POWELL v. WASHINGTON LAND CO., INC.

• Citation: 684 A.2d 769
• Decision Date: 07 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 93-CV-258,93-CV-258
• Parties: Andria D. POWELL, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON LAND CO., INC., Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

684 A.2d 769

Andria D. POWELL, Appellant, v. WASHINGTON LAND CO., INC., Appellee.

No. 93-CV-258.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted April 13, 1995.

Decided November 7, 1996.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT, CHERYL M. LONG, J.

Paris A. Artis, Hyattsville, MD, was on the brief, for appellant.

Jackson H. Rose, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for appellee.

Before SCHWELB and RUIZ, Associate Judges, and NEWMAN, Senior Judge. ^*.

Judge Newman joins the opinion of the court and the concurring opinion.

RUIZ, Associate Judge:

Andria Powell, appellant, appeals the dismissal with prejudice of her complaint pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The appellant filed her complaint pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-921 (1995) on March 10, 1992. The complaint contained three counts: count I alleged that the appellee's conduct constituted a wrongful eviction, count II alleged that the appellee's eviction of the appellant was in violation of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988), and count III alleged that the appellee's actions wrongfully converted the appellant's property. Because we find the trial court has jurisdiction over appellant's complaint, we reverse and remand.

The sequence of events is critical to the parties' claims and defenses: Appellant was the tenant under a lease for property in the District of Columbia. Appellee, Washington Land Company, Inc., managed the property. On October 2, 1991, the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia entered a default judgment against both the appellant and her husband granting the appellee possession of the property. On October 7, 1991, the appellee filed a Writ of Execution on the judgment against the appellant. Eight days later, on October15, 1991, the appellant filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the District of Columbia.

On October 18, 1991, three days after the bankruptcy filing, agents of the appellee, accompanied by U.S. Marshals, attempted to evict the appellant, pursuant to the Writ of Execution. The extent of the eviction, and whether it was completed, cannot be determined from the record.¹ On January 15, 1992, the appellant's bankruptcy case was involuntarily dismissed. On March 10, 1992, the appellant filed a complaint in the D.C. Superior Court alleging wrongful eviction, violation of the automatic stay resulting from the bankruptcy filing, and conversion. It is the trial court's dismissal of this complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction that we review in this appeal.

In granting the appellee's motion to dismiss with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, the trial court determined that the appellant's entire cause of action was based on allegations of a violation of the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, that it was a case arising under the Bankruptcy Code, and, thus, that original and exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the U.S. District Court and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.

Before analyzing the parties' arguments, a few preliminary comments regarding subject matter jurisdiction are in order. The D.C. Superior Court is "a court of general jurisdiction with the power to adjudicate any civil action at law or in equity involving local law." Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 992 (D.C. 1979); District of Columbia v. Group Ins. Admin., 633 A.2d 2, 13 (D.C. 1993). In the absence of legislative action, the Superior Court has general jurisdiction under D.C. Code § 11-921 over common law claims for relief. King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 661 (D.C. 1993); Group Ins. Admin., supra, 633 A.2d at 13-14. In contrast, "[t]he jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, like that of other federal courts, is grounded in and limited by statute." Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1493, 1498, 131 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995).

The jurisdiction of the federal district and bankruptcy courts is established in the Bankruptcy Code.² In particular, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1994) states

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.

(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.

(c)(1) Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.

(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11,with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.

(d) Any decision to abstain or not to abstain made under this subsection (other than a decision not to abstain in a proceeding described in subsection (c)(2)) is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292 of this title or by the Supreme Court of the United States under section 1254 of this title. This subsection shall not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in bankruptcy.

(e) The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate. (Footnotes omitted.)

The bankruptcy jurisdiction granted to the district courts by § 1334(a) and (b) may be transferred to the bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).³ Once the United States District Court has transferred its authority over to a bankruptcy judge, § 157(b) and (c) specify the bankruptcy court's authority with respect to proceedings that may come before that court. Section 157(b) allows the bankruptcy court to hear and decide cases as to which the district court has exclusive jurisdiction under § 1334(a) (cases "under title 11") as well as "core proceedings"⁴ as to which the district court has original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction under § 1334(b) (proceedings "arising under title 11" or "arising in a case under title 11"). With regard to the third category of cases covered by § 1334(b), those "related to a case under title 11," also referred to as "non-core proceedings," § 157(c)⁵ authorizes the bankruptcy court, upon special circumstances, to hear the case and make recommendations to the district court. Whether a case is a core proceeding is relevant to the scope of the bankruptcy court's authority; it is not relevant,however, to the inquiry whether it is a proceeding over which the district court has exclusive jurisdiction.

In the context of the Bankruptcy Code's jurisdictional statutory scheme, the narrow issue before us, thus, is whether the complaint filed by appellant in Superior Court is a "case under title 11" over which the U.S. District Court (or bankruptcy court) has exclusive jurisdiction.⁶ If so, the Superior Court would have no jurisdiction to hear the claim and properly dismissed the appellant's complaint. If not, the Superior Court would have jurisdiction because even if the claim could have been brought in U.S. District Court, as a proceeding "arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11" over which the U.S. District Court (or bankruptcy court) has original but not exclusive jurisdiction,⁷ the statute does not require that the claim be brought in federal court.⁸ Of course, it is also possible that a complaint involving a debtor in bankruptcy would be neither "under title 11" nor "arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11," in which case the federal courts would have no jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Code.

We turn to an examination of appellant's counts to determine whether any falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district court because it constitutes a case "under title 11" covered by § 1334(a).⁹ A case "under title 11" is the bankruptcy case per se, "the case upon which all of the proceedings which follow the filing of a petition are predicated." 1 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL § 3.01, at 3-20 (Lawrence P. King ed., 3d ed. 1996). In the situation before us, the case that was "under title 11," and within exclusive federal court jurisdiction, was the bankruptcy petition filed by appellant that had already been dismissed by the bankruptcy judge by the time she filed her complaint in Superior Court. See R.L. LaRoche, Inc. v. Barnett Bank of So. Fla. N.A., 661 So.2d 855, 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). The source of the claims in counts I and III is not federal bankruptcy law, but the laws of the District of Columbia. See D.C. Code §§ 45-1401 to 1432 (1996); Butler v. Whitting, 647 A.2d 383 (D.C. 1994); Robinson v. Sarisky, 535 A.2d 901 (D.C. 1988); Queen v. Postell, 513 A.2d 812 (D.C. 1986). Counts I and III, the wrongful eviction and conversion claims, do not constitute a case "under title 11" and therefore do not fall within the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction under § 1334(a).

We need not decide whether appellant's counts I and III "arise under" or "in" title 11 or are "related to" cases under title 11, placing them within the...