Potts v. City of Hugo

• Decision Date: 15 December 1987
• Docket Number: No. C3-87-1232,C3-87-1232
• Citation: 416 N.W.2d 465
• Parties: Arthur J. POTTS, Appellant, v. CITY OF HUGO, Gene Sampson, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 465

416 N.W.2d 465

Arthur J. POTTS, Appellant, v. CITY OF HUGO, Gene Sampson, et al., Respondents.

No. C3-87-1232.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Dec. 15, 1987.

Review Denied Feb. 17, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Trial court properly found that parking a semi-truck and trailer in the Hardwood Creek Estates subdivision was not inconsistent with that neighborhood's single-family, residential character; did not decrease that neighborhood's general appearance; and did not violate that subdivision's restrictive covenants.

2. Trial court erred in holding that the Sampsons' parking their semi-truck and trailer at their Hardwood Creek Estates' home does not violate the city of Hugo's zoning or parking ordinances. Such parking is not a permitted accessory use within the zoning ordinance because it is not accessory to the Sampsons' residential use of their property. The city of Hugo's residential parking ordinance prohibits the regular parking of a commercial vehicle weighing in excess of 7,000 pounds, such as the Sampsons', in Hardwood Creek Estates' residential neighborhood.

Bradley J. Gunn, Olson, Gunn & Seran, Ltd., Minneapolis, for appellant.

David T. Magnuson, Magnuson & Dieperink, Stillwater, for City of Hugo.

James I. Moberg, Eckberg, Lammers, Briggs, Wolff & Vierling, Stillwater, for Gene Sampson, et al.

Heard, considered and decided by SEDGWICK, P.J., and PARKER and HUSPENI, JJ.

OPINION

PARKER, Judge.

Appellant Arthur Potts brought a declaratory judgment action against respondents Gene and Lisa Sampson and the City of Hugo. The court determined that the zoning and parking ordinances of Hugo's city code and the Hardwood Creek Estates' restrictive covenants do not prohibit the Sampsons from parking their semi-truck and trailer at their home. Potts appeals from the judgment entered pursuant to the trial court's judgment in the Sampsons' favor. We reverse.

FACTS

The Sampsons live in a single-family dwelling in the Hardwood Creek Estates subdivision of the city of Hugo. The subdivision is located in an agricultural zoning district of the city.

Before purchasing their home, the Sampsons asked the Hugo city council whether they would be permitted to park their semi-truck and trailer on their property when it was not in use for over-the-road transport. At a council meeting, a majority of the council determined that parking the semi- truck and trailer was a permissible use of the property. Potts, a council member and the Sampsons' soon-to-be neighbor, opposed the determination.

The council then consulted with its city attorney. The city attorney reviewed the zoning ordinance and rendered an opinion that parking the truck was neither prohibited nor authorized by the ordinance. He further concluded that parking the truck in the agricultural district was comparable to other uses expressly permitted by the ordinance. Based on the council's interpretation of the ordinance, the Sampsons purchased the home and its 6.3-acre lot.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court properly find that parking a semi-truck and trailer in Hardwood Creek Estates does not violate the subdivision's restrictive covenants?

2. Did the court err in holding that parking a semi-truck and trailer is a permissible accessory use in Hardwood Creek Estates and is not prohibited by the city of Hugo's residential parking ordinance?

DISCUSSION

I

The Hardwood Creek Estates' recorded restrictive covenants provide:

"[S]ingle family residential plot" shall mean a Lot used for a residence constructed for occupancy of a single-family. Any plot conveyed by deed, shall thereafter be used only for a single-family residential plot, or held as vacant land * * *.

* * *

No activity shall be carried on upon the property nor shall anything be done thereon which * * * will decrease the general appearance of the neighborhood or be inconsistent with the character of a neighborhood of single-family residences.

The restrictive covenants restrict the Sampsons' land use to single-family residential. The land is not vacant, and the Sampsons concede they bought their house for a place in which to live.

The parties' dispute centers on whether parking the semi-truck and trailer is "inconsistent with the character of a neighborhood of single-family residences" (emphasis added). On the basis of the stipulated facts and the parties' photographs of the subdivision, the trial court found that the Sampsons' activities were not inconsistent with other property owners' activities and did not decrease the neighborhood's general appearance.

Evidence exists from which the trial court could reasonably find that parking a semi-truck and trailer was not inconsistent with this neighborhood, though the restrictive covenant uses the indefinite article "a" before "neighborhood." Had the case gone to trial, three Hardwood Creek Estates residents would have testified on Potts' behalf that, in their opinions, the Sampsons' truck decreases the neighborhood's general appearance. Four subdivision residents would have testified to the contrary on the Sampsons' behalf. Other evidence would show that subdivision residents conduct diverse activities on their properties, including an automobile repair business, automobile storage and body work, junk car storage, and the parking of another semi-truck and trailer.

II Scope of Review

[W]hile issues of fact and legislative policy-making decisions should be left to the city's determination, subject only to the broad limits of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, the interpretation of an existing ordinance is a question of law for the court. The opinions of the governmental authority, while entitled to consideration, are not as persuasive as they would be on questions of fact within its purview. Thus, where the question is whether an ordinance is applicable to certain facts, the determination of those facts is for the governmental authority, but the manner of applying the ordinance to the facts is for the court.

Frank's Nursery Sales v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn.1980) (citations omitted).

Because the parties submitted this case on stipulated facts, we need only address whether the trial court properly applied the ordinances in dispute to these facts.

Zoning Ordinance

Hugo City Code Sec. 320-4, subd. C provides:

REGULATIONS FOR THE AGRICULTURE DISTRICT (A). Within the Agriculture District, unless otherwise provided in this Ordinance, no building or land shall be used and no building shall hereafter be erected or structurally altered except for one or more of the following uses:

(1) Permitted principal uses. Rural agriculture, single family dwelling unit, sod farming and tree farming. * * *

(2) Permitted accessory uses. One roadside stand offering for sale only those products grown on the premises, provided that such stand does not exceed an area of 500 square feet, is located in conformance with yard regulations, and provisions are made for...