Portis v. First Nat. Bank of New Albany, Miss.

• Decision Date: 10 October 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-7673,93-7673
• Parties: Judy PORTIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF NEW ALBANY, MS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 325

34 F.3d 325

30 Fed.R.Serv.3d 715

Judy PORTIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF NEW ALBANY, MS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 93-7673.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Oct. 10, 1994.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing

Nov. 10, 1994.

Jim D. Waide, III, Luther C. Fisher, IV, Tupelo, MS, for appellant.

Lester F. Sumners, Sumners, Carter & McMillin, New Albany, MS, for appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Judy Portis sued her employer, the First National Bank of New Albany, Mississippi ("FNB"), after FNB demoted her from loan officer to a bookkeeping position. She alleged that her demotion constituted sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2 (1988) ("Title VII"). The district court granted FNB's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence. Portis appeals the district court's decision, claiming she had adduced sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination to overcome judgment as a matter of law. Because we agree that Portis was entitled to have her case submitted to a jury, we reverse the judgment as a matter of law and remand for a new trial.

I

Judy Portis is a long-term employee of FNB. ¹ She began her employment with FNB in 1971, and by 1978 she was promoted to loan secretary. As a loan secretary, she consistently received high performance evaluations. In June 1988, FNB gave Portis responsibility for student loans, and C.R. "Butch" Collums became her supervisor. One year later, Portis received a promotion to loan officer, retaining student loan responsibility in addition to her new duties.

Portis' performance evaluations as a loan officer ranged from mediocre to unacceptable. A month after FNB learned that the student loan files were substantially in arrears, FNB demoted Portis from loan officer to a bookkeeping position. ² Portis' salary accordingly decreased from $20,352 as a loan officer to $12,500 as a bookkeeper. ³

Portis brought suit against FNB, claiming sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. ⁴ She testified that her two and one-half years as a loan officer did not progress well. Among other problems, she and Collums did not have an amicable working relationship. According to Portis, Collums continuously belittled both her and her performance. ⁵ She asserted that Collums told her that she would never be worth as much as a man to the bank because she was a woman. Additionally, Collums refused to provide Portis with a secretary. Portis testified that every other loan officer, all of whom were male, had his own secretary. Other witnesses, however, testified that the secretaries all belonged to a pool and worked for all the loan officers, including Portis. Portis also testified that the loan secretaries either could not or would not work for her consistently, as they completed assignments for their assigned supervisors first and had no additional time to do Portis' assignments. Other evidence indicated that although the secretaries were willing to work for Portis, she preferred to do her own secretarial work. Moreover, FNB witnesses testified that Portis refused to use the loan secretaries even when ordered to do so.

Portis did not dispute her poor performance. Rather, Portis challenged the reasons for this failure, asserting that discriminatory conduct by FNB caused her poor performance. FNB claimed that Portis lied about the status of the student loan files and failed to carry out other job responsibilities, and that these reasons for demoting Portis were legitimate and nondiscriminatory.

At the close of all the evidence, the district court granted FNB a judgment as a matter of law. The court concluded that: 1) Portis failed to present sufficient evidence of sex discrimination to overcome a judgment as a matter of law; and 2) Portis failed to both causally connect any purported sex discrimination with FNB's reasons for demoting her and show that FNB's reasons were pretextual.

Portis appeals the grant of judgment as a matter of law to FNB. Primarily, she argues that she adduced sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination to warrant presentation of her case to a jury. She also argues that, even if her intentional discrimination claim failed, she presented sufficient evidence of a "hostile work environment" to withstand a motion for judgment as a matter of law.

II

A

"In reviewing a district court's disposition of a motion for judgment [as a matter of law], we apply the same test as did the district court, without any deference to its decision." Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir.1991). [T]he Court should consider all of the evidence--not just that evidence which supports the non-mover's case--but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motion[ ] is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion[ ], that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motion[ ] should be denied.... There must be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question. However, it is the function of the jury as the traditional finder of the facts, and not the Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses.

Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc); see also Normand v. Research Inst., 927 F.2d 857, 859 (5th Cir.1991) (applying Boeing standard).

Under Title VII, it is unlawful for any employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). A Title VII plaintiff carries "the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). ⁶ This inference arises "only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577, 98 S.Ct. at 2949-50.

A plaintiff may use either direct or circumstantial evidence to prove a case of intentional discrimination. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. at 1481 n. 3. Because direct evidence is rare, a plaintiff ordinarily uses circumstantial evidence to meet the test set out in McDonnell Douglas. ⁷ This test establishes a prima facie case by inference, but it is not the exclusive method for proving intentional discrimination. "[T]he McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 621-22, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1984). ⁸

"Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of intentional discrimination] without inference or presumption." Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir.1993). In the context of Title VII, direct evidence includes any statement or written document showing a discriminatory motive on its face. See Vaughn, 918 F.2d at 521; Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 870 (11th Cir.1985) (holding "discriminatory statements and admissions" to be direct evidence).

Portis contends that, because she had adduced sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination, the district court erred in granting FNB's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Portis testified about several statements by Collums, indicating his intent to discriminate against her because of her sex. According to Portis, Collums refused her a secretary because she was a woman and told her she would never be worth as much as a man to the bank, because she could not participate in the community. Because Collums had deprived her of a secretary, Portis testified, she had to do her own clerical work. Consequently, she fell behind in her other work, and FNB ultimately demoted her. As this case was decided on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, Portis is entitled to all "reasonable inferences," including that if she had been given a secretary, her performance would not have been deficient. We cannot say that a reasonable jury would not under any circumstances find that Portis' poor performance was a product of FNB's earlier discriminatory deprivation of a secretary. Given that standard, Portis has adduced sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination to warrant presentation of her case to a jury.

B

FNB, nonetheless, argues that Portis' testimony does not constitute direct evidence sufficient to overcome a motion for judgment as a matter of law because 1) it is merely her personal belief that Collums intended to discriminate against her; and 2) Portis failed to show a causal connection between Collums' alleged discriminatory intent and her demotion.

First, FNB contends that Portis only presented evidence of her personal belief that FNB discriminated against her. "[G]eneralized testimony by an employee regarding his subjective belief that his discharge was the result of [ ] discrimination is insufficient to make an issue for the jury in the face of proof showing an adequate, nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge." Elliott v. Group Medical & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 566 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467...