Poston v. Ingraham

• Decision Date: 27 February 1907
• Citation: 56 S.E. 780,76 S.C. 167
• Parties: POSTON v. INGRAHAM et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

56 S.E. 780

76 S.C. 167

POSTON v. INGRAHAM et al.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 27, 1907

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Chesterfield County Watts, Judge.

Action by Gracy D. Poston against Annie J. Ingraham and others. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. Reversed.

R. T Caston and G. K. Laney, for appellants. Stephenson & Matheson, for respondent.

WOODS J.

The plaintiff, claiming in the right of the vendor, brings this action for specific performance against the devisees of the vendee to enforce payment of the alleged balance due on the purchase money of a tract of land. The case as made by the complaint is this: The plaintiff's mother, Mary A Campbell, who was the owner of the land, some time before her death on the 17th of July, 1878, contracted by parol to sell it for $400 to her son-in-law, C. W. Ingraham. Ingraham immediately entered under the contract and remained in possession until his death on the 3d of September, 1893; and the defendants, as his devisees, have been in possession since his death, but the purchase money has never been paid. In her own right as an heir of Mary A. Campbell and by purchase of the claims of the other heirs, the plaintiff owns two-thirds of the tract of land and the defendants own one-third as the heirs of their mother, another daughter of Mary A. Campbell. The defendants, in their answers, specifically deny that either the plaintiff or the other heirs at law of Mary A. Campbell, whose interest the plaintiff claims to have purchased, have ever had any interest in the land and allege the sale and conveyance of the land to their testator, C. W. Ingraham, by Mary A. Campbell, and the receipt by her from him of the entire purchase money. The defendants also pleaded the statute of limitations. It will simplify the questions involved to observe that the complaint, being for specific performance of a contract, obviously states an equitable cause of action; while the answer sets up purely legal defenses, namely, paramount legal title by deed from plaintiff's ancestor and the statute of limitations. In this state of the pleadings the defendant was entitled to a trial by a jury at least on the legal issue of paramount title. Lancaster v. Lee, 71 S.C. 286, 51 S.E. 139; Sale v. Meggett, 25 S.C. 72; Bank v. Peterkin, 52 S.C. 236, 29 S.E. 546, 68 Am. St. Rep. 900. Accordingly the case was properly placed on calendar No. 1, and a jury trial had before Hon. James Aldrich, Circuit Judge. On the trial the contract of purchase by C. W. Ingraham from Mary A. Campbell was not in dispute, but the defendants offered no evidence of the actual execution of a deed from her to C. W. Ingraham. The only issues of fact remaining, therefore, were whether the purchase money had been paid and whether the possession of the defendants and their ancestor were of such adverse character as to make the statute of limitations available. On the part of the plaintiff, evidence was offered of admissions by C. W. Ingraham after the death of Mary A. Campbell of an unpaid balance of $80, and of his failure to pay to the plaintiff and other heirs, whose interests the plaintiff now holds, their respective shares of this balance. In rebuttal the defendant offered testimony of the assertion by C. W. Ingraham of full payment to Mary E. Campbell, on the very occasion when the witnesses for the plaintiff attributed to him an admission of an unpaid balance. The jury found a verdict of "fifty-six dollars and interest thereon from 1880." The exceptions to the charge of the circuit judge are to be considered in view of the issues just started.

1. There was no prejudicial error in saying to the jury: "The issues in this case you must pass upon--or some of them--are these: Did Mrs. Mary A. Campbell make a sale of land to C. W. Ingraham? Another issue is: After her death did the heirs at law ratify as alleged here and make good that sale, stand by the sale of Mrs. Campbell to C. W. Ingraham?" The verdict shows the jury found there had been a sale in accordance with the admissions of all parties, and almost the entire purchase money had been paid. It is familiar law that, when a purchaser enters into possession of land under a valid parol contract of sale, he has nothing more than an equity to require the execution of a deed upon payment of the purchase money; the seller, in the meantime, retaining the legal title. It is also well settled the statute of limitations is not applicable to an action for specific performance. The possession is not adverse under a contract to purchase until payment is made. Secrest v. McKenna, 6 Rich. Eq. 72; Blackwell v. Ryan, 21 S.C. 112. The exceptions charging error on these points must fail.

2. The next question is as to the effect of the verdict of the jury. "We find for the plaintiff fifty-six dollars and interest from 1880." At the conclusion of his charge Judge Aldrich gave the jury a form indicating the verdict would be either for the defendants or for the plaintiff for any sum they found unpaid on the...