Powell v. American Towing & Lighterage Co.

• Decision Date: 12 December 1917
• Docket Number: 24.
• Citation: 102 A. 747,131 Md. 539
• Parties: POWELL v. AMERICAN TOWING & LIGHTERAGE CO. et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

102 A. 747

131 Md. 539

POWELL v. AMERICAN TOWING & LIGHTERAGE CO. et al.

No. 24.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 12, 1917

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; Robert F. Stanton Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Suit by Lewis Frederick Powell against the American Towing & Lighterage Company and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Argued before BOYD, C.J., and BRISCOE, BURKE, THOMAS, and URNER, JJ.

R. E Kanode, of Baltimore (William W. Varney, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

W Lentz and John Peirce Bruns, both of Baltimore (France McLanahan & Rouzer, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellees.

BRISCOE J.

This is a suit brought by the plaintiff against the defendants in the superior court of Baltimore city for an alleged libel upon him, in a written communication to the Department of Commerce, of the United States. The plaintiff is a seafaring man holding a United States license as master and pilot of steam vessels in certain waters, under the United States, and who was at one time a steamboat inspector at the port of Baltimore. The defendants are the American Towing & Lighterage Company, a body corporate, John McLeod, the master of the tug Buccaneer, and Robert J. Bradford, a resident of Baltimore city.

The declaration avers that the defendants wrote of and concerning the plaintiff the following alleged false and malicious words, and did publish them in a written communication to the Department of Commerce of the United States, to wit:

"Our tug Buccaneer left Norfolk for Port Arthur on p. m. on January 6, 1915. The master, John McLeod, of the tug Buccaneer, had engaged and shipped a second mate, one by the name of Frederick Powell, who has a master's license and who was at one time steamboat inspector at the port of Baltimore. When he reported for duty, he was in such a condition from drink that the master of the Buccaneer was forced to leave without him"

-meaning thereby that the plaintiff, Lewis Frederick Powell, who is known among the seafaring profession as Frederick Powell, was negligent of his duty, unreliable in his profession under his United States license, and incompetent to perform the duties required under said license, and in consequence of which the plaintiff had his master's and pilot's license suspended for a long period of time and was deprived of the opportunity of earning a livelihood in his professional capacity; and the plaintiff says:

"That the aforesaid communication, and the statements contained therein, were false and malicious, and that the same has injured him in his good name, fame, and reputation as a licensed seafaring man."

At the trial of the case the defendants interposed a demurrer to the declaration upon two grounds: First, that the declaration does not state a good cause of action; and, second, that the written publication set out in the declaration was a privileged communication. The court below sustained the demurrer, with leave to amend. The plaintiff declined to amend, and from a judgment for the defendants for costs this appeal has been taken.

The principal question presented upon the appeal, it will be seen, is one of pleading, and if the court below was right in its rulings upon the demurrer, that is the end of the case. The general rule of law, as to what constitutes a libelous communication or publication, has been frequently discussed and applied in numerous cases in this court. The earlier leading cases have been reviewed, and the general principle stated in them has been adopted and followed by the more recent cases. In Goldsborough v. Orem & Johnson, 103 Md. 681, 64 A. 36, it is said a false and malicious printed or written publication, which imputes conduct or qualities tending to disparage or degrade the plaintiff, or expose him to contempt, ridicule, or public hatred, or prejudice his private character or credit, is libelous per se. Weeks v. News Pub. Co., 117 Md. 130, 83 A. 162; Stannard v. Wilcox et al., 118 Md. 154, 84 A. 335, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 515, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 709; Dewitt v. Scarlett, 113 Md. 56, 77 A. 271; Brinsfield v. Howeth, 107 Md. 286, 68 A. 566, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 583; Robinson v. State, 108 Md. 644, 71 A. 433; Brinsfield v. Howeth, 110 Md. 520, 73 A. 289.

Without discussing the general question as to what communications the law will protect from a civil action for libel, it is sufficient for the purposes of this case to say that applying the well-settled rules referred to in the cases cited, we think the declaration in this case is sufficient in law and states a good cause of action. The demurrer admits the publication by the defendants, and that the words are false and malicious, as averred in the declaration. The plaintiff is named in the alleged article, and described as the person "engaged and shipped as second mate and who had a master's license." The language employed in the written words of the communication is sufficiently clear and explicit in itself, and, when taken in connection with the inducement and the colloquium, they clearly warrant the interpretation placed upon it by the innuendo, and the allegation of special damage is sufficiently stated in the declaration. In Wilson v. Cottman, 65 Md. 158, 3 A. 890, it is said the actionable character of the language must be tested by the question whether it imputes to the plaintiff the want of any qualification such as a clerk ought to have, or any misconduct which would make him unfit to discharge faithfully and correctly the duties of a clerk. Stannard v. Wilcox & Gibbs, 118 Md. 158, 84 A. 335, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 515, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 709; Lumby v. Allday, 1 Compton & Jervis, 301, ...