Porterfield v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co.
| Docket Number | 04-20-00151-CV |
| Decision Date | 27 October 2021 |
| Parties | John PORTERFIELD, Appellant v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas Trial Court No. 18-366 Honorable Kirsten Cohoon, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice
Appellant John Porterfield appeals the trial court's summary judgment in favor of appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. On July 14, 2021, this court issued an opinion and judgment affirming the trial court's judgment in part and reversing it in part. Both parties sought rehearing from that opinion, and Deutsche Bank sought reconsideration en banc. After consideration, we deny both parties' motions for panel rehearing, withdraw our July 14, 2021 opinion and judgment, and substitute this opinion and judgment in their place. We affirm the trial court's judgment in part, reverse it in part, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we have issued a new panel opinion, Deutsche Bank's request for en banc reconsideration is denied as moot. See Tex. R. App. P. 49.4.
This appeal arises out of a long-running dispute between these parties regarding their competing claims to residential property in Kendall County, Texas. From 1996 until 2005, the property belonged to a non-party, Timothy Nobles, who used it as his homestead until at least August of 2005. In 2005, one of Nobles's creditors, Warren Power and Machinery obtained a judgment against him. WPM did not execute its judgment at that time, but it filed an abstract of judgment in the Kendall County real property records on April 11 2005. The abstract of judgment was indexed under the property's address.
At some point after Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans in 2005, Nobles moved out of Texas. Nobles never lived in the property again after that point. He died in 2007.
Prior to his death, Nobles sold the property to Jon Galland in November of 2005. To finance the purchase, Galland obtained a mortgage from Long Beach Mortgage Company, which was secured by a deed of trust filed in the Kendall County real property records on November 30, 2005 ("the Galland note"). In 2007, Porterfield and his wife obtained a judgment against Galland awarding the property to them. That same year, the servicer of Galland's mortgage loan accelerated the Galland note and sent it for foreclosure. On September 24, 2007, an Assignment of Lien assigning the Galland note to Deutsche Bank was filed in the Kendall County real property records.
The Porterfields sued Deutsche Bank, contending it had not provided them with the payoff amounts necessary to satisfy the Galland note and clear their title to the property. In September of 2011, the Porterfields and Deutsche Bank entered into a mediated settlement agreement in which the Porterfields agreed to pay $120, 000 to settle the Galland note. The Porterfields agreed that if they did not pay that amount by a specified deadline, they would vacate the property and would not contest Deutsche Bank's attempts to foreclose on the Galland note. The Porterfields did not pay by the deadline, so Deutsche Bank foreclosed on the Galland note and purchased the property at auction. Deutsche Bank filed its Substitute Trustee's Deed in the Kendall County real property records on August 13, 2012.
The Porterfields then sued Deutsche Bank again, this time to overturn the foreclosure sale. Deutsche Bank removed the suit to federal court and filed a counterclaim for breach of the mediated settlement agreement. On March 10, 2015, the Western District of Texas concluded the Porterfields breached the mediated settlement agreement by contesting the foreclosure and failing to vacate the property. That court issued a memorandum and order granting summary judgment for Deutsche Bank on its counterclaim and providing, "[a]ll of the Porterfields' claims have now been dismissed from this lawsuit."
On July 30, 2015, WPM assigned its abstracted, but still unexecuted, 2005 judgment against Nobles to Porterfield. On August 25, 2015, a Midland County court issued a writ of execution against Nobles. The Kendall County constable executed the writ by selling the property to Porterfield at public auction. Porterfield filed his resulting Deed Under Execution in the Kendall County real property records on November 13, 2015.
In July of 2018, Deutsche Bank filed this trespass to try title and quiet title action against Porterfield. Porterfield filed a general denial and several affirmative defenses to those claims. He contended in the alternative that if Deutsche Bank prevailed, he "should be allowed to remove the improvements" he had made to the property "or be compensated for same." He also asserted counterclaims for abuse of judicial process, abuse of process, false imprisonment, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference.
Deutsche Bank filed a motion for partial summary judgment on Porterfield's tort counterclaims and its own trespass to try title and quiet title actions. In support of its own claims, Deutsche Bank argued Porterfield's Deed Under Execution was void and, as a result, its title to the property was superior to Porterfield's as a matter of law. Porterfield filed a competing traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the issues Deutsche Bank raised in support of its trespass to try title and quiet title claims. In addition, he argued that as a matter of law, Nobles abandoned the property as his homestead when he left Texas and WPM's abstract of judgment attached to the property as a lien at that point. Porterfield argued that once that lien attached, every subsequent conveyance of the property-including the November 2005 sale to Galland and the Galland note on which Deutsche Bank eventually foreclosed-was made subject to it. Because Porterfield's Deed Under Execution arose out of that purported lien, he argued his title was superior to Deutsche Bank's.
On November 21, 2019, the trial court signed an "Order and Final Judgment" granting Deutsche Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and denying Porterfield's motion. The trial court ordered that title to the property was "quieted and vested in" Deutsche Bank and specified "that any right, title, or interest claimed by or through [Porterfield] is denied, dissolved, and removed as a cloud on [Deutsche Bank's] title to the property," including Porterfield's claimed interests under the Deed Under Execution. The court decreed that its order was "a final order that resolves all claims among all parties, and any relief not expressly granted is denied."
Porterfield filed a motion for new trial arguing, inter alia, that the trial court could not properly grant summary judgment for Deutsche Bank on the homestead issue and that "there has been no adjudication" on his claim for improvements. After the trial court overruled Porterfield's motion for new trial by operation of law, he filed this appeal.
In three issues, Porterfield argues the trial court erred by: (1) granting Deutsche Bank's motion for summary judgment and denying his competing motion on Deutsche Bank's trespass to try title and quiet title actions; (2) granting Deutsche Bank's motion for summary judgment on Porterfield's tort counterclaims; and (3) granting Deutsche Bank more relief than it requested by rendering judgment on Porterfield's claim for improvements.
We note as a threshold matter that Deutsche Bank filed a partial motion for summary judgment. Because Porterfield argues that motion did not address his claim for improvements, we must determine whether the trial court's judgment granting that motion is final or interlocutory. See M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004).
"[A]n order can be final and appealable when it should not be." Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 204 (Tex. 2001). An order that grants more relief than a party requested may be reversible, but it is not necessarily interlocutory. Id. Generally, a judgment is final if it either "actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language" or states with unmistakable clarity that it does so. Id. at 192-93. Here, the trial court's judgment states it "is a final order that resolves all claims among all parties, and any relief not expressly granted is denied." This language disposes of all of the parties' claims, including Porterfield's claim for improvements, even if that disposition granted Deutsche Bank more relief than its motion requested. See id. As a result, the judgment is final and appealable. See id.
Both parties sought traditional summary judgment on Deutsche Bank's trespass to try title and quiet title actions. Deutsche Bank also sought, and the trial court granted traditional summary judgment on Porterfield's tort counterclaims. To be entitled to a traditional summary judgment the movant must show there are no genuine issues as to any material facts and the movant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Tex. 2017). A plaintiff is entitled to traditional summary judgment on its own affirmative claim if it conclusively proves all essential elements of that claim. Compass Bank v. Durant, 516 S.W.3d 557, 565 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied). Conversely, "[a] defendant who conclusively negates at least one of the essential elements of a cause of action or conclusively establishes an affirmative defense is entitled to [traditional] summary judgment." Frost...
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