Powers v. Delnor Hosp.

• Decision Date: 20 October 1986
• Docket Number: No. 2-85-0593,2-85-0593
• Citation: 499 N.E.2d 666,102 Ill.Dec. 109,148 Ill.App.3d 844
• Parties: , 102 Ill.Dec. 109, 2 IER Cases 1940 Carmel POWERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DELNOR HOSPITAL, Sandy Fitzmaurice, and Shirley Smith, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 666

499 N.E.2d 666

148 Ill.App.3d 844, 102 Ill.Dec. 109,

2 IER Cases 1940

Carmel POWERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DELNOR HOSPITAL, Sandy Fitzmaurice, and Shirley Smith Defendants-Appellees.

No. 2-85-0593.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

Oct. 20, 1986.

Dan Walker, Jr., Oak Brook, for plaintiff-appellant.

Seyfarth Shaw Fairweather & Geraldson, Ralph A. Morris, Michael F. Dolan, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.

Presiding Justice NASH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Carmel Powers, appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of the defendant, Sandy Fitzmaurice, on count II of plaintiff's complaint, sounding in defamation. Plaintiff contends that summary judgment was improper because (1) the statements in the notice of her discharge made by defendant were defamatory as a matter of law, and (2) there is a disputed question of fact as to whether the statements in the notice were privileged.

Plaintiff originally filed a four-count complaint against Delnor Hospital and two of its employees in connection with her discharge as an emergency room nurse on April 25, 1983. The circuit court dismissed counts I, III and IV and, in an earlier appeal, this court affirmed the dismissal of count III and remanded count I. Powers v. Delnor Hospital (1985), 135 Ill.App.3d 317, 90 Ill.Dec. 168, 481 N.E.2d 968.

In count II of her complaint, plaintiff alleged that Fitzmaurice, who was plaintiff's supervisor, submitted a written notice of disciplinary action to Jack Taft, the hospital's chief administrator, recommending plaintiff's discharge; that as a result plaintiff was discharged; that the reasons for the discharge set forth in the notice were false; and that defendant knew or should have known they were false. The bases for plaintiff's recommended discharge as stated in the notice were:

"The continuous dissatisfaction that Carmel [plaintiff] has indicated in both written communications and verbally, regarding personell [sic] policies and procedures, as well as the continued friction and tension created within the department because of her expressed attitudes and feelings about the nursing profession and her peers make continued employment impossible."

Defendant moved for summary judgment, in support of which she submitted her own affidavit and that of Shirley Smith, Director of Nursing at Delnor Hospital. In response, plaintiff submitted her affidavit and deposition testimony, and defendant's deposition testimony, including exhibits consisting of plaintiff's employee evaluations, correspondence, and defendant's notes of incidents involving the plaintiff. On granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the circuit court found that there were no disputed issues of fact regarding privilege or malice.

Summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, affidavits and depositions on file reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1005; Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill.2d 444, 463-64, 58 Ill.Dec. 828, 430 N.E.2d 1079; Kroll v. Sugar Supply Corp. (1983), 116 Ill.App.3d 969, 975, 72 Ill.Dec. 396, 452 N.E.2d 649, appeal denied.) In deciding such a motion, the trial court must construe any evidence in support of it strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent. (Kolakowski v. Voris (1980), 83 Ill.2d 388, 398, 47 Ill.Dec. 392, 415 N.E.2d 397; Chapman v. Hosek (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 180, 186, 86 Ill.Dec. 379, 475 N.E.2d 593.) If any facts upon which reasonable persons may disagree are identified, or any inferences therefrom, the circuit court must deny the motion for summary judgment and direct that the resolution of those facts and inferences be made at trial. Montes v. Hawkins (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 419, 413, 81 Ill.Dec. 469, 466 N.E.2d 1271; Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos & Magnesia Materials Co. (1979), 74 Ill.App.3d 778, 794, 30 Ill.Dec. 307, 392 N.E.2d 1352, aff'd (1981), 85 Ill.2d 161, 52 Ill.Dec. 1, 421 N.E.2d 864.

In moving for summary judgment, defendant argued that the notice of discharge was nonactionable as a matter of law under the innocent construction rule, and now urges that the court's order be affirmed on this basis. Plaintiff contends that the notice was defamatory per se, as it disparaged plaintiff in her profession or trade.

A statement may be actionable per se if it imputes an inability to perform the duties of office or employment or prejudices a person in his profession. (Owen v. Carr (1986), 113 Ill.2d 273, 100 Ill.Dec. 783, 497 N.E.2d 1145; Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp. (1968), 40 Ill.2d 257, 261, 239 N.E.2d 837; Angelo v. Brenner (1980), 84 Ill.App.3d 594, 598, 40 Ill.Dec. 337, 406 N.E.2d 38, appeal denied.) Whether the particular language used is defamatory per se is a question of law to be determined by the court, and in making that determination, courts apply the "innocent construction" rule. (Owen v. Carr (1986), 113 Ill.2d 273, 100 Ill.Dec. 783, 497 N.E.2d 1145; Heying v. Simonaitis (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 157, 164, 81 Ill.Dec. 335, 466 N.E.2d 1137.) Under the rule, when the statement is considered in context, and the words and implications therefrom are given their natural and obvious meaning, if the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted, it cannot be actionable per se. (Chapski v. Copley Press (1982), 92 Ill.2d 344, 352, 65 Ill.Dec. 884, 442 N.E.2d 195; Erickson v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. (1984), 127 Ill.App.3d 753, 759, 83 Ill.Dec. 72, 469 N.E.2d 679, appeal denied.) Not every expression of opinion touching on a person's capabilities or qualifications is defamatory. Kakuris v. Klein (1980), 88 Ill.App.3d 597, 600, 43 Ill.Dec. 851, 410 N.E.2d 984, appeal denied.

Plaintiff interprets the notice of discharge as a statement that she was incapable of performing her profession as a nurse. Defendant, however, construes the notice as a recital of plaintiff's personality conflicts, which would be nonactionable under Heying v. Simonaitis (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 157, 81 Ill.Dec. 335, 466 N.E.2d 1137, because it does not impute a lack of integrity or capacity in plaintiff's profession. In Heying, a nurse brought an action for slander against two physicians who had commented that personality conflicts involving the plaintiff had created unrest among the staff. The appellate court concluded that since the comments did not address plaintiff's ability as a nurse, they were not defamatory per se. 126 Ill.App.3d 157, 165, 81 Ill.Dec. 335, 466 N.E.2d 1137.

In the present case, we conclude that a reading of the disputed statement as nonactionable per se is reasonable...