Poway Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (Copley Press)

• Decision Date: 13 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. D029634,D029634
• Citation: 62 Cal.App.4th 1496,73 Cal.Rptr.2d 777
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 125 Ed. Law Rep. 165, 26 Media L. Rep. 1943, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2736, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3738 POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent; The Copley Press, Real Party in Interest.

Page 777

73 Cal.Rptr.2d 777

62 Cal.App.4th 1496, 125 Ed. Law Rep. 165,

26 Media L. Rep. 1943, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2736,

98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 3738

POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Diego County, Respondent The Copley Press, Real Party in Interest.

No. D029634.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

April 13, 1998.

Review Denied July 29, 1998. ^*

Stutz, Gallagher, Artiano, Shinoff & Holtz, Daniel R. Shinoff and Jack M. Sleeth, Jr., San Diego, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Gray, Cary, Ware & Friedenrich, Guylyn R. Cummins, San Diego, for Real Party in Interest.

Thomas W. Newton, James E. Grossberg, Washington, DC, and Anne H. Egerton, Burbank, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

McINTYRE, Associate Justice.

ISSUE

We decide here whether a claim form submitted by a minor to a public school district under the California Tort Claims Act (hereafter the Claims Act) (GOV.CODE, § 910¹ et seq.), is protected against disclosure under (1) certain exemptions in the Public Records Act (§§ 6254, subd. (b) or 6255), or (2) the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (hereafter FERPA) (20 U.S.C. § 1232g) and/or Education Code section 49060. We conclude these provisions of law do not protect the information from disclosure.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As part of a hazing incident at a high school in the Poway Unified School District (District) in March 1997, three 16-year-old sophomores brutally sodomized a 15-year-old freshman student with a broomstick. After the perpetrators pleaded guilty, they were sentenced in juvenile court. In proceedings attended by the media, the victim's identity was disclosed.

The media provided wide coverage of the sentencing court's comments excoriating the District for tolerating a climate of abusive initiation practices. In addition, the parents of the perpetrators agreed to the public release of confidential juvenile court records and files concerning prior hazing incidents to publicize the history of hazing at the high school. However, in accordance with its own policy, the Union-Tribune, a San Diego newspaper, did not publicize the name of the victim or the perpetrators.

One of the perpetrators then submitted a Claims Act claim against the District. The claim apparently included a description of prurient details about the attack. There were also claims submitted by other students, based on different hazing incidents at the same high school.

The victim did not submit a formal Claims Act claim to the District. However, the victim's attorney sent a letter in May 1997, urging settlement of the victim's potential claim, and raising the issue of confidentiality:

"Because I am keenly aware of your duties as trustees for the children and residents of your community I believe that you will want to deal with your district's liability to [the victim] in a professional and, if possible, a confidential way."

The victim and the District did settle, in part to protect the privacy of the victim, and the superior court ordered the settlement sealed. Nonetheless, in September 1997, the victim's attorney and the District participated in a press conference to announce the fact of settlement.

Meanwhile, in July and August 1997, the Union-Tribune sought access "to any and all [Claims Act] claims filed with the District between March 20, 1997 through July 18, 1997" under the Public Records Act. However, the District refused to provide unresolved claims, citing the "open claims" exemption to the Public Records Act and its own concern about protecting the privacy of the minor victim of the assault. (§ 6254, subd. (b).) The Copley Press Inc. (Copley), publisher of the Union-Tribune, thereupon filed a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court, contending these reasons for nondisclosure did not apply.

The trial court granted the writ; ordered the District to produce records with names, addresses and telephone numbers of the minors redacted; and denied the request for stay. It also awarded attorney fees and costs to Copley pursuant to section 6259. The District has produced redacted records in compliance with the order.

The District filed this petition, asking for published guidance concerning its duties on an issue likely to recur. ² Other media representatives joined Copley's opposition as amici curiae, and the County of San Diego expressed its particular interest in clarification of the issue under FERPA (20 U.S.C. § 1232g), and/or Education Code section 49060.

DISCUSSION

The Public Records Act specifies that any public record in the possession of a state or local agency must be disclosed to any citizen unless an exemption applies. (§ 6253.) It enumerates specific exemptions, and also provides a catchall withholding clause, allowing nondisclosure of a record if the government can demonstrate that public policy necessitates nondisclosure. (§§ 6254, subd. (b), 6255.)

"Public records" is defined in broad terms, to include:

"[A]ny writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public's business prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics." (§ 6252, subd. (d).)

This broad definition is designed to protect the public's need to be informed regarding the actions of government, as expressed both in the Public Records Act and in the open meeting requirements of the Ralph M. Brown Act (§ 54950 et seq.). (Barber, The California Public Records Act: The Public's Right of Access to Governmental Information (1976) 7 Pacific L.J. 105, 110-111.) Indeed, secrecy is "antithetical to a democratic system of 'government of the people, by the people [and] for the people.' " (San Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 762, 771-772, 192 Cal.Rptr. 415.)

Balanced against the public's right to know is the victim's right to privacy. (See Welf. & Inst.Code, § 676, subd. (b) [barring the public from juvenile court hearings, even on serious crimes, upon request of the victim]; Pen.Code, § 293.5 [analogous protections in criminal proceedings]; § 6254, subd. (f)(2) [allowing a state or local agency compiling law enforcement records to withhold the name of a minor victim of enumerated crimes at the request of his parent]; and § 54961, subd. (b) [Brown Act exception to disclosure requirements in sex crime cases].) People v. Ramirez (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 47, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9, eloquently articulated the privacy concern for these types of crimes:

"There can be little dispute that the state's interest in protecting the privacy of sex offense victims is extremely strong and fully justified. 'No crime is more horribly invasive or more brutally intimate than rape.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 53, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9.)

" 'Privacy' is not an insignificant interest --- it is described in our state Constitution as one of our 'inalienable rights.' (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) In the context of the victim of a sex offense, our Legislature ... has likewise determined that the privacy interest of such a victim is significant.... [M]any victims are reluctant to report sex offenses 'because of fear they will be publicly identified and humiliated.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 56, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 9.)

In this context, we discuss the various bases for withholding the claims presented here.

1. EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 6254, SUBDIVISION (b)

Section 6254, subdivision (b) provides:

"[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to require disclosure of records that are any of the following:

"(b) Records pertaining to pending litigation to which the public agency is a party, or to claims made pursuant to Division 3.6 (commencing with Section 810), until the pending litigation or claim has been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled."

To initiate litigation against a public entity, it is well-established that a plaintiff must first file a claim under the Claims Act. (§§ 945.4, 912.4; Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 860.) Section 910 specifies the information to be included, some of which may implicate privacy concerns. Many public entities provide forms for this purpose. (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 1997) p 1:681, pp. 1-144, rev. #1, 1996.)

There are no California cases deciding whether the exemption of section 6254, subdivision (b) encompasses the actual claim form itself. Although the Public Records Act is modeled on the federal Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552), the federal statute contains no comparable provision for guidance in interpreting the California statute. (Schaffer, A Look at the California Records Act and its Exemptions (1974) 4 Golden Gate L.Rev. 203, 216.)

There is a 1988 opinion by the California Attorney General, which concludes the exemption does not encompass the Claims Act claim form itself. (71 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 235, 238 (1988).) The Attorney General reasoned the word "pertain" means "to relate, to belong, to be pertinent to something However, the language of section 6254, subdivision (b) is also susceptible to a different interpretation, advocated by the District, reflecting the common parlance usage of "claim" as a set of facts giving rise to obligations. (See DeCastro West Chodorow & Burns, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 410, 421, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 792.) In this sense, the claim form itself "pertains to" the underlying operative facts. Under this interpretation, the language of the exemption would include the claim form.

else," and the claim form itself was that "something else" not encompassed in the exemption.

Based on the existence of more than one reasonable interpretation of the statute, it seems to us that the language of the statute, "pertaining ... to claims," is ambiguous. When an examination of the plain meaning of the pertinent terms of a statute fails to resolve a dispute, we next consider the context in which the words...