judgment was entered accordingly. Defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

John J Nangle and Miles W. Newby, for appellants.

B. H Morrison and Prichard & Prichard, for appellee.

DE GRAFF, J. EVANS, C. J., WEAVER, PRESTON, STEVENS, and FAVILLE, JJ., concur. ARTHUR, J., dissents.

OPINION

DE GRAFF, J.

Plaintiff was regularly and permanently employed, installing telephones and doing line work for the New State Telephone Company at Mapleton, Iowa, and had been in such employment for 18 months prior to his injury. On the day in question, through arrangements made between the manager of the telephone company and the manager of the defendant electric light company, plaintiff had been "loaned" or transferred for special service from the former to the latter company, to assist in resetting a few light poles, in order that certain curbing and paving construction then in progress at Mapleton would not be delayed. The work to which plaintiff had been assigned was temporary, and contemplated about three hours' time. Nothing was said to him, when he was transferred, as to the length of time he would be so employed, what work he was to do, or his wages. He made no arrangements personally with the defendant's manager, but received his instructions from the said manager after "he got on the job." Plaintiff had no prior employment with the defendant company, had never handled wires charged with electricity, and possessed very little knowledge concerning same, although he was an experienced telephone lineman. Before climbing the pole in question to cut the wires, he asked defendant's manager, who was personally supervising the work, whether the wires carried any "juice," to which question plaintiff received a negative answer. In cutting the second wire, which proved to be "alive," he was severely and painfully burned. The material facts in evidence are not in controversy, and plaintiff's allegations of negligence are clearly established.

It is contended that the district court had no jurisdiction of the parties or the subject-matter of this suit, and that the recoverable damage is within the purview of the provisions and terms of the Workmen's Compensation Law of Iowa. This claim is predicated on the proposition that the defendant company had accepted the terms of said statute, and that plaintiff had not rejected its terms prior to his injury. If this contention is sustainable, plaintiff is confined to the remedy provided by the statute. Section 2477-m, Code Supplement, 1913. This is the primary question on this appeal, and the crux of the case.

The term "workman," under this law, means "any person who has entered into the employment of, or works under contract of service, express or implied, or apprenticeship for an employer, except a person whose employment is purely causal or not for the purpose of the employer's trade or business * * * ." Section 2477-m16, Code Supplement, 1913, as amended by Chapter 270, Section 10, Acts of the Thirty-seventh General Assembly.

Was the employment of plaintiff, under the facts of this case, "purely casual?" If it was, then it is wholly immaterial whether or not his employment was "for the purpose of the employer's trade or business."

This case presents a question of legal definition, and the application of such definition to the facts. To define a term is to state its connotation or to enumerate the attributes which it implies, and it must take account of the whole class to which it belongs, and nothing but the class. A definition, then, is such a description of the thing defined, including all essential elements and excluding all nonessential, as to distinguish it from all other things and classes. To illustrate: A man is a matured male biped with a double curve in his backbone. This is an exact definition, unless it can be shown that some other species of animal "not man" is included therein, or some species of animal called "man" is excluded therefrom.

Not all words can be defined with mathematical nicety, and we appreciate that, in construing and defining the terms of the statute in question, "the court is bound, not to a narrow technical construction, but rather to a broad and...