Powell v. Crow

• Decision Date: 29 May 1907
• Citation: 204 Mo. 481,102 S.W. 1024
• Parties: POWELL v. CROW et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

102 S.W. 1024

204 Mo. 481

POWELL v. CROW et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

May 29, 1907.

1. QUIETING TITLE—SCOPE OF RELIEF.

In a suit to quiet title under Rev. St. 1899, § 650 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 667], the court may not do more than determine and adjudge the several interests of the parties.

2. JUDGMENT—AGAINST PERSON NOT PLEADING.

Where, at the close of a trial in suit to quiet title, one asked to be made a party defendant and his request was granted, but he afterwards concluded not to avail himself of the privilege and filed no pleading, and no issue was tendered to him, there was no basis for a decree against him.

3. MORTGAGES — ABSOLUTE DEED AS MORTGAGE.

If a deed was intended as security only, the grantee became an equitable mortgagee, and, when defendant bought the land afterwards at sheriff's sale under execution against the grantor, if, in the face of the grantor's homestead right, defendant acquired any title, it was only an equity of redemption.

4. QUIETING TITLE—EVIDENCE—BURDEN OF PROOF.

Where, in a suit to quiet title defendant, claiming under a sheriff's deed, asserted that plaintiff's prior deed was intended as a mortgage, the burden was on him to prove it; there being no showing of fraud and no great disproportion between the value of the property and the amount of the grantor's debt to plaintiff.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Crawford County; L. B. Woodside, Judge.

Suit to quiet title by W. J. Powell against W. N. Crow and another. From the judgment, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

J. B. Harrison, for appellant. Frank H. Farris, for respondents.

VALLIANT, P. J.

This is a suit under section 650, Rev. St. 1899 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 667], to quiet title to 319 acres of land in Crawford county. In the petition the plaintiff states that she is the owner of the land in fee simple; that she is informed and believes that the defendant W. N. Crow claims title to the land adverse to her claim, and prays that he be summoned to come in and show what he claims, and that the court will ascertain and determine the estate of plaintiff and defendant, respectively, and by its decree adjudge who has the title and general relief. Defendant Crow answered that he bought the land at sheriff's sale under execution against one Francis Martin, and believes he thereby acquired perfect title to the same. He also says that the plaintiff's interest is derived from a deed from Francis Martin to her, which, though absolute in form, was in equity only a mortgage to secure a debt Martin owed her. Defendant also prays that the court will determine the respective interests of the parties to the land. After the evidence was all in Martin, under whom both parties claim, asked the court to make him a party defendant and the court so ordered, but he filed no pleading of any kind, and took no part in the proceedings. On the trial the plaintiff introduced in evidence a warranty deed from Francis Martin to herself conveying the land in fee dated September 6, 1898. Then the plaintiff rested. Defendant introduced a judgment of the circuit court in his own favor against Martin for $1,679 and a deed from the sheriff under execution on that judgment conveying all of Martin's right, title, and interest in the land to defendant, dated February 21, 1901, and then introduced testimony tending to show that the plaintiff's deed from Martin, though absolute on its face, was really designed by the parties to be only a security for a debt Martin owed her. That was the main controversy in the case. The court found that issue for the defendant, and adjudged that the plaintiff's deed was an equitable mortgage; that there was due her on the mortgage debt from Martin $3,449 and interest; that Martin had a homestead in the land to the extent of $1,500 value, decreed that the mortgage be foreclosed by sale of the land, that out of the proceeds, after payment of costs, $1,500 be set apart as representing the homestead and that the plaintiff's debt be paid pro rata out of the $1,500 and the residue of the proceeds, and what was left of the $1,500 was to be paid to Martin, and what was left of the residue was to be paid to defendant. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed.

1. The decree went beyond the scope of the statute under which it was brought. When a court of equity acquires jurisdiction of a cause for any reason peculiar to original equity jurisprudence, it will retain the cause for all purposes, do full justice between the parties, instead of relegating them to another forum. But this is not the ancient equity suit to quiet title. The only authority for its institution or maintenance is contained in section 650, Rev. St. 1899, which prescribes who may bring the suit the purpose for which it may be brought and the extent to which the decree may go in adjusting the rights of the parties. That section is in these words: "Any person claiming any title, estate or interest in real property, whether the same be legal or equitable, certain or contingent, present or in reversion, or remainder, whether in possession or not, may institute an action against any person or persons having or claiming to have any title, estate or interest in such property, whether in possession or not, to ascertain and determine the estate, title and interest of said parties, respectively, in such real estate, and to define and adjudge by its judgment or decree the title, estate and interest of the parties severally in and to such real property." There is no authority in that section for the court to do more than to ascertain and determine define and adjudge the title, interest and estate of the parties severally in and to such real estate. Seidel v. Cornwell, 166 Mo. 51, 65 S. W. 971; Howard v. Brown, 197 Mo. 36, loc. cit. 50, 95 S. W. 191. If on a retrial of the cause the chancellor should find that the transaction between the plaintiff and her father, Francis Martin, which resulted in the deed she offered in evidence, was really intended as security for the debt her father owed her, that the debt was not extinguished, but remained after the delivery of the deed a personal obligation upon which she could maintain an action at law, then the court would be within the scope...