Porter v. State

Citation400 So.2d 5
Decision Date04 June 1981
Docket NumberNo. 55841,55841
PartiesRaleigh PORTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Jerry Hill, Public Defender, and Paul C. Helm, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Having been convicted of first-degree murder for the slaying of Harry G. Walrath and Margaret Ann Walrath, Raleigh Porter was sentenced to death. This Court has jurisdiction. * We affirm the convictions but reverse the sentence because of procedural error.

The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the convictions has not been raised. We have, however, carefully reviewed it. That review clearly discloses that Porter broke and entered the home of Mr. and Mrs. Walrath, a retired elderly couple living the remaining years of their lives together in Charlotte County, Florida. Inside their home Porter encountered the Walraths, whereupon he struck and beat them. Thereafter he strangled them with an electrical cord. Their car and goods taken from their home were later linked to Porter. Porter voluntarily made incriminating statements. The evidence is sufficient to find that Porter caused the Walrath's deaths while he was engaged in the crime of robbery.

There was a large amount of publicity surrounding this crime. Apprehensive of its effect on the grand jury (which had been empaneled prior to the commission of this crime), counsel for the defendant sought the right to voir dire the grand jury. His motion asked permission to question the individual jurors regarding their legal qualification, to inquire into the state of mind of the jurors to discover whether there were any facts that would prevent the grand jury from acting impartially and without prejudice to the rights of the defendant, and to determine whether the jurors knew that a sentence of death might be imposed if the defendant were convicted of the offense sought to be charged by indictment. The trial judge denied that motion. After an indictment was returned the appellant moved to quash the indictment on several grounds, one of which was the judge's refusal of the requested voir dire examination. This also was denied. Appellant contends error was committed by denying these motions. This is not so.

Section 905.04(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that a person who has been held to answer may challenge an individual prospective grand juror on the ground that the juror has a state of mind that will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging. Section 905.05, Florida Statutes (1977), allows a belated right to challenge the grand jury to a person who did not know at the time the grand jury was empaneled that he was subject to grand jury action. These statutes are an extension of prior law which had limited challenges of grand jurors to the time of empanelment and on the grounds of legal qualifications. This Court, in sustaining the prior rule, made a point of the different roles of the grand jury and the petit jury. See, e. g., Lake v. State, 100 Fla. 373, 129 So. 827 (1930); Reed v. State, 94 Fla. 32, 113 So. 630 (1927). Although these statutes extend the grounds for challenge to a grand juror, no statute or rule provides for voir dire examination of a grand juror after the grand jury is empaneled. The difference between the roles of the grand jury, to investigate and accuse, and that of a petit jury, to find facts, supplies a basis to provide voir dire for petit jurors but to omit it for grand jurors.

Porter did not file a motion to challenge a juror or jurors in this cause. His motion was to voir dire the grand jury to determine if he had a basis to so challenge. Later he filed a motion to dismiss the indictment because he could not voir dire the jury.

The State of Maine apparently would allow voir dire in certain exigent situations. See State v. Warren, 312 A.2d 535 (Me.1973). Even if Florida were to follow the direction of Maine, which we do not feel we should do in the absence of a statute or a rule, the exigent circumstances that authorize voir dire in Maine do not exist in this case, just as they did not in Warren.

No error was shown in the composition of this grand jury nor was there error in disallowing the voir dire examination of the grand jury. The indictment was valid.

We next turn our attention to the sentencing phase of this case. The trial jury recommended a life sentence following a sentencing hearing, but the trial judge, finding three aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, imposed the death sentence. The first two aggravating points were that the felonies were committed for pecuniary gain and for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest. A substantial portion of the basis for these findings was the testimony of an acquaintance of the appellant, Larry Schapp. The difficulty lies in the fact that the critical findings did not come from Schapp's trial testimony, but rather from testimony he had given in a deposition. The trial judge never advised the appellant of his intention to utilize the deposition and never afforded the appellant an opportunity to rebut, contradict, or impeach the deposition testimony.

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18 cases
  • Bundy v. State, 57772
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • 21 d4 Junho d4 1984
    ...to neither a temporary restraining order nor an opportunity to voir dire the individual members of the grand jury. See Porter v. State, 400 So.2d 5 (Fla.1981). In every criminal proceeding a defendant has the absolute right to remain silent. At no time is it the duty of a defendant to prove......
  • Porter v. Wainwright
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • 17 d1 Novembro d1 1986
    ...On June 4, 1981, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Porter's conviction but vacated and remanded the case for resentencing. Porter v. State, 400 So.2d 5 (Fla.1981). The basis for the order to vacate Porter's sentence was a violation of Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.E......
  • Krawczuk v. Tucker
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • 29 d5 Junho d5 2012
    ...basis for a sentence, he must advise the defendant of what it is and afford the defendant an opportunity to rebut it.Porter v. State, 400 So.2d 5, 7 (Fla.1981) (citations omitted). Thus, it is well settled that if a trial judge uses information not stated in open court to make a determinati......
  • Porter v. Singletary
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
    • 2 d3 Fevereiro d3 1994
    ...On June 4, 1981, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Porter's conviction but vacated and remanded the case for resentencing. Porter v. State, 400 So.2d 5 (Fla.1981). The basis for the order to vacate Porter's sentence was a violation of Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.E......
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