Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co.

• Decision Date: 28 March 1985
• Citation: 166 Cal.App.3d 357,212 Cal.Rptr. 395
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Bruce L. POWELL et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STANDARD BRANDS PAINT COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 23427.

Page 395

212 Cal.Rptr. 395

166 Cal.App.3d 357

Bruce L. POWELL et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. STANDARD BRANDS PAINT COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 23427.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

March 28, 1985.

Friedman, Collard & Poswall and Allan J. Owen, Sacramento, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Curotto Law Offices and William E. Barnes, Sacramento, for defendant and respondent.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs Bruce Powell and Dale Mereness appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of defendant Standard Brands Paint Company (Standard Brands) in an action for personal injuries. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As relevant to this appeal, the complaint prepared by plaintiffs' attorneys stated that defendant Standard Brands and other defendants were the suppliers or manufacturers "of certain equipment and cleaning solvents, specifically being, but not limited to a buffer and/or thinner referred to herein." The complaint further alleged that Standard Brands and other defendants "negligently and carelessly operated, controlled, warned, supplied, maintained, managed, designed, manufactured, or modified said buffer and/or thinner which proximately caused the injuries and damages to plaintiff as herein described." Paragraph As relevant here, plaintiff sought recovery for damages on theories of negligence and strict liability.

X of the complaint pleaded in pertinent part, "That on or about June 10, 1982, ... while plaintiff was stripping a tile floor with said buffer and thinner, an explosion occurred due to the negligence of the defendants, and each of them, proximately causing the hereinafter described injuries and damages to plaintiff." (Emphasis added.)

In moving for summary judgment, Standard Brands competently showed that plaintiffs commenced work on June 9, 1982, using lacquer thinner supplied by Standard Brands to remove sealer from ceramic tile. They worked without incident throughout the evening until they had used up the Standard Brands lacquer thinner. However, plaintiffs were unable to finish the job on June 9. The following day, June 10, plaintiffs' employer ordered two five-gallon containers of lacquer thinner from codefendant Harris Automobile (Harris). This lacquer thinner was manufactured by codefendant Grow Chemical Coatings Company (Grow). ¹ Working in an area approximately 25-50 feet from where they had worked the previous evening, plaintiffs commenced pouring the Grow lacquer thinner on the tile floor and buffing the thinner with the electric buffer. During this operation, an explosion occurred, seriously injuring both plaintiffs and giving rise to the instant lawsuit.

Plaintiffs relied primarily on the declaration of plaintiff Powell. ² Powell declared that the lacquer thinner purchased from Standard Brands contained neither warnings nor safety instructions and that "Had anyone at STANDARD BRANDS advised us of the dangerous nature of lacquer thinner or of its highly flammable characteristics, I would not have used it on the job and would not have been using it at the time of my injury."

The trial court granted the motion and plaintiffs appeal from the summary judgment entered in favor of Standard Brands.

DISCUSSION

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to determine if there are any triable issues of material fact, or whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874, 191 Cal.Rptr. 619, 663 P.2d 177.) Because summary judgment is a drastic procedure all doubts should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 183, 203 Cal.Rptr. 626, 681 P.2d 893.) However, where, as here, the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is properly granted when dispositive issues of law are determined in favor of the moving party. (Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. City of Oxnard (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 814, 818, 179 Cal.Rptr. 159; see Miller v. Bechtel Corp., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 876, 191 Cal.Rptr. 619, 663 P.2d 177.)

As best we understand it, plaintiffs assert on appeal that Standard Brands owed them a duty to warn them of the dangerous properties of its lacquer thinner, that it breached its duty to warn, and that its failure to warn was a legal proximate cause of the injuries suffered by plaintiffs. To our knowledge, no reported decision has held a manufacturer liable for its failure to The premise of plaintiffs' argument is clearly correct; a manufacturer owes a foreseeable user of its product a duty to warn of risks of using the product. (See, e.g., Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 691, 699, 200 Cal.Rptr. 870, 677 P.2d 1147; Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413, 428, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443; Cavers v. Cushman Motor Sales, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 338, 347, 157 Cal.Rptr. 142; Burke v. Almaden Vineyards, Inc. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 768, 772, 150 Cal.Rptr. 419; Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co. (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 228, 244-245, 71 Cal.Rptr. 306; Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co. (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 44, 54-55, 46 Cal.Rptr. 552; [all decided upon principles of strict liability]; see also McEvoy v. American Pool Corp. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 295, 195 P.2d 783; Tingey v. E.F. Houghton & Co. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 97, 103, 179 P.2d 807; Larramendy v. Myres (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 636, 640, 272 P.2d 824; Gall v. Union Ice Com pany (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 303, 310, 239 P.2d 48; [all decided upon principles of negligence].) ⁴

                warn of risks of using its product, where it is shown that the immediate efficient cause of injury is a product manufactured by someone else.  Unfortunately, in addressing the merits of plaintiffs' important and novel contention, we find the meagre brief filed by plaintiffs' attorneys of little assistance. 3  Needless to say, however, we believe our own research has produced a correct result
                

Standard Brands has not refuted plaintiffs' pleaded assertions that said defendant owed plaintiffs a duty to warn of risks of its product and that it breached its duty. However, the evidence is undisputed that the immediate efficient cause of plaintiffs' injuries was the explosion of a product manufactured not by Standard Brands but rather by Grow. The question posed is whether Standard Brands' failure to warn was a legal proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. We conclude, in the circumstances of this case, it was not.

As a general rule, the imposition of liability in tort for personal injuries depends upon a showing by the plaintiff that his or her injuries were caused by the act of the defendant or by an instrumentality under the defendant's control. (Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 597, 163 Cal.Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924.) "Proximate cause is a necessary element of both negligence and strict products liability actions. [Citations.]" (Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49, 54, fn. 4, 192 Cal.Rptr. 857, 665 P.2d 947.)

In Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., supra, our Supreme Court characterized the questions of duty and proximate cause as presenting "the same issue in different guises." (34 Cal.3d at p. 56, 192 Cal.Rptr. 857, 665 P.2d 947.) Each construct, said the court, involves the question whether the risk of injury to the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable. (Ibid.) The court stated that ordinarily foreseeability is a question of fact for the jury. (Ibid.) However, the question of reasonable foreseeability may be decided as a question of law if, under the undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion. (Ibid.; see, e.g., Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 66, 271 P.2d 23 (opn. by Traynor, J.) [as a matter of law, defendant who left keys in car had no reason to Where a defendant has committed a wrongful act, and where a third person also commits a later wrongful act, and both are alleged to have caused plaintiff's injuries, the courts have asked whether the subsequent act of the third party was a superceding cause that served to break the requisite chain of causation between defendant's wrongful act and the injury. (See, e.g., Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 688, 693, 59 P.2d 100 [negligence of assembler of scaffold using defective board without inspection was superceding cause exonerating manufacturer of defective board from liability].) Whether the act of the third person is a superceding cause depends in part on whether it (and plaintiff's injury) was reasonably foreseeable. ⁵

believe that a car thief would be an incompetent driver]; compare Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 183-186, 203 Cal.Rptr. 626, 681 P.2d 893.)

On the undisputed facts tendered in this case, we conclude the explosion of Grow's product, and plaintiffs' consequent injuries, were not reasonably foreseeable consequences of Standard Brands' failure to warn as a matter of law. We explain.

Although there appears to be some uncertainty about the knowledge required of a manufacturer to justify liability for failure to warn of its product (see Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 699, 200 Cal.Rptr. 870, 677 P.2d 1147), it is clear the manufacturer's duty is restricted to warnings based on the characteristics of the manufacturer's own product. (See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 611, 163 Cal.Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924; Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 121, 129, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153; Blackwell v. Phelps Dodge Corp. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 372, 377, 203 Cal.Rptr. 706; Garman v. Magic Chef, Inc. (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 634, 638, 173 Cal.Rptr. 20.) Understandably, the law does not require a manufacturer to study and analyze the products of others and to warn users of risks of those products. A manufacturer's decision to supply warnings, and the nature of any warnings, are therefore necessarily based upon and tailored to the risks of use of...