Postal Police Officers Ass'n v. U.S. Postal Serv., Case No. 20-cv-2566 (CRC)

• Decision Date: 24 November 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 20-cv-2566 (CRC)
• Citation: 502 F.Supp.3d 411
• Parties: POSTAL POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

502 F.Supp.3d 411

POSTAL POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 20-cv-2566 (CRC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed November 24, 2020

Arlus Jeremiah Stephens, Charles Andrew Sinks, Roseann R. Romano, Murphy Anderson PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Katherine Boyd Palmer-Ball, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, United States District Judge This case is the latest proceeding to raise a long-debated question: What, exactly, is the lawful role of Postal Police Officers ("PPOs") employed by the United States Postal Service? USPS recently declared that PPOs may exercise law-enforcement functions only when they are protecting Postal Service real estate. Plaintiff Postal Police Officers Association ("PPOA" or "the Union") disagrees, arguing that Congress also authorized PPOs to enforce the law away from Postal Service premises to protect chattel property, such as in-transit mail and delivery trucks. The Union sued the Postal Service and Postmaster General Louis DeJoy (together, "USPS"), claiming that USPS exceeded its statutory authority by unduly restricting PPOs’ law-enforcement jurisdiction. The Complaint asks the Court to set aside the USPS policy limiting PPOs’ authority or, alternatively, temporarily enjoin the policy while the parties arbitrate their dispute. The Union has also moved for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order granting PPOs off-premises authority during this litigation. USPS has moved to dismiss the Complaint.

The Court concludes that USPS did not exceed its statutory authority by interpreting the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act to either require or permit USPS to restrict PPOs’ law-enforcement activities to contexts related to postal real estate. The agency's reading of the statute is reasonable and therefore entitled to deference. The Court is also persuaded that it lacks jurisdiction to enter a temporary injunction pending arbitration. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Complaint and deny the Union's request for preliminary relief.

I. Background

A. Facts

The following facts are alleged in the Complaint or drawn from declarations in the record that are not disputed in relevant part, except where otherwise noted. USPS has employed PPOs since 1971. Compl. ¶ 15. PPOs are part of the agency's Inspection Service, which also includes a separate group of employees called Postal Inspectors. Id. ¶¶ 15, 30. Today, about 534 PPOs work for USPS, stationed in 20 major metropolitan areas around the country. Brubaker Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 14-1; First Bjork Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 7-2. PPOA is the labor union that represents most PPOs in collective bargaining with USPS. Compl. ¶ 12; First Bjork Decl. ¶ 3.

Prior to 2006, Congress periodically granted law enforcement authority to PPOs through appropriations bills. Compl. ¶ 17. During this period, PPOs were assigned to various duties. Some of these duties took place on premises owned, occupied, or controlled by USPS, but other duties occurred away from such premises. For example, armed PPOs sometimes accompanied high-value mail shipments in transit to provide protection. Id. ¶ 19.

In 2006, Congress enacted the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, which permanently authorized USPS to employ PPOs "for duty in connection with the protection of property owned or occupied by the Postal Service or under the charge and control of the Postal Service, and persons on that property, including duty in areas outside the property to the extent necessary to protect the property and persons on the property." 18 U.S.C. § 3061.

Since 2006, PPOs have continued to perform some law-enforcement duties away from USPS premises, although the parties dispute the extent of this off-premises work. Compare Brubaker Decl. ¶¶ 8-9 (describing limited off-premises law-enforcement work by PPOs in ten cities) with Albergo Decl. ¶¶ 4-9, ECF No. 15-2 (disputing Mr. Brubaker's account and describing more widespread off-premises law-enforcement work). According to the Union, USPS expanded its off-premises use of PPOs after 2006, increasingly sending PPOs on mobile patrols, assigning them to protect letter carriers and in-transit mail, and relying on them to deter mail theft. Compl. ¶ 29. During this period (and even before 2006), USPS officials have sometimes taken steps to limit PPOs’ off-premises work and suggested that PPOs’ authority to engage in law enforcement was confined to postal premises. The Union, however, claims that these episodes usually coincided with contract negotiations and were strategically designed by USPS to justify paying PPOs less than they would otherwise earn. Suppl. Bjork Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 15-3.

USPS and the Union are currently operating under a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") that went into effect in 2012. First Bjork Decl. ¶ 4. The CBA prohibits USPS from unilaterally making certain changes to PPOs’ terms and conditions of employment. Compl. ¶ 36. It also provides that USPS handbooks, manuals, and regulations directly related to PPOs’ wages, hours, and working conditions must be consistent with the CBA, and it establishes a process for the Union to object to any proposed change that might conflict with the CBA. Id. ¶¶ 39-40. In the event of a dispute about the interpretation of the CBA, the Union may file a grievance, which is subject to arbitration. Id. ¶ 35.

The current CBA is due to be replaced by a new one, but the terms of the forthcoming CBA will depend on the outcome of a currently pending arbitration ("the Interest Arbitration"). First Bjork Decl. ¶ 4. At a February 2020 hearing in the Interest Arbitration, the Union sought to prove that PPOs are fully functioning police officers who do much of their work off-premises. Id. ¶ 5. In the same proceeding, Craig Goldberg, Deputy Chief Inspector of the Postal Service, testified that he did not know whether PPOs’ law-enforcement authority was limited to USPS real estate. Compl. ¶ 44.

In August 2020, Deputy Chief Inspector David Bowers issued a management communication to all divisions of the Inspection Service ("the Bowers Memo"). Id. ¶ 45. The Bowers Memo declares that "PPOs may not exercise [their] law enforcement authority in contexts unrelated to Postal Service premises." First Bjork Decl., Ex. K, ECF No. 7-2. Accordingly, it states that, "[e]ffective immediately," any utilization of PPOs away from USPS premises requires approval from a Deputy Chief Inspector. Id. It further clarifies that PPOs may travel off USPS premises on their way to assignments, but "during this travel they are not to be placed into situations in which it would be reasonably likely that they would be compelled to exercise law enforcement activity[.]" Id.

Since the Bowers Memo was issued, PPOs have been assigned mostly to duties at postal facilities. Compl. ¶ 46. The Union alleges that "in many places, the U.S. mail and postal personnel are receiving less protection" due to this change. Id. ¶ 47. In September 2020, the Union filed a grievance challenging the Bowers Memo, which will be heard by an arbitrator. Id. ¶ 1.

B. Proceedings in this Case

Days after filing its grievance against the Bowers Memo, the Union filed this lawsuit. In the Complaint, the Union alleges that USPS acted in excess of its statutory authority by purporting to limit PPOs’ law-enforcement authority to postal premises. Id. ¶ 60. It also alleges that, regardless of whether the Bowers Memo can be reconciled with the governing statute, the Union is likely to succeed on the merits of its grievance challenging the Bowers Memo as a violation of the CBA. Id. ¶ 50. However, the Union contends that by the time it wins the grievance arbitration, its members will have already suffered irreparable harm. Id. ¶ 49. The Complaint therefore seeks either a permanent injunction striking down the Bowers Memo or, alternatively, an injunction prohibiting the Memo's enforcement pending the grievance arbitration. Id. 15.

The Union then filed the present Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Preliminary Injunction ("PI Motion"), seeking temporary relief requiring USPS to rescind the Bowers Memo and recognize PPOs’ "authority to protect the U.S. Mail and other postal property away from postal real estate." PI Mot. 1.

USPS responded in opposition to the PI Motion and, simultaneously, moved to dismiss the Complaint. USPS argues that the Union's statutory-authority claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and that the Court lacks jurisdiction to enter an injunction pending arbitration of the Union's grievance. Defs.’ Mem. 15, 21.

The Union filed a combined reply in support of its PI Motion and response in opposition to USPS's Motion to Dismiss. USPS replied in support of its Motion. The PI Motion and the Motion to Dismiss are now fully briefed and ripe for decision.

II. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires the Court to dismiss a complaint that fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In analyzing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether the complaint "contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "The Court takes all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes those facts ‘liberally in the plaintiff's favor with the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.’ " Johnson v. United States, No. 17-cv-2411 (CRC), 2019 WL 2424039, at *3 (D.D.C. June 10, 2019) (quoting Stewart v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ).

B. Motion to Dismiss...