Porter v. Queen's Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 19 January 2021
• Docket Number: SCWC-16-0000602
• Citation: 479 P.3d 148
• Parties: Adeline N. PORTER, Petitioner/Claimant-Appellant, v. The QUEEN'S MEDICAL CENTER, Respondent/Employer-Appellee, Self-Insured.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

479 P.3d 148

Adeline N. PORTER, Petitioner/Claimant-Appellant,

v.The QUEEN'S MEDICAL CENTER, Respondent/Employer-Appellee, Self-Insured.

SCWC-16-0000602

Supreme Court of Hawai‘i.

JANUARY 19, 2021

Adeline N. Porter, Pro Se

Scott G. Leong, Shawn L.M. Benton, Honolulu, for Respondent

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, AND WILSON, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE OCHIAI, IN PLACE OF POLLACK, J., RECUSED

OPINION OF THE COURT BY WILSON, J.

I. BACKGROUND

Pro se¹ Petitioner/Claimant-Appellant Adeline N. Porter ("Porter") is a registered nurse who worked for the Queen's Medical Center ("QMC") from 1967—when she graduated from the Queen's School of Nursing—until 2005 when her employment was terminated. In 2002, Porter and other QMC employees in her building began suffering from respiratory symptoms precipitated by "environmental health issues" that she believed were the result of "contaminated carpet and wall coverings[.]" As a result of the alleged chemical exposure, Porter was treated in the emergency room on five separate occasions in 2002 and 2003. Porter was subsequently diagnosed with a disease known as Multiple Chemical Sensitivity

("MCS")² and filed multiple claims for workers’ compensation ("WC") benefits alleging that she sustained MCS injuries that occurred on August 9, 2002, August 31, 2002, November 6, 2002, November 8, 2002, and May 13, 2003.³

II. DISCUSSION

The issue before this court arises from the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeal Board's ("LIRAB") denial of Porter's request to reopen her claims pursuant to HRS § 386-89 (2013),⁴ and the Intermediate Court of Appeals’ ("ICA") affirmance of the denial. In particular, Porter claims that the ICA erred by: (1) affirming the LIRAB's conclusion that she failed to present substantial evidence of a mistake in a determination of fact that would warrant a reopening of her WC claims under HRS § 386-89(c) ; and (2) failing to apply the presumption of compensability under HRS § 386-85(1) (2011)⁵ to her case.

HRS § 386-89(c) provides that a request for reopening a WC claim must be "supported by a showing of substantial evidence, on the ground of a change in or of a mistake in a determination of fact related to the physical condition of the injured employee," and if such a showing is made by the claimant, "the director may ... review a compensation case and issue a decision which may award, terminate, continue, reinstate, increase, or decrease compensation." HRS § 386-89(c). A request for reopening is governed by the procedure provided in Hawai‘i Administrative Rules ("HAR") § 12-10-63. HAR § 12-10-63 provides that an application for reopening "shall be in writing[ and] shall state specifically the grounds upon which the application is based[.]" HAR § 12-10-63. Following an application for reopening a case, "the director shall review the case file and may, by discretion, hear the interested parties." Id. Moreover, HAR § 12-10-30(d) provides that any request for reopening under HRS § 386-89(c) "shall be accompanied by medical information or any other substantial evidence showing a change in or of a mistake in a determination of fact related to the physical condition of the injured employee." HAR § 12-10-30(d). "Substantial evidence" must be "relevant and credible evidence of a quality and quantity sufficient to justify a conclusion by a reasonable [person.]" Van Ness v. State, Dep't of Educ., 131 Hawai‘i 545, 558, 319 P.3d 464, 477 (2014) (quoting Flor v. Holguin, 94 Hawai‘i 70, 79, 9 P.3d 382, 391 (2000) ).

Here, Porter argues that it was a mistake for the Director to deny her claims based on his conclusion that "[s]ince there is no such injury as multiple chemical sensitivity, there is no injury per se." The LIRAB majority determined that Porter failed to produce "substantial evidence" of a mistake to support her HRS § 386-89(c) request for reopening. Porter challenges the ICA's affirmance of the LIRAB majority's determination that she failed to produce substantial evidence to support her allegations of a mistake of fact related to the Director's determination that she had not suffered a compensable illness because MCS is not an "injury per se." Porter also argues that it was a mistake for her claim to have been decided on the question of whether MCS is a legitimate diagnosis, rather than on the question of whether her injury—described as MCS or otherwise—was work related.

The LIRAB majority's conclusion that Porter failed to present substantial evidence of a mistake in the determination of a fact was based on its finding that Porter "offered no new credible or reliable evidence that that [sic ] MCS is, was, or has become an accepted medical diagnosis or a valid medical disorder." The LIRAB's and subsequently the ICA's characterization of the basis for Porter's allegations of mistake was artificially narrow. The LIRAB's decision appears to assume that Porter was arguing that the alleged mistake was only that MCS became a more recognized diagnosis subsequent to the original disposition of her claims.

In fact, in addition to arguing the mistake recognized by the LIRAB, Porter also clearly argued that it was a mistake for the Director to dispose of her claims based on his conclusion that MCS is not an "injury per se" given that Disability Compensation Division ("DCD") Administrator Gary Hamada ("DCD Administrator Hamada") stated that the compensability of an MCS claim is dependent on whether or not it is work related. Porter supported this argument with substantial evidence, including two letters from DCD Administrator Hamada representing that an MCS injury may be compensable if it is determined to be work related. Throughout the litigation of her WC claims, Porter has repeatedly alleged that it was a mistake to deny her claims based on the Director's March 19, 2004 finding that "there is no such injury as multiple chemical sensitivity[.]"⁶ That decision, denying Porter's claims because MCS is not an injury, was signed by DCD Administrator Hamada. Just over two years later, on September 6, 2006, DCD Administrator Hamada represented to Senator Norman Sakamoto that an MCS injury would be compensable if it was found to be work related.

Both of DCD Administrator Hamada's letters constitute substantial evidence supporting Porter's contention that it was a mistake to dispose of her claims on the basis that MCS is not a legitimate diagnosis. The first letter from DCD Administrator Hamada was a September 6, 2006 letter to Senator Sakamoto in response to an inquiry about the compensability of MCS. DCD Administrator Hamada wrote that the DCD database "is not able to identify cases involving MCS" but that "[a]ny employee may file a WC claim for MCS. If the MCS is determined to be caused by work, the injury would be covered under WC, however if MCS is determined not to have been caused by work, the claim would be denied."⁷

The second letter from DCD Administrator Hamada was an August 10, 2007 letter to Porter in which he again represented that MCS may be a compensable claim if it is determined to be work related. The letter stated that "[t]he department has NOT changed its policy regarding MCS. MCS is NOT recognized as a compensable injury for all workers’ compensation claims. Workers’ compensation determinations are based upon whether a claimant suffered a workplace injury/illness, for example, as a result of chemical exposure in the workplace."

Both letters from DCD Administrator Hamada plainly represent that MCS is a diagnosis that would be compensable under WC if it is found to be work related. These representations stand in stark contrast to the March 19, 2004 conclusion upon which the DCD Director relied in denying Porter's 2002 claims: that "[s]ince there is no such injury as multiple chemical sensitivity, there is no injury per se." This contrast is underscored by the fact that DCD Administrator Hamada was the signatory of both contradictory representations. As such, DCD Administrator Hamada's 2006 and 2007 letters represent substantial evidence of a mistake of fact in the determination of Porter's claims.

Accordingly, the LIRAB majority's finding that Porter failed to provide substantial evidence of a mistake is clearly erroneous. Likewise, the ICA's affirmance of the LIRAB's conclusion on this issue was error.

III. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, we vacate the ICA's March 23, 2020 judgment on appeal and remand Porter's request for reopening to the LIRAB to determine if Porter's MCS injury is work related.⁸

1 As a pro se litigant, Porter's pleadings must be interpreted liberally. See Dupree v. Hiraga, 121 Hawai‘i 297, 314, 219 P.3d 1084, 1101 (2009). This court has explained that a pro se petitioner is not expected to comply with the "technical exactness" of the rules because the court will make "a determined effort to understand what the pleader is attempting to set forth" and will "construe the pleading in [her] fa...