Potts v. Riddle

• Decision Date: 23 December 1908
• Docket Number: 1,042.
• Citation: 63 S.E. 253,5 Ga.App. 378
• Parties: POTTS v. RIDDLE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

63 S.E. 253

5 Ga.App. 378

POTTS v. RIDDLE.

No. 1,042.

Court of Appeals of Georgia

December 23, 1908

Syllabus by the Court.

There was no error in overruling the demurrer to the plaintiff's petition. In cases of doubt, a contract is to be construed as seeking to effect a legal object rather than as an agreement to commit a crime. One may legally contract to purchase the notes of another, even though such notes be payable in labor, provided he who has agreed to labor voluntarily consents to the transfer of his obligation to labor from the original payee of the note to another.

[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 734; Dec Dig. § 153; ^[*] Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 157; Dec. Dig. § 89. ^[*] ]

Where one is induced to purchase certain promissory notes upon the undertaking of the promisor to perform a contract of labor the undertaking of the purchaser of such notes to pay the agreed price for them is not avoided by the death of the maker of the notes or by loss of the services it was contemplated he should receive in exchange for the purchase price. To safeguard a contract of hire against loss liable to accrue by reason of the death of the employé, it must be expressly stipulated that such is the agreement of the parties.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bills and Notes, Cent. Dig. § 746; Dec. Dig. § 313. ^[*] ]

In a suit upon a contract, it is not error to refuse an amendment attempting to set up fraud in the procurement of the contract where there is no allegation that the defendant did not know or have reasonable means of knowing the contents of the contract, especially where there was failure to allege that the defendant was in fact defrauded.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 416; Dec. Dig. § 93. ^[*] ]

A citizen of full age, laboring under no disabilities, may agree, in payment of his debt, to labor for another suggested by his creditor instead of for the creditor himself, and, in the absence of evidence that the debtor was in any wise coerced, or even that there was any attempt to influence him into performing services unwillingly, a plaintiff who sues to recover the value of the indebtedness transferred by him to a named defendant is entitled to recover upon his contract.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 151; Dec. Dig. § 83. (FN*) ]

Error from City Court of Newman; A. D. Freeman, Judge.

Action by D. H. Riddle against W. A. Potts. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

In the absence of an allegation of want of knowledge of the true terms of a contract, the presumption is that a party did know its terms before he actually signed it and, if he knew them before he signed it, is immaterial that the other party may have induced him to sign it by saying that he was in a hurry, and that the party signing did not have time to get an attorney.

D. H. Riddle sued W. A. Potts on a written contract, and there was a verdict for the plaintiff. The contract attached to the petition was as follows: "Georgia, Coweta County. Know all men by these presents that whereas Will Dews is indebted to D. H. Riddle of Goodwater, Ala., in the sum of $272, evidenced by seventeen notes in the sum of $16 each, payable monthly, and whereas the said Riddle is on the bond of said Dews for $500, for the appearance of the said Dews before the county court of Clay county on a charge of murder, and in consideration of the said Riddle remaining on said bail bond, and the further consideration that the said Dews has agreed to work with the said Riddle or at his direction, and whereas I am desirous of securing the services of the said Dews, it is therefore agreed that I will pay cash to said Riddle $112, on the indebtedness due the said Riddle from the said Dews, and the said Riddle transferred to me seven of the $16 notes on said Dews, and that on the 1st day of January, 1907, if the grand jury in the county of Clay county, Ala., fail to indict the said Dews, or if he is indicted, and the said Riddle procures a nolle pros. of such indictment, then, in either of those events, I agree to pay the said Riddle on the 1st day of January, 1907, the further and additional sum of $113, and the said Riddle agrees to transfer to me the remainder of said notes on said Dews, except two of the same. In case said Dews is indicted and his case is not nolle prossed, then I agree to deliver said Dews back to the said Riddle or the sheriff of Clay county, Ala., at Ashland, Ala., by the 1st day of January, 1907; and, on failure to deliver said Dews, I agree to pay the said Riddle the said sum of $113. It is understood and agreed that said Riddle is to remain on the bond of the said Dews, and continue to represent and defend him in said criminal prosecution. Witness my hand and seal to day, February 19, 1906.-W. A. Potts. (L. S.)" The defendant demurred to the petition generally upon the ground that it was insufficient in law to set forth a cause of action, and also because the allegations of the petition and the contract itself as attached show that the contract sued on is contrary to public policy, illegal, null and void, because it is in violation of paragraph 17, § 1, art. 1, of the Constitution of the state of Georgia and of the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The court overruled the demurrer.

In the defendant's answer he admitted that the copy of the alleged written contract was correct, but denied liability thereon, and, among other reasons, pleaded in the sixth paragraph of the answer a total failure of consideration growing out of the fact that the Will Dews mentioned in the contract had been killed in March, 1906, without fault of the defendant. Upon demurrer by the plaintiff this paragraph of the answer was stricken. The defendant then offered to amend his answer, and proposed two additional paragraphs thereto; and exception is taken to the refusal of the court to allow that part of the proposed amendment in which the defendant attempted to set up that the contract was the result of fraud practiced on him by the plaintiff. The amendment disallowed was as follows: "It was understood and agreed by and between plaintiff and defendant, at the time of the making of said alleged contract attached to the petition in said case, that defendant was not to pay plaintiff any amount over and above said $112 actually paid plaintiff by defendant if the same Dews should either die or leave the service of defendant prior to January 1, 1907, and, further, if said Dews should remain with defendant until January 1, 1907, and should not be indicted by said grand jury in Alabama, or, if indicted, said plaintiff should secure a nolle prosequi of said indictment, then defendant was to have the right and option of either returning said Dews to plaintiff, or of paying the plaintiff further money, and retain said Dews in his service. The foregoing stipulations and provisions were a part of said contract, and should have been engrafted therein, but were omitted by the fraud of plaintiff and the misrepresentations of plaintiff to defendant, in this, to wit: At the time of the execution of said contract plaintiff represented to defendant he was sick and suffering intensely with sick headache, and was greatly pressed for time to catch a train for his home, and plaintiff represented to defendant that said contract was so worded and framed as to embody said stipulations above set forth, and so as to protect defendant against said contingencies, and give him the said option, and plaintiff, being an attorney at law, and defendant presuming he knew how to prepare contracts, and defendant relying on the representations of plaintiff that said contract protected defendant as aforesaid, signed said contract. On account of the pressure on defendant at the time brought on by what plaintiff represented was his condition, to wit, suffering with sick headache, and being pressed for time to catch said train, defendant did not have time to submit said contract to an attorney at law or person capable of construing same, and hurriedly signed said contract, relying solely on said representations of plaintiff as aforesaid." Upon the trial the contract was introduced in evidence, and it was shown that the eight notes specified in it had been duly transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant and tendered to him. It was also shown that no indictment had ever been returned against Will Dews by the grand jury of Clay county, Ala. The only testimony in behalf of the defendant was that Will Dews mentioned in the contract had been killed by one Bowen in the early part of March, 1906, without the fault of the defendant, and that he was present when Riddle dictated the contract to a stenographer, and that he signed the same after it was written out. The court ruled out the evidence of the killing of Dews, and exception is taken to this ruling.

W. L. Stallings and W. C. Wright, for plaintiff in error.

A. H. Freeman, for defendant in error.

RUSSELL J.

We think the court properly overruled the demurrer to the petition. The petition fully and specifically set forth a cause of action against the defendant upon the contract attached as part of the petition, and the special contention raised that the contract is unenforceable because it is contrary to public policy and void because in violation of the Constitution is without merit. We think the court upon consideration of the demurrer properly construed the contract. Not only is the construction, which will uphold a contract as a whole and in every part, to be preferred ( Fletcher & Bullock...