Post Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind

• Decision Date: 17 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 23712,23712
• Citation: 962 P.2d 1018,131 Idaho 634
• Parties: POST FALLS TRAILER PARK, an Idaho partnership, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marilyn FREDEKIND, Defendant-Respondent. Coeur d'Alene, April 1998 Term
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1018

962 P.2d 1018

131 Idaho 634

POST FALLS TRAILER PARK, an Idaho partnership, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marilyn FREDEKIND, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 23712.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Coeur d'Alene, April 1998 Term.

June 17, 1998.

Malcolm S. Dymkoski, Attorney at Law, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant.

Givens, Funke & Work, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Raymond C. Givens argued.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

This appeal concerns the applicability of the Mobile Home Park Landlord-Tenant Act to the relationship between the Post Falls Trailer Park (the Partnership), the landlord and owner of a mobile home park, and Marilyn Fredekind, a tenant whose mobile home occupies a lot in the Partnership's mobile home park. The Partnership brought an action for unlawful detainer against Fredekind and moved for summary judgment. The magistrate granted summary judgment in favor of the non-moving party, Fredekind. The district court affirmed the magistrate's decision.

I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

The Partnership owns the Post Falls Trailer Park. Fredekind rents a space at the Post Falls Trailer Park where she has resided in her mobile home since 1972. There has never been a written rental agreement between the parties. Prior to the commencement of this action, Fredekind rented the lot on a month-to-month basis pursuant to an oral agreement.

On August 10, 1995, the Partnership sent Fredekind a letter notifying her that it did not intend to renew her month-to-month rental space beyond November 15, 1995. Through a letter by counsel dated October 3, 1995, Fredekind informed the Partnership that its attempt to terminate the month-to-month lease was "improper and potentially violative of the Act." Fredekind also requested a written rental agreement. The Partnership provided an unsigned written agreement on November 14, 1995, approximately forty days later. The Partnership demanded acceptance of the written rental agreement by November 30, 1995. On November 30, 1995, counsel for Fredekind delivered a letter to the Partnership requesting additional time to consider the proposed rental agreement. The Partnership denied Fredekind's request for additional time and revoked the proposed rental agreement through a letter by counsel dated December 1, 1995. On December 4, 1995, after receiving the Partnership's letter, Fredekind signed the rental agreement.

The Partnership refused to sign the rental agreement. On December 5, 1995, it filed a complaint against Fredekind for unlawful detainer. It also filed an amended complaint alleging that Fredekind's son was living with her in violation of the Park's regulation which restricts residents under the age of sixty-two from residing at the Park. Fredekind has continued to pay rent throughout the proceedings, but the Partnership has refused to accept it.

On March 26, 1996, the Partnership moved for summary judgment. The magistrate granted summary judgment in favor of Fredekind as the non-moving party, holding that the Mobile Home Park Landlord-Tenant Act (the Act) governs this action and precludes a landlord from claiming benefits under the Act, unless a written rental agreement signed by both parties exists. Because there was no written rental agreement signed by both parties, the Partnership was not entitled to recover under the Act's unlawful detainer statute. The magistrate also awarded Fredekind attorney fees pursuant to section 55-2018 of the Act. The district court affirmed the magistrate's ruling.

The Partnership argues that Fredekind was not entitled to the protection of the Act because she refused to sign the rental agreement within the time allotted by the Partnership. The Partnership also argues that Fredekind is not entitled to attorney fees because

the magistrate failed to consider "[t]he prevailing charges for like work" as required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.) 54(e)(3).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a case decided in the magistrate division that has been appealed to the district court, this Court reviews the magistrate's decision independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate decision. Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955, 957-58, 855 P.2d 40, 42-43 (1993); Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194, 765 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ct.App.1988).

When this Court reviews the [lower] court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it employs the same standard properly employed by the ... court [below] when originally ruling on the motion. City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 200, 899 P.2d 411, 413 (1995); Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994). Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Mutual of Enumclaw v. Box, 127 Idaho 851, 852, 908 P.2d 153, 154 (1995). Both this Court and the ... court [below] shall liberally construe the record in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of that party. City of Chubbuck, 127 Idaho at 200, 899 P.2d at 413.

Allen v. Blaine County, 131 Idaho 138, 140, 953 P.2d 578, 580 (1998). In this case, summary judgment was granted to the non-moving party. In such instances, the Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party against whom summary judgment was entered. Id. at 141, 953 P.2d at 581.

III.

THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE PARTNERSHIP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Act governs disputes between a park operator-landlord and a mobile home owner-tenant. I.C. § 55-2004; Fuhrman v. Wright, 125 Idaho 421, 871 P.2d 838 (Ct.App.1994). The Act requires that a landlord "shall provide ... a written rental agreement. This agreement must be executed by both parties." I.C. § 55-2005(1). In Fuhrman the Court of Appeals properly held that the Act is the exclusive source of a landlord's rights and remedies. The landlord may not claim benefits under the Act unless a written rental agreement exists between the parties. Fuhrman, 125 Idaho at 424, 871 P.2d at 841.

The Partnership argues that it is entitled to recover under the Act's unlawful detainer statute, despite the fact that there was not a written rental agreement, because Fredekind refused to sign the proposed agreement within the time allotted by the Partnership. Although Fredekind did not sign the agreement by November 30, 1995, as required by the Partnership, she did sign it four days later. The Partnership could have accepted the agreement or it could have drafted a new agreement for Fredekind to sign. If a written rental agreement executed by both parties had existed, then the Partnership could have claimed the benefits under the Act and filed a complaint alleging unlawful detainer. If at that time, a court determined that Fredekind was in violation of the park rules that were incorporated into the agreement, then the Partnership could have obtained an order for an eviction.

The Partnership also argues that once a landlord provides a tenant with a written rental agreement, the landlord's duty is complete and it may avail itself of the benefits under the Act. This contention is in contravention of both the rule and the policy behind the Act. The Act clearly requires that the written rental agreement be "executed by both parties." I.C. § 55-2005(1). It is undisputed that the Partnership did not sign the rental agreement. Furthermore, the purpose of the Act is "to provide the mobile home owner with certain statutory rights not now included in the Idaho Code." Fuhrman, 125 Idaho at 423, 871 P.2d at 840 (quoting Statement of Purpose R.S. 5699, H.B. 651, 1980 Idaho Sess. Laws). "The legislature The Partnership contends that if the magistrate's decision stands, then a mobile home owner can repeatedly refuse to sign a rental agreement, and the landlord is precluded from collecting rent or evicting the mobile home owner. However, the Act protects a landlord from such a result by imposing a duty of good faith:

recognized a difference between the customary residential tenancy and the unique nature of the landlord-tenant relationship between a park operator-landlord and a mobile home owner-tenant, resulting from the significant cost and effort in installing the owner's mobile home in a park." Id. If a landlord can evict a mobile home owner simply because he or she requests additional time to sign a rental agreement, then a mobile home owner's investment is not adequately protected, as the Act intended.

Every duty under this chapter and every act which must be performed as a condition precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under this chapter imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.

I.C. § 55-2002. If a tenant refuses to sign a rental agreement in bad faith, the landlord may evict the tenant. In this case, however, the Partnership did not argue that Fredekind acted in bad faith when she requested additional time to sign the rental agreement.

Next, the Partnership argues that the Act does not preclude a landlord from specifying the time in which a tenant has to sign the agreement. This is a correct statement. However, this does not change the fact that a written rental agreement signed by both parties is a prerequisite to claiming benefits under the Act. The Act does not require a tenant to sign the rental agreement in...