Robinson v. Sarisky

• Decision Date: 07 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-258.,86-258.
• Citation: 535 A.2d 901
• Parties: Jack ROBINSON, et al., Appellants, v. Joseph L. SARISKY, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

535 A.2d 901

Jack ROBINSON, et al., Appellants, v. Joseph L. SARISKY, Appellee.

No. 86-258.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 5, 1987.

Decided January 7, 1988.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Margaret A. Beller, Washington, D.C., for appellants.

John J. Brennan, III, with whom Richard M. Tarby, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellee.

Before PRYOR, Chief Judge, and NEWMAN and TERRY, Associate Judges.

TERRY, Associate Judge:

Appellee Sarisky brought this action for wrongful eviction against appellants Jack Robinson, Thomas Robinson, and William Robinson. Sarisky alleged that appellants, over a three-week period in April and May 1981, had locked him out of his home four times and had waged a campaign of malicious harassment to force him to move out. Appellants answered that they did not know the building was occupied and that they had properly taken possession of the property pursuant to a valid tax deed. After a trial before Judge Salzman, the jury awarded Sarisky $4,000 in compensatory damages. The jury could not agree on punitive damages, however, so appellants moved for a mistrial, which Judge Salzman granted only in part. He ordered that a new trial be held on Sarisky's claim for punitive damages, but he refused to order a new trial on the issue of liability or on Sarisky's claim for compensatory damages. At the second trial before Judge Fauntleroy, the jury awarded Sarisky $250,000 in punitive damages.

Appellants raise three issues on appeal. First, they argue that Sarisky did not present sufficient evidence to support the first jury's award of $4,000 in compensatory damages. Second, they challenge the second jury's award of $250,000 in punitive damages as excessive, particularly in comparison with the compensatory damages awarded by the first jury. Finally, appellants claim that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial on only the punitive damages issue. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.

I

On April 15, 1981, the District of Columbia conveyed to appellants by deed a twostory building at 2114 N Street, N.W., after appellants had purchased the property at a tax sale. The tax deed, however, had been issued in error, for in fact no taxes on the property were in arrears.

Joseph Sarisky testified at trial that he was the record owner and occupant of the building at 2114 N Street, N.W. On the evening of April 20, 1981, upon returning from a trip to Pennsylvania, he found that his home had been broken into and that his deadbolt lock had been removed and replaced with a hasp and padlock. Sarisky immediately called the telephone number on the crudely lettered "No Trespassing" sign which had been placed on the door, leaving a message that he wished to speak the next morning to whoever had locked him out. He then removed the new lock and spent a fitful night in his home.

The following morning, April 21, Sarisky spoke to William Robinson by telephone. telling Robinson that he was living in the building, that he owned it, and that he wished to meet with Robinson to prove he was the owner. Sarisky testified that his statements were met with hostility, and that Robinson repeatedly denied that Sarisky lived in or owned the building. When Sarisky offered to meet Robinson at the N Street address and show him that the building was occupied, "[Robinson] said, `The building is vacant,' and slammed the phone down." Later that day Sarisky replaced the lock which he had found on the door the previous evening with a new lock that he bought at a hardware store.

Upon his return home from work that same evening, Sarisky found that yet another lock had been installed. In addition, a notice to quit the premises within thirty days, addressed to him by name as "Occupant" of 2114 N Street, N.W., was posted on the door. Sarisky again removed the lock and replaced it with one of his own.

On April 26 Sarisky came home to find that he had been locked out a third time. On this occasion the door and the frame had been damaged by the removal of Sarisky's padlock, and a new lock had been installed. Several "For Sale" signs had been nailed into the aluminum siding on the second story of the building, and another "No Trespassing" sign had been posted on the front door. Sarisky removed the lock and the signs.

On May 4 Sarisky returned from a weekend trip to discover that someone had again nailed "For Sale" signs into the aluminum siding. This time, however, the front door had also been nailed shut around the entire door frame, and a hand-lettered cardboard sign saying "No Trespassing/Property Checked/24 Hours a Day/Monarch Security/452-5533" had been nailed to the door. Fearing that appellants might return and try to oust him forcibly at any time, Sarisky moved out of the building and sought legal help.

A few weeks later Sarisky filed suit against appellants and the District of Columbia, seeking cancellation of the tax deed, an injunction against any interference by appellants with his use of the property, damages for appellants' allegedly tortious conduct, and other relief. Along with his complaint Sarisky filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to keep appellants from exercising dominion over his building; that motion was promptly granted. In the course of the litigation, the District of Columbia admitted that the tax deed had been wrongfully issued, and the court declared it null and void and ordered it canceled. At that point the District of Columbia dropped out of the case.¹

The case then went to trial on Sarisky's claims against the Robinsons for wrongful eviction and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Sarisky asserted that he had been the victim of an intentional, malicious campaign to force him from his home and that he was therefore entitled to compensatory damages for repairs to the house, personal items which he had been obliged to replace, and mental suffering. He also sought punitive damages. He presented evidence that he had lived at 2114 N Street, N.W., since 1976, that he was in the process of renovating the building so that the first floor could be used as a restaurant and the second floor as an apartment, and that it was zoned for both residental and commercial uses. Sarisky further testified that he kept his personal belongings there, including a bed, other furniture, clothing, dishes, silverware, an air conditioner, and a heater, all plainly visible on any inspection. Photographs were introduced to corroborate Sarisky's testimony.

Appellants had originally asserted that they did not know anyone was occupying the building, that it was zoned only for commercial use, and that all their acts were done lawfully, pursuant to a valid tax deed. At trial, however, they admitted that they had acted as they did in order to force Sarisky to sue them. Sarisky would then have had the burden of proving that he had a valid title to the property, and the Corporation Counsel would have had to defend the suit on behalf of the District of Columbia.

Concerning their own actions, appellants testified² that after obtaining the tax deed, they visited the property on April 20 to inspect it. They gained entry through the front door, which they said was open. With the aid of a flashlight, they inspected both floors of the building but saw no signs of habitation. Inside the building they found two motorcycles with expired license plates and flat tires sitting in a large puddle of water, several acoustic ceiling tiles that had fallen to the floor, dirt, sheet rock, and a badly leaking roof. They did locate an office with a few pieces of furniture in it, but concluded that it had not been used for some time. Assuming that they had purchased an abandoned warehouse,³ they removed the lock from the front door and replaced it with another. They nailed a sign on the door stating that the building was for sale and giving a telephone number at which inquiries could be made. That evening they received a call from Joseph Sarisky, the record owner of the property prior to the tax sale. Jack or Thomas Robinson answered the phone and took his number, and the next morning William Robinson called him back. William Robinson denied telling Sarisky that the building was vacant, saying, "We did not get into that."

II

Appellants claim that Sarisky offered no proof of medical expenses or of relocation, repair, or replacement costs so that the jury could not have set a reasonable amount of compensatory damages. They also maintain that Sarisky offered no proof of the value of the items he bought to replace those which were allegedly damaged or destroyed. Further, appellants assert that the award of $4,000 was excessive because Sarisky was limited by his pre-trial statement to $2,225. Finally, appellants argue that Sarisky failed to prove that they engaged in the type of conduct which would support an award of damages for emotional distress. We find none of these arguments to be persuasive.

In the first place, the law presumes that some damages result from an unlawful eviction. Higgins v. Dail, 61 A.2d 38, 40 (D.C. 1948); see Northeast Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. Sanford, 43 A.2d 292, 293 (D.C. 1945). Such damages are not limited to physical injury or property loss. This court long ago accepted the principle "that a tenant who has been unlawfully evicted may recover for mental suffering, inconvenience and discomfort." Higgins v. Dail, supra, 61 A.2d at 40 n. 2 (citations omitted). In this case, moreover, the wrongful eviction claim was joined with a separate claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on essentially the same facts. We have often held that an award of compensatory damages "should be set aside only when [the jury's verdict] indicates prejudice, passion, or partiality, or when it must have been based on oversight, mistake, or consideration of an improper element." Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173, 180 (D.C. 1977) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., ...