Powell v. Havens, Civil Action 4:21-CV-01565
| Decision Date | 22 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 4:21-CV-01565 |
| Parties | THERIN POWELL, Plaintiff, v. DETECTIVE TYSON HAVENS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the Court is a Complaint filed by pro se Plaintiff Therin Powell (“Powell”) on September 13, 2021. (Doc. 1). In his Complaint, Powell alleges that Defendants Tyson Havens, Dent, Caschera, Loudenslager, Gardner Adnerson, USMS, Edkin, Bell, Nancy Butts, and Ryan Gardner (hereinafter, collectively known as “Defendants”) illegally detained and confined him in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. (Doc. 1, at 3-8). At the time he filed his Complaint, Powell was a pretrial detainee at the Lycoming County Prison, located in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, at 3). Powell seeks the dismissal of his charges with prejudice, a restraining order, the return of his property, and the dismissal of his indictment. (Doc. 1, at 8).
The Court has conducted its statutorily-mandated screening of the Complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (Doc. 1). For the reasons provided herein, the Court finds that Powell's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 1). It is respectfully recommended that the Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. (Doc. 1).
Powell, proceeding pro se, initiated the instant action by filing a Complaint in this matter on September 13, 2021.[1] (Doc. 1). In his Complaint, Powell alleges that he was illegally detained violating his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process. (Doc. 1, at 7). Powell states that his case was dismissed, and the Defendants' appeal was denied, but the Defendants still presented his case to the grand jury for a resulting indictment. (Doc. 1, at 7). Powell argues that such fraudulent actions were retaliatory in nature due to Defendant Havens vendetta against Powell. (Doc. 1, at 7). Additionally, Powell alleges malicious prosecution, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, vindictive prosecution, and theft of property. (Doc. 1, at 8).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil complaint in which a prisoner is seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity.[2] 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 230 Fed.Appx. 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); see generally Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F.Supp.2d 579, 587-89 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (). Here, as Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee seeking to bring his suit in forma pauperis, both screening provisions apply. In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint's ‘bald assertions' or ‘legal conclusions' . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need the court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. St. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. There is no requirement that the pleading be specific or probable. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347 (citing Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 224, 233-234 (3d Cir. 2008). Rule 8(a) requires a “showing that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545).
With the aforementioned standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, ” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
To the extent that Powell is challenging the fact or duration of his confinement, the proper avenue is a petition for writ of habeas corpus; prisoners cannot challenge the fact or duration of confinement through a § 1983 action. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). A prisoner may challenge the fact or duration of confinement through a § 1983 action only after it has already been “reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994).
To determine if the fact or duration of confinement is, in fact being challenged, the Court must ask whether a win for the prisoner on the § 1983 action would necessarily imply that his confinement is invalid. Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006). The Third Circuit has stated that “a § 1983 action is not the appropriate action for claims challenging bail, a conviction and/or a sentence.” Bucano v. Sibum, No. 3:12-CV-606, 2013 WL 2456009, at *12 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 2013) (quoting Learner v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002). At its core, a habeas corpus action is “used to ‘inquir(e) into illegal detention with a view to an order releasing the petitioner.'” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 n. 5 (1963)). The Court may discharge a prisoner “upon...
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