Powell v. Chapman, 19637
| Decision Date | 08 June 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 19637,19637 |
| Citation | 197 S.E.2d 287,260 S.C. 516 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Hester POWELL, Appellant, v. Robert CHAPMAN et al., Respondents. |
Cox & Lamb, Spartanburg, for appellant.
E. W. Johnson, Spartanburg, and Huger Sinkler, Charleston, for respondents.
This action is one under the 'Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act', Section 10--2001, et seq., 1962 Code of Laws, brought by Hester Powell, the appellant herein, the owner of property and a taxpayer in Spartanburg School District No. 3, against the Board of Trustees of said school district and the Attorney General of the State, the respondents herein. The purpose of the action is to determine whether certain property, situate within Spartanburg School District No. 3 and owned by Spartanburg County and acquired by it pursuant to Section 14--399.21, et seq., of the Code, The Industrial Bond Act, is includable as 'taxable property' in accordance with the true intent and meaning of Article X, Section 5(152) of the 1895 Constitution of this State which permits the said school district to 'incur bonded indebtedness for school purposes to an amount not exceeding twenty percent of the assessed value of all taxable property therein.'
It is admitted that the records of the Auditor of Spartanburg County show that the assessed value of all taxable property within School District No. 3 is approximately $11,260,000 and that approximately $4.2 million of this total assessment constitutes property of Spartanburg County acquired with the proceeds of bonds issued under the aforesaid Act. All of these properties are now leased by Spartanburg County to certain industries.
It is provided in Section 14--399.33 of the Code that 'all projects so long as county owned . . . shall be exempt from all taxation . . .', but under Section 14--399.26 it is provided that:
'Every lease shall contain a provision requiring the lessee to make payments to the county or counties, school district or school districts, and other political units wherein the project shall be located in lieu of taxes, in such amounts as would result from taxes levied on the project by such county or counties, school district or school districts, and other political unit or units, if the project were owned by the lessee, but with appropriate reductions similar to the tax exemptions, if any, which would be afforded to the lessee if it were the owner of the project.'
The properties acquired by Spartanburg County pursuant to the Industrial Bond Act have been leased to private industry, and such leases meet all of the requirements of the Act, including the requirement that the several lessees make payments in lieu of taxes in the same amounts as they would pay if they were, in fact, the owners of such properties. The amount of revenues which the taxing units, including Spartanburg School District No. 3, will collect with respect thereto, will be the same as if the properties were not exempt from Ad valorem taxes.
The Board of Trustees of School District No. 3, in calculating the amount of bonds which it may issue under its constitutional debt limitation, has included the properties owned by Spartanburg County under the Act as taxable property of the school district. The trial judge sustained this action of the Board of Trustees of the School District and the appellant alleges that he was in error in so holding.
It is the contention of the appellant that the term 'all taxable property' includes all such property as is subject to Ad valorem taxation. The respondents do not quarrel with the foregoing position but reject the appellant's conclusion that only property which is subject to Ad valorem taxation is includable as a part of the district's taxable property for the purpose of calculating the applicable constitutional debt limit. The respondents assert that the properties here, although exempt from Ad valorem taxes, are nevertheless 'taxable property'.
The essential characteristics of a tax are that it is not a voluntary payment or donation, but an enforced contribution, enacted pursuant to legislative authority, in the exercise of the taxing power, the contribution being of a proportional character, payable in money, and imposed, levied, and collected for the purpose of raising revenue, to be used for public or governmental purposes. 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 1, at page 32. The question of whether a particular contribution, charge, or burden is to be regarded as a tax depends on its real nature and not on its designation. Whether revenue shall be raised by one system or plan or by another, are matters committed necessarily to the discretion of the General Assembly of this State.
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Horry County Sch. Dist. v. Horry County
...is not subject to ad valorem taxes."). In support of its position, the district cites the following passage from Powell v. Chapman, 260 S.C. 516, 520, 197 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1973): The essential characteristics of a tax are that it is not a voluntary payment or donation, but an enforced contr......
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Brown v. County of Horry
...The question of whether a particular charge is a tax depends on its real nature and not its designation. Powell v. Chapman, 260 S.C. 516, 197 S.E.2d 287 (1973); Jackson v. Breeland, 103 S.C. 184, 88 S.E. 128 (1915) (in distinguishing assessments from taxes the court held that courts will lo......
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In re South Atlantic Packers Ass'n, Inc.
...and collected for the purpose of raising revenue, to be used for public or governmental purposes. emphasis added. Powell v. Chapman, 260 S.C. 516, 197 S.E.2d 287 (1973). The SCDA charges do not possess the essential characteristics of a tax—they are specific charges for specific services, w......
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State v. Foster
... ... State, 247 S.C. 393, 147 S.W.2d 627 (1966). Mr. Justice Powell, in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), laid down the controlling ... ...