Powell v. Advancing Opportunities

Decision Date16 November 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 22-00525 (FLW)
PartiesTAMEKA POWELL, Plaintiff, v. ADVANCING OPPORTUNITIES; VANESSA ORTIZ; PAUL RONOLLO; JOHN DOE; JANE DOE, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

FREDA L. WOLFSON U.S. CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

Pro se Plaintiff Tameka Powell (Plaintiff or “Powell”) brings employment related claims against Defendants advancing Opportunities (Advancing Opportunities), Paul Ronollo (Ronollo) and Vanessa Ortiz[1](“Ortiz”) (collectively Defendants), in connection with her termination from Advancing Opportunities. Presently before the Court, is a partial motion to dismiss filed by Advancing Opportunities pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), in which it argues that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for wrongful termination, misrepresentation violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), violation of the New Jersey Family Leave Act (“NJFLA”), N.J.S.A. § 34:11B-1 et seq., and violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In addition, Advancing Opportunities seeks a more definite statement pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) as to Plaintiff's remaining claim for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601.

For the reasons set forth below, Advancing Opportunities' partial motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically Plaintiff's claims for wrongful termination, misrepresentation, and violation of the ADA, NJFLA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the Rehabilitation Act are dismissed for failure to state a claim. These claims are dismissed without prejudice. To the extent that Plaintiff believes she can supply additional facts to cure the deficiencies discussed in this Opinion, Plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to amend her Complaint within 30 days from the date of the accompanying Order. As to Plaintiff's FMLA claim, Advancing Opportunities' request for a more definite statement is denied, because it is clear from the Complaint's allegations that she asserts a retaliation claim.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Court assumes the facts set forth in the Amended Complaint to be true for the purposes of the present motion.

Plaintiff alleges that she was hired by Advancing Opportunities in October 2015, and that in 2018, she was elevated to a manager.[2](ECF No. 17 (“Am. Compl.”), ¶¶ 6-7.) According to Plaintiff, on March 12, 2020, a new patient was admitted into the Advancing Opportunities facility without “paperwork stating that he was free and clear from all communicable disease[.] (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that this patient had been diagnosed with COVID-19 and later died from the virus. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff further alleges that on March 20, 2020, she was diagnosed with COVID-19, and she went to the hospital with severe shortness of breath. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that she was hospitalized for twelve days, but that she still suffered from difficulties breathing. (Id. at ¶ 12.) According to Plaintiff, her primary care physician kept Plaintiff from working until August 3, 2020, due to “the seriousness of [her] medical complications.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) Plaintiff claims that her medical leave was approved from March 23, 2020 to May 4, 2020, and that she extended the leave until June 8, 2020. (Id. at ¶ 17.) While Plaintiff's FMLA was set to expire on June 12, 2020, Plaintiff alleges that Advancing Opportunities granted her “personal leave” for a period of thirty days from June 15, 2020 to July 15, 2020. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Then, on July 7, 2020, Plaintiff claims that she received an email from Advancing Opportunities stating that she would be terminated unless she returned to work by July 15, 2020. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff purportedly requested to work from home temporarily, but Advancing Opportunities denied that request. (Id. at ¶ 21) When Plaintiff did not return to work as demanded by Advancing Opportunities, she was terminated in July 2020. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

On June 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division - Monmouth County. (ECF No. 1-1.) After filing a Notice of Removal, Advancing Opportunities filed a partial motion to dismiss and moved for a more definite statement as to Plaintiff's FMLA claim. (ECF No. 4.) In that motion, Advancing Opportunities argued that most of Plaintiff's purported claims, which were referenced in a “Damages” paragraph, must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Id.)

On June 17, 2022, the Court denied Advancing Opportunities' motion to dismiss, but required Plaintiff to file an “all-inclusive amended complaint[.] (ECF No. 12.)

On July 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, adding Mr. Ronollo as an individual defendant. (Am. Compl.) Shortly thereafter, on August 11, 2022, Advancing Opportunities filed the instant partial motion to dismiss and for a more definite statement, which Plaintiff has opposed. (ECF No. 18.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a claim “for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the moving party “bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)); Haney v. USA Gymnastics, Inc., No. 21-07213, 2022 WL 909871, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2022). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts first separate the factual and legal elements of the claims, and accept all of the well-pleaded facts as true. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). Thus, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to raise a plaintiff's right to relief above the speculative level, so that a claim “is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570; Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). All reasonable inferences must be made in the plaintiff's favor. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).

Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding Pro se, I construe her Amended Complaint liberally and in the interests of substantial justice. See, e.g., Higgs v. AG of the United States, 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a Pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (Courts are to construe complaints so as to do substantial justice, keeping in mind that Pro se complaints in particular should be construed liberally.”); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d. Cir. 2003) (“apply[ing] the applicable law, irrespective of whether the Pro se litigant has mentioned it by name,” on a motion to dismiss) (citations omitted). Even so, I am not required to credit “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions” simply because Plaintiffs are proceeding Pro se. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A Pro se complaint may just as readily be dismissed if it sets forth allegations which cannot be construed to supply facts supporting a claim for relief. See Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981); Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F.Supp.3d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013).

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e)

Rule 12(e) provides, in pertinent part: [a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Defendants must file a motion pursuant to Rule 12(e) “before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). In the Third Circuit, a motion for a more definite statement is granted when “the pleading is too vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith, without prejudice to [itself].” MK Strategies, LLC v. Ann Taylor Stores Corp., 567 F.Supp.2d 729, 736-37 (D.N.J. 2008). Rule 12(e) motions are a remedy for an unintelligible pleading, but it is not to be utilized to correct a pleading simply lacking in detail. Premier Payments Online, Inc. v. Payment Sys. Worldwide, 848 F.Supp.2d 513, 522 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). These motions are generally disfavored “in light of the liberal pleading standards under the Federal Rules,” Marley v. Donahue, No. 14-1597, 2014 WL 5152618, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 2014) (citation omitted) and can be prone to abuse by defendants because it could require more specificity than required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), therefore such motions should only be granted under “strictest necessity.” Gittens v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 13-5534, 2014 WL 1744851, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2014). Rule 12(e) motions are within the sound discretion of the district court. Clark v. McDonald's Corp., 213 F.R.D. 198, 232 (D.N...

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