Potter v. Aiden Lair Farms Ass'n

• Citation: 113 N.E. 1035,225 Mass. 97
• Parties: POTTER et al. v. AIDEN LAIR FARMS ASS'N.
• Decision Date: 19 October 1916
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

225 Mass. 97

113 N.E. 1035

POTTER et al.

v.AIDEN LAIR FARMS ASS'N.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Franklin.

Oct. 19, 1916.

Report from Superior Court, Franklin County.

Action by Arthur D. Potter and others against the Aiden Lair Farms Association. Verdict for defendant, and plaintiffs except, and case reported. Judgment on the verdict.Wm. A. Davenport, of Greenfield, and Abner S. McLaud, of Lynn, for plaintiffs.

Sanborn G. Tenney, of Williamstown, for defendant.

CARROLL, J.

[1] The plaintiffs sought to recover from the defendant for certain merchandise sold to George Peabody, the clerk and a director of the defendant corporation, who, when the goods sued for were purchased, was the lessee of the farm and all the ‘equipment, chattels, live stock and personal property,’ under a lease running from February, 1913, to February, 1928. The lease was not recorded as required by R. L. c. 127, § 4. The plaintiff contended that Peabody was the defendant's agent. This the defendant denied and claimed he was its lessee carrying on the business on his own account.

The plaintiffs excepted to the admission of the lease in evidence, for the reason that under R. L. c. 127 § 4, a lease for more than seven years is not valid against any person except the lessor, his heirs or devisees, and persons having actual notice of it, unless it is recorded in the registry of deeds. The defendant had the right to show its relation to Peabody-that he was its agent, not its lessee. The statute did not prohibit it from showing these facts. Between the parties the lease was valid. The purpose of the statute was to protect subsequent purchasers against prior and unrecorded conveyances; it was not passed to protect those who claim no right or title in the premises conveyed by the unrecorded lease. As was said by Morton, J., in Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Boston, 211 Mass. 526, 531, 98 N. E. 1067:

‘The object of the statute is to protect those taking title bona fide from a prior unrecorded deed or lease of which they have no notice.’

See Butrick, Pet'r, 185 Mass. 107, 111, 69 N. E. 1044;Anthony v. N. Y. Prov. & Boston R. R., 162 Mass. 60, 61, 37 N. E. 780. The lease, therefore was properly admitted in evidence.

[2] We do not think the jury were misled by what the judge said to them when speaking of the intention of the corporation acting by its officers and agents. Their undisclosed intention was of no importance. It was what was said and done-their speech and conduct-that the jury were to pass on in determining whether Peabody was in fact...