Powell v. State, 94-0326
| Decision Date | 11 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-0326,94-0326 |
| Citation | 188 Wis.2d 605,526 N.W.2d 280 |
| Parties | NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. Connie G. POWELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Charles W. Sorenson, David Cook, Arlene M. Cooper, and Calvin Stoudt, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
MYSE.
Before CANE, P.J., LaROCQUE and MYSE, JJ.
Connie Powell appeals a judgment dismissing her complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Powell argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed the complaint because she properly alleged that the defendants violated her constitutional rights. Powell further contends that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) refusing to grant her leave to amend the complaint and (2) dismissing the complaint with prejudice. We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and that it did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant Powell leave to amend. 1 However, because we conclude that the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint with prejudice, we reverse that part of the judgment.
The complaint alleges that in 1987 Powell was admitted to the University of Wisconsin-Stout's graduate program in guidance and counseling. After she was admitted to the program, Dr. David Cook was assigned to be Powell's academic advisor. Powell informed Dr. Cook that she suffered from a manic-depressive disorder. Upon being informed of Powell's condition, neither Dr. Cook nor any other staff member at the university gave Powell reason to believe that her condition would affect the completion of her graduate work.
After completing the required course work for her graduate degree, Powell spoke to Dr. Arlene Cooper to schedule her practicum. At that time, Powell informed Dr. Cooper that she suffered from a manic-depressive disorder. Upon learning of Powell's disorder, Dr. Cooper refused to grant her admission into the practicum.
Approximately a month later, Powell met with Dr. Cooper and Dr. Calvin Stoudt regarding her admission to the practicum. During this meeting, Powell was told that she would be granted admission to the student practicum if she agreed to disclose her condition to the practicum supervisor. Powell refused to make such a disclosure.
Powell subsequently filed a complaint alleging damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2) and (3) et seq., the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as under the Wisconsin Constitution, Wisconsin common-law and unspecified provisions of Wisconsin statutory law. Additionally, the complaint alleged that Powell had a contract with the university which the university breached by refusing to allow her admission to the practicum without disclosure of her manic-depressive condition.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Prior to the court's consideration of the defendants' motion, Powell stipulated to a dismissal of her contract claim. The court subsequently granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Powell's complaint with prejudice. Additionally, the court refused to grant Powell leave to amend under § 802.09(1), Stats. 2
The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen'l Ins. Co., 87 Wis.2d 723, 731, 275 N.W.2d 660, 664 (1979). Whether a complaint states a claim is a question of law that we review without deference to the trial court. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 103 Wis.2d 428, 433, 308 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Ct.App.1981). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we must accept the facts pled in the complaint as true. Evans v. Cameron, 121 Wis.2d 421, 426, 360 N.W.2d 25, 28 (1985). We will find the complaint legally insufficient "only if 'it is quite clear that under no conditions can the plaintiff recover.' " Morgan, 87 Wis.2d at 731, 275 N.W.2d at 664 (citation omitted). However, under the Civil Rights Act, the plaintiff's complaint will be found insufficient if it does no more than state conclusory allegations. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 581 F.2d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1135, 99 S.Ct. 1058, 59 L.Ed.2d 97 (1979) (citations omitted). "Some particularized facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation are needed to sustain a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act." Id. (citations omitted).
Powell contends that based on Wisconsin precedent, the trial court erred by dismissing her complaint for failure to state a claim because her complaint was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. In support of this contention, Powell points to Boldt v. State, 101 Wis.2d 566, 305 N.W.2d 133 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 973, 102 S.Ct. 524, 70 L.Ed.2d 393 (1981), and Reidy v. Sperry, 83 Wis.2d 158, 265 N.W.2d 475 (1978). In Boldt, the plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because his action was based on § 1983. Id. at 585, 305 N.W.2d at 143. In determining whether the plaintiff would be entitled to attorney's fees, the court noted that the plaintiff's complaint alleged "as a cause of action 'a violation of the due process clauses of the Wisconsin and United States constitutions.' " Id. at 584, 305 N.W.2d at 143. The court found that this allegation was sufficient to plead a § 1983 claim. Id.
In Reidy, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against the city attorney and the chief of police alleging that they interfered with her right to carry on her business. Id. 305 N.W.2d at 161, 265 N.W.2d at 477. The complaint alleged that "their conduct was under color of law, that she was afforded no prior hearing, and that she was denied due process of law." Id. 305 N.W.2d at 162, 265 N.W.2d at 477-78. The complaint further alleged that "Sperry and Johnson conspired to prevent her from exercising her rights and privileges guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Wisconsin." Id. 305 N.W.2d at 162, 265 N.W.2d at 478. In her complaint, the plaintiff specifically characterized "these rights as her right to due process and her property right to pursue her occupation and profession." Id. The court concluded that these allegations were sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. Id.
Based on Boldt and Reidy, Powell contends that the allegations in her complaint were sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. We conclude that neither Boldt nor Reidy is dispositive of this case. In Boldt, the issue was not whether the plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Rather, the issue was whether the court could properly find that the plaintiff's complaint was based on a § 1983 claim for purposes of awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Consequently, we cannot conclude that Boldt stands for the proposition that mere conclusory allegations are sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.
In Reidy, the plaintiff's complaint expressly alleged that the defendants deprived her of her property rights and due process rights under the constitution because they interfered with the operation of her business without following proper procedures. Id. 305 N.W.2d at 162, 265 N.W.2d at 478. In support of this allegation, the plaintiff in Reidy alleged facts which would allow a reasonable person to conclude that the defendants did indeed violate her constitutional rights. Id. 305 N.W.2d at 167, 265 N.W.2d at 480 (). The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendants interfered with her business, that she had a property right to pursue her occupation, that the defendants interfered with this right without according her due process of law and that the defendants therefore violated her property and due process rights under the constitution. Based on these allegations, the court concluded that the plaintiff's complaint stated a claim under § 1983. Id.
This case is unlike Reidy. Here, Powell alleges in her complaint that the defendants' actions violated several of her constitutional rights under both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. Powell, however, has failed to allege any facts from which a reasonable person could conclude that her constitutional rights were, in fact, violated by the defendants. The only allegations in Powell's complaint that would support an inference that her constitutional rights were violated are her conclusory statements to that effect. "Mere legal conclusions are insufficient to state a cause of action." Troutman v. FMC Corp., 115 Wis.2d 683, 689, 340 N.W.2d 581, 585 (Ct.App.1983).
Powell, however, contends that her complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action because she alleged that the defendants deprived her of a constitutionally protected property right when they breached an alleged contract to provide her with a graduate degree in guidance and counseling. This argument is without merit. Powell abandoned her contract claim by voluntarily dismissing it prior to the court's judgment dismissing the complaint. Consequently, the court properly disregarded the contract allegations by dismissing Powell's complaint. Because Powell failed to raise the contract allegations before the trial court, we will not consider this issue on appeal. See Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis.2d 433, 443, 287 N.W.2d 140, 145 (1980).
Although a plaintiff is not required to plead a specific constitutional violation to state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff is required to plead particularized facts from which a reasonable person could conclude that the defendants violated his or her constitutional rights. Cohen, 581...
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