Postell v. State
Decision Date | 28 April 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 79-1901,79-1901 |
Citation | 398 So.2d 851 |
Parties | Larry POSTELL, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Beth C. Weitzner, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Joel D. Rosenblatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before HENDRY, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.
The armed robbery with which Postell was charged and convicted occurred late at night in a dark alley when five black males attacked Alfredo Fernandez and Carlos Lopez.
The criminal episode lasted approximately five minutes. It began when one man approached Lopez's stopped car, pointed a gun at his head and ordered him to pull the car into an adjacent dark alley. In the alley, four more men descended on the vehicle. One pulled Lopez from the driver's seat. When Fernandez turned toward the passenger window, a rock was thrown, hitting him in the head and shoulder area and causing him severe pain. Fernandez was pulled from the vehicle, and he and Lopez were attacked by the five men. Lopez's car, watch and $30.00 were taken, and Lopez and Fernandez were ordered to walk away. According to both victims, two of the robbers left in one vehicle and three in the other.
At trial, Fernandez identified Postell as the person who threw the rock. Lopez was unable to identify Postell as one of the perpetrators. Fernandez acknowledged that he had never seen Postell before, that Postell never spoke to him, and that during the affray his attention was primarily focused on another man holding a gun. He admitted he had difficulty in identifying blacks, and he had variously described the person who threw the rock as short and tall. No physical evidence linked Postell to the crime, and Postell made no statement admitting his complicity. In sum, the State's case against Postell depended solely on the believability of Fernandez's suspect testimony. 1
To fortify the case against Postell, the prosecutor sought to elicit through the testimony of a police officer, Seymen, the out-of-court declarations of an unidentified woman. 2 According to the State's proffer, the mystery woman's statements would reveal her to have been an eyewitness to the crime who identified Postell as one of the perpetrators. The trial court correctly recognized that the woman's statements were egregious hearsay. It determined, however, that the hearsay rule would not be offended nor the right of confrontation implicated by the admission of all but the woman's words. 3 We find that determination to be error and reverse and remand for a new trial.
The prominent role this mystery woman would play in the trial of the case was heralded in the prosecutor's opening statement:
Officer Seymen, testified he went to the scene of the crime. Over repeated, but overruled, defense objections, he was permitted to go on:
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
Laughlin and Areu, the other arresting officers, testified that they abandoned their on-scene investigation and went to seek out Postell after talking to Seymen. Apparently still not satisfied that the picture was clear enough, the prosecutor elicited from Fernandez:
Finally, the prosecutor administered the coup de grace when she argued to the jury:
"(The Prosecutor): Once again ladies and gentlemen, at the conclusion of this conversation between Officer Seymen and this woman, the officers responded to the home of the defendant.
. . . .
"Now, ladies and gentlemen, consider what a coincidence it would be to come upon a scene of a robbery within two to three blocks of this defendant's home, within thirty minutes of the robbery, go to the location and find an individual who exactly fits the description given to the police officers before he was ever a suspect by name.
. . . .
We reject the trial court's wooden application of the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. We hold that where, as in the present case, the inescapable inference from the testimony is that a non-testifying witness has furnished the police with evidence of the defendant's guilt, 4 the testimony is hearsay, and the defendant's right of confrontation is defeated, notwithstanding that the actual statements made by the non-testifying witness are not repeated. 5 In so holding, we announce no novel rule.
In Favre v. Henderson, 464 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 942, 93 S.Ct. 235, 34 L.Ed.2d 193 (1972), as in the present case, the critical issue was identification of the defendant. The identification of the defendant was shown by "two tentative identifications," "one dubious positive identification," and "one vigorously challenged positive identification," including "a questionable lineup procedure." To bolster its case, the State called a police officer who testified that he arrested Favre for armed robbery based on information he received from two reliable informants. The informants did not testify, and their statements to the officer were not repeated. The court held that this testimony violated the defendant's right of confrontation 6:
Favre v. Henderson, supra, at 362.
In State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 307 A.2d 65 (1973), the critical issue was whether the defendant possessed the contraband that was found by the police on a tavern counter top near where Bankston had been seated. The State elicited testimony from the police that shortly before arresting Bankston, based upon information received from an informer, they went to the tavern looking for...
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