Powers v. Manning

• Decision Date: 05 September 1891
• Citation: 154 Mass. 370,28 N.E. 290
• Parties: POWERS v. MANNING.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

154 Mass. 370

28 N.E. 290

POWERS v. MANNING.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

September 5, 1891

COUNSEL

H.L. Boutwell, for plaintiff.

J.F Manning, pro se.

OPINION

LATHROP, J.

These are two actions of contract, tried in the superior court without a jury. In each case the presiding justice found for the plaintiff, and the case comes before us on the defendant's exceptions.

The first count in the first case is on a promissory note, dated July 11, 1884, by the terms of which the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff the sum of $685, "when the United States pays judgments of the court of commissioners of Alabama claims in the so-called 'Class Two Cases.' " The defendant asked the court to rule that this note did not become due and payable until the United States had paid all such judgments in full, and that this action as to said note had been prematurely brought. The court refused so to rule, as it appeared at the trial that the United States had substantially paid all judgments of the first class in full, and had paid 35.22 per cent. of the greater part of the judgments of the second class, and substantially exhausted the fund. The court of commissioners of Alabama claims was constituted by the United States statute of June 23, 1874 for the purpose of receiving and examining all claims admissible under the act resulting from damage caused by the Alabama and other designated Confederate cruisers. The claims allowed by this tribunal did not equal the amount of the award of the arbitrators appointed in pursuance of the treaty of Washington between the United States and Great Britain and which had been paid to the United States. The court of commissioners of Alabama claims having ceased to exist, congress, by the act of June 5, 1882, re-established it for the term of two years. By section 4 it was authorized to receive and examine the claims mentioned in section 5, and to enter judgments for the amounts allowed therefor in two classes. Section 5 defines the claims of the two classes. Section 7 provides that the judgments rendered by the court under the act shall be paid by the secretary of the treasury out of the sum of money paid to the United States under the treaty of Washington, and not appropriated to claims proved under preceding legislation. Section 8 provides that "judgments entered in the first class shall be paid before judgments of the second class are paid. If the sum of money so appropriated shall be insufficient to pay the judgments of the first class, they shall be paid according to the proportions which they severally bear to the whole amount of such unappropriated sum. If such sum shall be sufficient to pay the judgments of the first class, and not sufficient to pay the judgments of the second class, the latter judgments shall be paid according to the proportions which they severally bear to the residue of such unappropriated sum after the judgments entered in the first class are paid." 22 U.S.St. at Large, 98. Construing the condition contained in the note in suit and the finding of the court in connection with the terms of this statute, we are of opinion that the ruling requested was rightly refused. The award of the arbitrators was to the United States as a nation, and the fund was "to be distributed by congress as it saw fit. *** No individual claimant had, as matter of strict legal or equitable right, any lien upon the fund awarded; nor was congress under any legal or equitable obligation to pay any claim out of the proceeds of that fund." Williams v. Heard, 140 U.S. 529, 537, 538, 11 S.Ct. 885. When, therefore, the note in suit was made payable "when the United States pays judgments of the court of commissioners of Alabama claims in the so-called 'Class Two Cases,' " the parties to the note had reference to claims which could be enforced only under the terms of the statute, which were to be paid out of a specific fund, in subordination to cases of the first class, and which were, in a certain contingency, to be paid proportionally.

The remaining exception in the first case may be briefly disposed of. The second count is on an account annexed, which contained over 20 items. The defendant objected to several of these items on the ground that the plaintiff sought in each of them to recover for services in several different matters; and the defendant asked the court to rule that the plaintiff could recover for but one matter of charge under each of said items, and also asked the court to rule that there could be no recovery on any of said items. The court found upon the evidence as a fact that the different matters mentioned in each of said items constituted one item of charge upon the same subject-matter, and refused to give the rulings requested. One of these items is as follows: "1885, Dec. 8. To letter to Payson and Speer, and two-page letter to Brigham, $3." If these letters related to the same subject-matter, we are unable to see why one charge might not be made, and why, being so charged, they could not be inserted in one item. The other items are similar, and fall within the same rule. The case of Jones v. Ilsley, 1 Allen, 273, on which the defendant relies, is clearly distinguishable. The defendant in that case filed a declaration in set-off, one item of which was as follows: "To goods sold, materials found, and work done, $100." At the hearing before an auditor the defendant introduced evidence of several distinct matters of charge under said item. At the trial this item was disallowed. In delivering the opinion of this court, CHAPMAN, J., said: "The item in the account in set-off: 'To goods sold, materials found, and work done, $100,'--should not have been entirely rejected. In many cases all these particulars may enter into a single item of charge; and any single thing of which that item gives reasonable notice might have been proved. But it appears that the auditor allowed the defendant to prove several particulars, with the various prices of the same, under this single item. This was erroneous. Under a single item of his bill, the defendant should have been limited to the proof of a single article."

In the second case, one of the counts was on an account annexed in which the plaintiff sought to recover on an oral agreement made between himself and the defendant, by which the defendant promised to pay him at the rate of $20 a day for every business day in which he was engaged in taking depositions as a commissioner appointed by the court of Alabama claims, for the defendant. Other counts were upon promissory notes the consideration of which was services rendered as such commissioner and as an attorney. The charges for such services are found by the court not to conform either in form or amount, to the provisions of Rev.St.U.S. § 847. The defendant asked the court to rule "that the plaintiff, as commissioner of the court of commissioners of Alabama claims, was a public officer; that the fees to which he was entitled for services as such commissioner were regulated by the Revised Statutes of the United States,§ 847; and that he can recover no more fees than those prescribed in the said section, even though the defendant expressly agreed to pay him more; and also that, having made a special contract in reference to his fees, which is opposed to public policy, the plaintiff cannot recover on a quantum meruit. The court refused so to rule, and found for the plaintiff. Section 847, Rev.St.U.S., is entitled "Commissioners' Fees," and prescribes what are the legal fees of such persons. Section 823 of the same chapter provides that "the following, and no other, compensation shall be taken and allowed to attorneys, solicitors, and proctors in the courts of the United States, to district attorneys, clerks of the circuit and district courts, marshals, commissioners, *** except in cases otherwise expressly provided by law. But nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit attorneys, solicitors, and proctors from charging to and receiving from their clients, other than the government, such reasonable compensation for their services, in addition to the taxable costs, as may be in accordance with general usage in their respective states, or may be...