Potts v. State
| Citation | 72 S.E.2d 553,86 Ga.App. 779 |
| Decision Date | 18 September 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 34229,34229,2 |
| Parties | POTTS v. STATE |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where evidence partly competent and partly incompetent is offered as a whole and objected to as a whole, the illegal portion not being objected to separately, admitting all of such evidence affords no legal cause of complaint to the objecting party.
2. There was no error in admitting the evidence discussed in the second division of this opinion for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of the prosecutrix, an accomplice in the crime, and of showing the state of mind of the defendant.
3. The answer elicited on cross-examination of a witness for the State, while damaging to the defendant, was responsive to the question and the motion of counsel to strike such answer was properly overruled.
4. 'The sufficiency of circumstances proved to corroborate the accomplice is entirely a matter for the jury, provided the circumstances proved, independently of the testimony of the accomplice, lead to the inference that the defendant is guilty, and in some way connect him with the guilty act.' Rice v. State, 16 Ga.App. 128(4), 84 S.E. 609.
C. A. Potts was indicted, tried and convicted in the Superior Court of Turner County for the offense of incestuous adultery upon the person of his stepdaughter. The prosecutrix testified in substance that the defendant had forced her to have intercourse with him about twelve times in a period of 18 months, the first being in April, 1950, at which time she was 15 years old; that on this occasion she first refused and the defendant beat her with a belt until she consented; that he then threatened to kill her if she told her mother; that because of his threats and beatings she did not tell anyone and continued to have intercourse with him; that she and the defendant were both employed at the Gulf Oil Refining Company; that on April 17, 1951, her employer sent the defendant on a trip for oil; that the defendant made her quit work and wait until he was ready to leave; that she went to Rebecca with him and on the way home refused to have intercourse with him, but acceded after he threatened to kill her and leave her in the woods; that because of the defendant forcing her to leave work both were discharged the next day. The employer testified substantially to the effect that the defendant had told the prosecutrix to go with him; that the witness had refused her permission to leave; that the defendant had talked to her again and that she had then come back with tears in her eyes and said that she had to go anyhow; that because of the defendant's interference he had been forced to discharge them both; that on another occasion when the defendant was to take gas to Rebecca and leave at four o'clock in the afternoon he had waited until seven o'clock and taken the prosecutrix with him although the employer had offered her transportation home, and that on still another occasion he had driven them both home but the defendant had insisted on getting out of the car with the prosecutrix some distance from the house. The prosecutrix further testified that after her discharge she obtained employment with Colonial Stores; that the defendant continually hung around and spied on her; that on June 27, 1951, he came up and slapped her, accusing her of improper behavior with another clerk; that he beat her with a belt buckle and an ax handle that night and ordered her from the premises; that she then went to the sheriff and told him the entire story, and that because he had told her to leave she had for the first time had courage to make the report.
The manager of the store testified to the incident of the slapping, and that he went to the house that night to talk to the defendant because of his treatment of her. Another witness corroborated the testimony of the prosecutrix that the defendant had interfered with her telephone calls in the place of business, accusing her of talking with boys, and the defendant said, 'I used the buckle on you one time and I would use it on you again', and that the prosecutrix burst into tears. Medical testimony that the beating had been severe, and as to the extent of the bruises, was introduced; also that the prosecutrix had engaged in sexual intercourse prior to the examination. The sheriff's testified that he talked with the defendant for about an hour on the night of his arrest and stated:
The defense relied principally upon written and oral statements of the prosecutrix tending to impeach her testimony. The defendant made a statement in which he denied the charge for which he was on trial, stating that he had sought to correct the girl by whipping her because she stayed out late at night, but that he had always had her interest at heart.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial which was later amended by the addition of nine special grounds, the overruling of which is assigned as error.
Bobby Lee Cook, Summerville, for plaintiff in error.
J. Bowie Gray, Solicitor-Gen., Tifton, for defendant in error.
TOWNSEND, Judge (after stating the foregoing facts).
1. Special ground 1 of the amended motion for a new trial complains of the admission over objection of a portion of the prosecutrix' testimony, including her testimony that she was regularly employed, and her place of employment. Special ground 8 assigns error on the admission of the entire testimony of the sheriff, including the incriminatory admission to him by the defendant. In each case, at least part of the evidence objected to was clearly admissible. Where evidence partly competent and partly incompetent is offered as a whole and objected to as a whole, the illegal portion not being objected to separately, admitting all of such evidence affords no legal cause of complaint to the objecting party. Loughridge v. State, 181 Ga. 261(4), 182 S.E. 12; Ogletree v. State, 66 Ga.App. 49(3), 16 S.E.2d 882. Further, the only objections to the evidence offered at the time of its admission were that such evidence was 'irrelevant and immaterial and prejudicial to the rights of the defendant' and 'had nothing to do with the case at bar.' Such an assignment of error is insufficient, as not showing wherein the evidence was as characterized, and therefore the overruling of the objections was not reversible error. Mims v. State, 207 Ga. 118(2), 60 S.E.2d 373; Deen v. Baxley State Bank, 62 Ga.App. 536(2), 8 S.E.2d 689.
2. Special ground 2 complains of error in admitting over objection testimony of the prosecutrix as to the...
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Clyatt v. State
...further; hence, he has no standing to complain about her responsive answer to his questions, which he himself elicited. Potts v. State, 86 Ga.App. 779(3), 72 S.E.2d 553; Scott v. State, 57 Ga.App. 187(1), 194 S.E. 844. Furthermore, the evidence was admissible to show the defendant's identit......
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Hufstetler v. State, 67571
...this testimony, no matter how prejudicial it may have been. Thomas v. State, 213 Ga. 237(2), 98 S.E.2d 548 (1957); Potts v. State, 86 Ga.App. 779(3), 72 S.E.2d 553 (1952); see Perryman v. State, 244 Ga. 720(2), 261 S.E.2d 588 (1979); Jackson v. State, 154 Ga.App. 411(1), 268 S.E.2d 749 (198......
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Pitts v. State, 47587
...177 Ga. 757(3), 171 S.E. 290. 5. The sufficiency of corroboration of the accomplice is entirely a matter for the jury. Potts v. State, 86 Ga.App. 779(4), 72 S.E.2d 553. And if there be some corroborating testimony, this court will not say the evidence did not authorize the verdict. Walters ......
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Thomas v. State, 19649
...77 Ga. 181(3), 3 S.E. 399; Mickle v. Moore, 188 Ga. 444, 4 S.E.2d 217; Scott v. State, 57 Ga.App. 187, 194 S.E. 844; and Potts v. State, 86 Ga.App. 779(3), 72 S.E.2d 553. And in the second place, this court has repeatedly held that, where the accused after arrest does an act, without object......