Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Worcester

• Decision Date: 22 May 1909
• Citation: 202 Mass. 320,88 N.E. 777
• Parties: POSTAL TELEGRAPH CABLE CO. v. CITY OF WORCESTER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

202 Mass. 320

88 N.E. 777

POSTAL TELEGRAPH CABLE CO. v. CITY OF WORCESTER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 22, 1909

COUNSEL

Carver Wardner & Goodwin, G. Philip Wardner, and Clifford H. Walker for complainant.

Ernest H. Vaughan, City Sol., for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON C.J.

By St 1902, p. 286, c. 372, provision is made for the removal of wires and electrical appliances from the public streets in the central portion of the city of Worcester. The act authorizes a designation by ordinance of an officer or officers of the city, who are given full power and authority and are directly required by the statute to carry out the provisions under which these wires and appliances are to be removed from the streets, and placed under ground. The city itself is not authorized to take any action in regard to the removal of any of these wires or appliances, other than to designate by ordinance the officer or officers that the statute calls for. These officers, when designated, are public officers, who derive their power and authority from the statute, and are not subject to direction or control by the city in any way. They represent the commonwealth, for the public good. The city is not responsible for their acts nor liable for their omissions. There is a long list of decisions in which this doctrine, in its application to similar officers, has been established and maintained by this court. McGinnis v. Medway, 176 Mass. 67, 57 N.E. 210; Dunbar v. Boston, 112 Mass. 75; Butterick v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 172, 79 Am. Dec. 721; Kimball v. Boston, 1 Allen, 417; Rossire v. Boston, 4 Allen, 57; Tindley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 171-174, 50 Am. Rep. 289; McCarthy v. City of Boston, 135 Mass. 197-200. It is not material that the designation of the officers is required to be by city ordinance. In Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87-93, 6 Am. Rep. 196, Mr. Justice Gray said: 'It makes no difference whether the Legislature itself prescribes the duties of the officers charged with the repair and management of fire engines, or delegates to the city or town the definition of those duties by ordinance or by-law. However appointed or elected, such persons are public officers who perform duties imposed by law for the benefit of all the citizens, the performance of which the city or town has no control over, and derives no benefit from in its corporate capacity. The acts of such public officers are their own official acts, and not the acts of the municipal corporation or its agents.' This is even more plainly true of the officers acting under the statute before us.

It is not material on this point that there is a right of appeal from these officers to the mayor and aldermen. The mayor and aldermen, in dealing with such an appeal, would not be the agents of the city, but would act as a quasi judicial board of officers, as they do in most cities in laying out streets and sewers and in the performance of some other public duties.

The suit before us is a bill in equity to obtain an injunction against the city of Worcester, to restrain it 'from enforcing or endeavoring to enforce * * * the provisions of chapter 372, p....