Issendorf v. State

• Decision Date: 31 January 1939
• Docket Number: 6567
• Citation: 283 N.W. 783,69 N.D. 56
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

283 N.W. 783

69 N.D. 56

JOHN H. ISSENDORF, Respondent, v. THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, Doing Business as the State Hail Insurance Department, and Oscar E. Erickson, as Commissioner of Insurance of the State of North Dakota, Appellants

No. 6567

Supreme Court of North Dakota

January 31, 1939

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In determining the intention of the legislature courts will take into consideration the object sought to be accomplished by the law.

2. Section 2 of Chapter 137, Session Laws, N.D.1933, is examined and held not to render uninsurable crops upon which hail has fallen without doing material damage, prior to the receipt of an application for insurance by the State Hail Department.

Appeal from District Court, Bottineau County; G. Grimson, Judge.

Action by John H. Issendorf against the State, doing business as the State Hail Insurance Department, and Oscar E. Erickson, as Commissioner of Insurance of the State of North Dakota, to recover on hail insurance policy. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendants appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

Alvin C. Strutz, Attorney General, W. J. Austin and B. F. Tillotson, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants.

The courts must confine themselves to the construction of the law as it is, and not attempt to construe statutes before they take effect, to supply defective legislation, or otherwise amend or change the law under the guise of construction. 59 C.J. § 564, p. 945.

The intention of the legislature is to be obtained primarily from the language used in the statute. The court must impartially and without bias review the written words of the act, being aided in their interpretation by the canons of constructions. 59 C.J. § 567, p. 948.

The court cannot supply words purposely omitted and should supply an omission only when the omission is palpable and the omitted word plainly indicated by the context. 59 C.J. § 593, p. 992.

Where different language is used in the same connection in different parts it is presumed that a different meaning was intended. 59 C.J. § 597, p. 1004.

In determining the meaning of a statute, a construction should be adopted that gives meaning to every word, clause, and sentence in the enactment, and where a clause is used as a limitation upon that which has gone before it must be so construed, if possible, as to be made effective. Grabow v. Bergeth, 59 N.D. 214, 229 N.W. 282; State v Duggan, 15 R.I. 403, 6 A. 787; 2 Lewis's Sutherland Stat. Constr. p. 706; State v. Rother, 56 N.D. 875 886, 219 N.W. 574; 26 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 599; State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, 33 N.D. 76, 98, 156 N.W. 561, 569, L.R.A.1918B, 156, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 583; State ex rel. Farmers State Bank v. Wallace, 48 N.D. 803, 811, 187 N.W. 728.

The courts are not concerned with the wisdom, necessity, or expediency of legislation. These are matters for the legislature. State ex rel. Linde v. Taylor, 33 N.D. 76, 156 N.W. 561, L.R.A.1918B, 156, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 583.

The courts must construe the law as they find it; it being no part of their duty to determine what the law ought to be. Harris v. School Dist. 32 S.D. 544, 143 N.W. 898.

Statutes should not be given strained construction to effect a result easily obtained by plain enactment. State v. Dailey, 57 S.D. 554, 234 N.W. 45; Federal Farm Mortg. Corp. v. Falk, 67 N.D. 154-173, 270 N.W. 885, 113 A.L.R. 724.

W. H. Adams, for respondent.

The object of construction is to arrive at the true intention; when necessary, the strict letter of the law must yield to the manifest intent. Vermont Loan & T. Co. v. Whithed, 2 N.D. 82, 101, 49 N.W. 318; Power v. Hamilton, 22 N.D. 177, 179, 132 N.W. 664; State v. Hanson 16 N.D. 347, 353, 113 N.W. 371; McCurdy v. Patterson, 53 N.D. 423, 426, 206 N.W. 228.

It is presumed that the legislature does not intend absurd or unjust consequences or great public inconvenience. North Fargo v. Fargo, 49 N.D. 597, 603, 192 N.W. 977, citing 36 Cyc. 1135, 1136; 25 R.C.L. 1017 ff.; 59 C.J. 968, § 574; 25 R.C.L. 1019, § 257, and 1022, § 258; Power v. Hamilton, 22 N.D. 177, 181, 132 N.W. 664.

The spirit of the law and not the letter should be observed. 59 C.J. 964, § 573, pp. 944, 957; State v. Moorhouse, 5 N.D. 406, 411, 67 N.W. 140; State v. Totten, 44 N.D. 557, 175 N.W. 563; McCurdy v. Patterson, 53 N.D. 423, 426, 206 N.W. 228; Vermont Loan & T. Co. v. Whithed, 2 N.D. 82, 49 N.W. 318.

Morris, J. Nuessle, Ch. J., and Christianson and Burr, JJ., and Swenson, Dist. J., concur. Mr. Justice Sathre, being disqualified, did not participate, Hon. P. G. Swenson, Judge of the First judicial District, sitting in his stead.

OPINION

MORRIS

This is an appeal from a judgment entered against the State Hail Insurance Department for hail insurance on three tracts of land amounting to $ 594.40. No trial de novo is asked and the specifications predicate no error upon the court's findings of fact. It is claimed that the court erred in its conclusions of law and in entering judgment for the plaintiff. The facts show that about 1 o'clock P.M June 23, 1937, the plainiff executed three applications addressed to the State Hail Insurance Department for hail insurance covering crops on three tracts of land. The applications were received by the department and duly approved on June 24, 1937, at 9 o'clock A.M. After execution of the applications and before receipt thereof by the department the crops covered thereby "were struck by hail, but only nominally damaged thereby, at 5 o'clock P.M., on June 23d, 1937." On July 22 these same crops were struck by hail and were partially destroyed. On August 4 the plaintiff and the defendants adjusted the damage at the sum of $ 594.40, which sum the defendants refused to pay.

The defendants claim that the court erred in finding that the State Hail Insurance Department is liable for any loss to the plaintiff's crops under the facts so found. They rely upon the following provision contained in § 2 of chapter 137, N.D. Session Laws 1933. "The insurance provided for in this Act shall not be effective on crops struck by hail before an application is filed with the Hail Insurance Department."

Section 5 of this Act makes it the duty of assessors to take applications for hail insurance at the time they are listing property for assessment and provides that, "Such application may be taken by the assessor at any time before crops are struck by hail and not later than the fifteenth day of July of the year for which said insurance is desired. Provided, however, that in no case shall insurance take effect before such application is actually received in the office of the Hail Insurance Department." In the defendants' brief it is asserted that "When a crop is struck by hail, it means that hail has fallen in an appreciable amount irrespective of the extent of the damage or loss, if any." Defendants urge that a complete defense has been established by the finding of the court that the crops were struck by hail and were nominally damaged, and that to allow plaintiff's recovery means that the statute must be given a meaning inconsistent with its plain and unambiguous language.

The present system of State Hail Insurance was created by chapter 160, N.D. Session Laws 1919. It provides indemnity for losses sustained from damage to crops by hail. The amount of hail that falls does not enter into the scheme. The amount of indemnity to be paid is measured by the resulting damage regardless of the amount of the hail.

The...