Portercare Adventist Health Sys. v. Lego
| Decision Date | 28 October 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09CA0900.,09CA0900. |
| Citation | 312 P.3d 201 |
| Parties | PORTERCARE ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM, d/b/a Porter Hospital, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Robert T. LEGO, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
McConnell Fleischner Houghtaling & Craigmile, LLC, Traci L. Van Pelt, Troy R. Rackham, Sara M. Cantrick, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Russel Murray III, PC, Russel Murray III, Lone Tree, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.
Opinion by Judge J. JONES.
Defendant, Robert T. Lego, appeals the judgment entered on a jury verdict finding that he is liable to plaintiff, Portercare Adventist Health System (the hospital), on its claim for breach of a contract implied in fact to pay for medical services and care the hospital provided to his wife (Bernadette F. Lego). He also appeals the district court's order requiring him to pay the hospital's attorney fees incurred during the entirety of the district court proceedings.
We agree with Mr. Lego's contention that the district court erred in not granting him judgment on the hospital's claim based on the statute of limitations. The hospital's claim was subject to the three-year statute of limitations generally applicable to contract actions, section 13–80–101(1)(a), C.R.S.2010, not the six-year statute of limitations applicable to contract actions in which the damages are “liquidated” or unliquidated but “determinable,” section 13–80–103.5(1)(a), C.R.S.2010. Because it is undisputed that the hospital commenced this case more than three years after its claim accrued, Mr. Lego is entitled to judgment on the claim as a matter of law.
In light of this determination, and because of other infirmities in the district court's order awarding the hospital its attorney fees, we vacate that order and remand for the court to reconsider the hospital's motion for fees.
On August 18, 2001, Ms. Lego was admitted to the hospital, where hospital staff treated her for several weeks. In late September, Ms. Lego's insurer indicated that it believed she no longer needed the level of care provided by the hospital and therefore would not pay for her to stay at the hospital after October 1. The written notice from the insurer informed Ms. Lego that if she chose to remain at the hospital, she would “be financially responsible for all costs of the services and care” provided after October 1.
Ms. Lego unsuccessfully challenged the insurer's determination through administrative channels and in court. She remained at the hospital until November 9, 2001. Though the hospital later claimed that hospital personnel told the Legos repeatedly that they would be responsible for paying for services provided after October 1 if Ms. Lego remained at the hospital, Mr. Lego maintained that he refused to agree to be financially responsible for any such services.
The hospital billed a total of $453,084 for Ms. Lego's stay. Her insurer paid $301,570.99. In November 2001, the hospital demanded that Ms. Lego pay the remaining bill of $144,044.36. The Legos refused.
In April 2005, the hospital filed a complaint against Ms. Lego's estate (Ms. Lego had died in the interim) and Mr. Lego stating a single claim for “money owed.” A few months later, the hospital filed an amended complaint asserting the same claim. Therein, the hospital alleged that the parties' conduct—specifically, (1) Ms. Lego's decision to remain at the hospital after her insurance coverage ceased, knowing that the hospital would charge her for services provided after October 1, and (2) the hospital's provision of services after that date—created a contract implied in fact. The amended complaint sought $144,044.36, the amount billed but unpaid, in damages from the estate and Mr. Lego jointly and severally. (The district court dismissed the claim against the estate for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a determination from which the hospital has not appealed.)
Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground the hospital's claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations, section 13–80–101(1)(a). In response, the hospital argued that, because it sought a specific amount of money, the amount of its claim was “liquidated” or “determinable” within the meaning of the six-year statute of limitations, section 13–80–103.5(1)(a), and therefore the claim was timely. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the amended complaint stated a claim for breach of contract, “not a claim in quantum meruit,” and it could not determine at that stage whether the amount of the claim was liquidated or determinable within the meaning of section 13–80–103.5(1)(a).
Defendants again raised their statute of limitations defense in a motion for summary judgment. The gist of their argument was that recovery under a claim for breach of a contract implied in fact is the reasonable value of the services provided, and no document evidencing any contract purported to show either what that reasonable amount was or how it could be readily calculated. The district court denied the motion on the basis of a hospital representative's affidavit testifying to the amount of the bill and that the fees charged were in line with market rates. The district court concluded that this rendered the amount of the claim “liquidated” for purposes of the six-year statute of limitations.
Before trial, Mr. Lego designated an expert to testify as to the reasonableness of the hospital's charges. The hospital moved to strike the designation, arguing, in part, that the issue of the reasonableness of its charges was irrelevant because it was requesting an award of a liquidated or determinable amount of money. Agreeing with the hospital's argument, the district court granted the hospital's motion, and ruled that “[t]he issues of reasonableness and necessity of care rendered as well as the billing practices of [the hospital] are precluded.”
When the hospital finished presenting its evidence at trial, Mr. Lego moved for a directed verdict, arguing, among other things, that the hospital had failed to present evidence of the reasonable value of its services. The district court denied the motion.
In instructing the jury on the hospital's breach of implied contract claim, the district court used a modified version of CJI–Civ. 30:14 (2010), deleting, as relevant here, the element that the hospital prove the reasonable value of its services, and substituting therefor an element that the hospital must prove “[t]he total of the rendered medical services and delivered supplies.” It further instructed the jury that if it found in the hospital's favor on liability, it should “assess as its actual damages the amount of the medical services rendered and supplies delivered.” Mr. Lego objected to these instructions because they omitted the requirement of proof of the reasonable value of the services.
The jury found in the hospital's favor and awarded $144,044.36, the full amount sought by the hospital, as damages. Mr. Lego filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, again arguing that the hospital had filed its claim after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The district court denied that motion without explanation. The court subsequently added $105,371.13 in prejudgment interest and $7,437.65 in costs to the judgment.
The hospital moved for an award of its attorney fees under section 13–17–102, C.R.S.2010. It argued that Mr. Lego's defense of the action was substantially frivolous, groundless, and vexatious. The court found that Mr. Lego had unnecessarily expanded the proceeding, and awarded the hospital $156,656.50, the total amount of attorney fees the hospital had incurred in the case, less some minor charges.
As noted, Mr. Lego appeals from both the judgment and the order awarding attorney fees.
Mr. Lego raises several contentions challenging the judgment. We need not address all of them, however, because we conclude that his contention that the hospital's claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations is correct and dispositive.
The hospital concedes that its sole claim for breach of a contract implied in fact accrued in November 2001.1 Therefore, if the three-year statute of limitations rather than the six-year statute of limitations applies to the hospital's claim, it was barred. We review de novo the issue of what statute of limitations applies to a particular claim, at least where, as here, all facts relevant to that issue are undisputed. See Hurtado v. Brady, 165 P.3d 871, 873 (Colo.App.2007).
Section 13–80–101(1)(a) provides that “[a]ll contract actions ..., except as otherwise provided in section 13–80–103.5,” must “be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues ....” A claim based on an implied contract is subject to this provision. See CAMAS Colorado, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 36 P.3d 135, 139–40 (Colo.App.2001); see also Rotenberg v. Richards, 899 P.2d 365, 367–68 (Colo.App.1995).
But section 13–80–103.5(1)(a) provides an exception to the three-year limitations statute for a contract claim if, as relevant here, it is one “to recover a liquidated debt or an unliquidated, determinable amount of money....” For such a claim, the statute of limitations is six years.
Divisions of this court have held that a claim is for a “liquidated debt” or “determinable” sum for purposes of section 13–80–103.5(1)(a) “if the amount due is capable of ascertainment by reference to an agreement or by simple computation.” Rotenberg, 899 P.2d at 367;accord Interbank Investments, L.L.C. v. Vail Valley Consol. Water Dist., 12 P.3d 1224, 1230 (Colo.App.2000); Tafoya v. Perkins, 932 P.2d 836, 838 (Colo.App.1996); Fishburn v. City of Colorado Springs, 919 P.2d 847, 849 (Colo.App.1995). And, a debtor's dispute of or defenses against such a claim or the need to refer to some fact outside the agreement to determine the amount owed does...
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