Powell v. Mills

Decision Date29 April 1953
Docket NumberNo. 311,311
Citation237 N.C. 582,75 S.E.2d 759
PartiesPOWELL et ux. v. MILLS et al.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

L.T. Grantham, W.B.R. Guion and R.A. Nunn, New Bern, for plaintiffs appellees.

Henry P. Whitehurst, New Bern, J.D. Paul, Washington, Bland & Bland, Goldsboro, for defendants appellants.

WINBORNE, Justice.

While there are thirty-seven assignments of error based upon exceptions to rulings on matter of evidence adverse to defendants, and while the case on appeal discloses numerous rulings of the court on objections to matters of evidence to which assignments of error are not brought forward, from which it might be assumed that the rules of evidence were thrown to the winds, and the floodgates opened to admit incompetent testimony, the decision on this appeal turns on the assignments of error based upon exceptions to the rulings of the court in denying defendants' motions for judgment as of nonsuit at the close of plaintiffs' evidence, and renewed at the close of all the evidence. And these assignments effectively challenge the sufficiency of the description set out in the complaint to identify the land claimed by plaintiffs.

When in an action for the recovery of land and for trespass thereon defendant denies plaintiff's title and defendant's trespass, nothing else appearing, issues of fact arise both as to title of plaintiff and as to trespass by defendant,--the burden as to each being on plaintiff. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Barco, 218 N.C. 154, 10 S.E.2d 642; Smith v. Benson, 227 N.C. 56, 40 S.E.2d 451; Locklear v. Oxendine, 233 N.C. 710, 65 S.E.2d 73; Williams v. Robertson 235 N.C. 478, 70 S.E.2d 692.

In such action plaintiff must rely upon the strength of his own title. This requirement may be met by various methods which are specifically set forth in Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N.C. 112, 10 S.E. 142. See also Prevatt v. Harrelson, 132 N.C. 250, 43 S.E. 800; Moore v. Miller, 179 N.C. 396, 102 S.E. 627; Smith v. Benson, supra, and many others, including Locklear v. Oxendine, supra, and Williams v. Robertson, supra.

Moreover, in all actions involving title to real property, title is conclusively presumed to be out of the State unless it be a party ot the action, G.S. § 1-36, but "there is no presumption in favor of one party or the other, nor is a litigant seeking to recover land otherwise relieved of the burden of showing title in himself". Williams v. Robertson, supra [235 N.C. 478, 70 S.E.2d 696], and cases cited. In the light of such presumption, apparently plaintiffs in the present action, assuming the burden of proof, have elected to show title in themselves by adverse possession, under known and visible lines and boundaries, and under color of title, which is a method by which title may be shown. But in pursuing this method a deed offered as color of title is such only for the land designated and described in it. Davidson v. Arledge, 88 N.C. 326; Smith v. Fite, 92 N.C. 319; Barker v. Southern R. Co., 125 N.C. 596, 34 S.E. 701; Johnston v. Case, 131 N.C. 491, 42 S.E. 957; Smith v. Benson, supra; Locklear v. Oxendine, supra; Williams v. Robertson, supra.

Moreover, decisions of this Court generally recognize the principle that a deed conveying land within the meaning of the statute of frauds, G.S. § 22-2, must contain and description of the land, the subject matter of the deed, either certain in itself or capable of being reduced to certainty by reference to something extrinsic to which the deed refers. The office of description is to furnish, and is sufficient when it does furnish means of identifying the land intended to be conveyed. Where the language is patently ambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to aid the description. But when the terms used in the deed leave it uncertain what property is intended to be embraced in it, parol evidence is admissible to fit the description ot the land. Such evidence cannot, however, be used to enlarge the scope of the descriptive words. The deed itself must point to the source from which evidence aliunde to make the description complete is to be sought. See North Carolina Self Help Corp. v. Brinkley, 215 N.C. 615, 2 S.E.2d 889, where the authorities are cited. See also Searcy v. Logan, 226 N.C. 562, 39 S.E.2d 593; Plemmons v. Cutshall, 234 N.C. 506, 67 S.E.2d 501; Linder v. Horne, 237 N.C. 129, 74 S.E.2d 227; Cherry v. Roanoke Tobacco Warehouse Co., 237 N.C. 362, 75 S.E.2d 124.

In Smith v. Fite, supra, this headnote eptimizes the opinion of the Court by Smith C. J.: 'Where a party introduces a deed in evidence, which he intends to be used as color of title, he must prove that its boundaries cover the land in dispute, to give legal efficacy to his possession. ' In other words, the plaintiff must not only offer the deed upon which he relies, he must by proof fit the description in the deed to the land it covers,--in accordance with appropriate law relating to course and distance, and natural objects called for as the case may be.

The general rule as to this is that in order to locate a boundary of land, the lines should be run with the calls in the regular order from a known beginning, and the test of reversing in the progress of the survey should be resorted to only when the terminus of a call cannot be ascertained by running forward, but can be fixed with certainty by running reversely the next succeeding line. Lindsay v. Austin, 139 N.C. 463, 51 S.E. 990; Asheville Land Co. v. Lang, 146 N.C. 311, 59 s.E. 703; Hanstein v. Ferrall, 149 N.C. 240, 62 S.E. 1070; Cornelison v. Hammond, 224 N.C. 757, 32 S.E.2d 326; Town of Bethaven v. Hodges, 226 N.C. 485, 39 S.E.2d 366; Locklear v. Oxendine, supra; Williams v. Robertson, supra.

Now adverting to the description set out in plaintiff's complaint we are constrained to hold that it is too vague to admit of proof at least as to any land south or southeast of the Dover-Fort Barnwell Road. There does not appear to be any controversy as to the...

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26 cases
  • State v. Johnson
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 10 March 1971
    ...asserting ownership has the burden of showing title in himself. Moore v. Miller, 179 N.C. 396, 102 S.E. 627 (1920); Powell v. Mills, 237 N.C. 582, 75 S.E.2d 759 (1953). In support of their claim of ownership, the Sherrills offered in evidence a deed from D. C. Boyd and wife to Frank O. Sher......
  • Sledge v. Miller
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 28 January 1959
    ...visible lines and boundaries gave defendants good title. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Miller, 243 N.C. 1, 89 S.E.2d 765; Powell v. Mills, 237 N.C. 582, 75 S.E.2d 759; Martin v. Bundy, 212 N.C. 437, 193 S.E. 831; Berry v. Coppersmith, 212 N.C. 50, 193 S.E. 3; Johnson v. Fry, 195 N.C. 832, 14......
  • Batson v. Bell
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 18 March 1959
    ...the unknown corner. This backtracking is permissible only because it permits the location of an otherwise unknown corner. Powell v. Mills, 237 N.C. 582, 75 S.E.2d 759; Town of Belhaven v. Hodges, 226 N.C. 485, 39 S.E.2d 366; Lindsay v. Austin, 139 N.C. 463, 51 S.E. 990; Harry v. Graham, 18 ......
  • McDaris v. Breit Bar 'T' Corp., 122
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 22 September 1965
    ...the land or referring to something that will identify it with certainty. Carrow v. Davis, 248 N.C. 740, 105 S.E.2d 60; Powell v. Mills, 237 N.C. 582, 75 S.E.2d 759. 'Parol evidence is admissible to fit the description to the land. G.S. § 8-39. 'Such evidence cannot, however, be used to enla......
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