Power v. Hamilton

• Decision Date: 08 September 1911
• Citation: 22 N.D. 177,132 N.W. 664
• Parties: POWER v. HAMILTON.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

22 N.D. 177

132 N.W. 664

POWER

v.HAMILTON.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Sept. 8, 1911.

Syllabus by the Court.

In construing a statute, the courts will give effect to the spirit, rather than the mere letter, of the same, with a view of effectuating the evident intention of the Legislature, and to this end the courts, where necessary to carry out the evident legislative intent, will limit general language of an act to the cases contemplated by it. In other words, where the enforcement of general statutory provisions to particular facts clearly not in the contemplation of the Legislature would lead to unjust and absurd results, the court is justified and required to limit the application of such general provisions so as not to thwart the legislative will.

Applying the above rule of statutory construction, held, construing section 738, R. C. 1905, that the provision therein providing that a vote of a nonregistered person shall not be received or counted unless such voter furnishes an oath of a householder and registered voter has no application, where, as in the case at bar, the officers, through an oversight, omit and neglect to meet as a registration board; and when, as in the case at bar, the nonregistered voters, who admittedly are qualified electors, furnish their affidavits, as required by said statute, their votes must be received and counted.

Appeal from District Court, Cavalier County; W. J. Kneeshaw, Judge.

Action by Joseph Power against J. K. Hamilton. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.W. A. McIntyre and G. M. Price, for appellant. W. B. Dickson and Joseph Cleary, for respondent.

FISK, J.

This is an election contest, in which the appellant contests the right of respondent to the office of county auditor of Cavalier county for the term which began April 3, 1911. The facts are not in dispute, and, briefly stated, are as follows: At the general election held in said county on November 8, 1910, the parties were opposing candidates for the office aforesaid, and the returns of the canvassing board show that appellant received 1,305 votes and the contestee 1,342 votes for said office. In the First and Second wards of the city of Langdon respondent received a plurality of 41 votes. Notwithstanding the fact that such city possessed the requisite population to require the registration of voters prior to the election, no attempt was made through an oversight of the proper officers to comply with the registration laws in such wards prior to such election. There was no meeting or assembly of the registration boards therein for such election, and no lists of the voters were prepared, posted, or certified as required by law. Each of the voters voting therein did, however, prior to casting his vote, furnish to the election officers an affidavit in compliance with section 738 of the Revised Codes; this section being that portion of the registration law giving the right to a nonregistered voter to vote by furnishing a certain affidavit, etc. It was expressly stipulated that each person who voted in such wards at said election was a duly qualified elector therein.

[1][2] The above facts, with others not deemed necessary to mention, were embraced in stipulations or admitted by the pleadings, but each party reserved the right to object to any of the stipulated facts on the ground of irrelevancy and immateriality, and appellant's counsel interposed certain objections accordingly. Much space is devoted to such objections by counsel, and they disagree as to the issues framed by the pleadings, but we find it unnecessary to consider these questions; for, conceding for the purposes of this case the correctness of the various contentions of the appellant's counsel with reference to these preliminary questions of pleading and evidence, we have no difficulty in reaching the main conclusion arrived at by the learned trial court, viz., that the contest is without merit, and should be dismissed. Appellant's contention on the merits, in effect, is that as a necessary result of the omission of the election officers to meet as a registration board no valid election could be held in said wards, the precise point being, as we understand counsel, that, because of the omission of the registry board to meet, the section of the statute aforesaid, which, in effect, prescribes that a nonregistered person's vote cannot be received or counted unless such person shall furnish his affidavit stating certain facts, and also prove, by the oath of a householder and registered voter of the precinct, that he knows such person to be a resident therein, etc., could not be complied with, and hence none of such votes could legally be received or counted. In other words, that, inasmuch as the strict letter of such statute could not be complied with by furnishing the oath of a registered voter (as there were none), the entire electorate of such wards must be disfranchised, even in the face of the admitted fact that every person who voted was a duly qualified elector. We cannot yield our assent to such a contention. The strict letter of the statute will not be permitted to control over its true spirit and the evident legislative intent, especially where such literal construction would lead to such absurd results. This statute is, no doubt, mandatory, as was held in Fitzmaurice v. Willis et al., 127 N. W. 95; but it does not follow from this that a good-faith compliance with its provisions to the utmost extent of the voter's ability will not suffice. In the Fitzmaurice Case no attempt was made to furnish the statutory proof required of nonregistered voters; and, while it was not necessary to the decision, we there stated in effect that, had the voters furnished the statutory affidavit, their votes would and properly should have been counted. As before stated, such affidavit was furnished by each voter in the case at bar, and not only this, but an oath, in corroboration thereof, was also furnished by a householder. This was a sufficient compliance with such law under the circumstances, and, in fact, the only compliance possible. The law does not exact the impossible, and any attempt by the Legislature to do so would be both unreasonable and absurd. But the Legislature by the enactment of said statute attempted no such thing. It is evident that in enacting such statute the Legislature did not contemplate a situation where it would be impossible on account of...