Powers v. Massachusetts Homoeopathic Hospital

• Decision Date: 07 December 1899
• Docket Number: 330.
• Parties: POWERS v. MASSACHUSETTS HOMOEOPATHIC HOSPITAL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

101 F. 896

POWERS v. MASSACHUSETTS HOMOEOPATHIC HOSPITAL.

No. 330.

United States Circuit Court, D. Massachusetts.

December 7, 1899

Thomas H. Russell and Arthur H. Russell, for plaintiff in error.

Charles P. Greenough and Julian Codman, for defendant in error.

PUTNAM Circuit Judge (orally).

This is a suit for damages to compensate for an injury alleged to have occurred to a patient through the neglect of one of defendant's nurses.

The first question which presents itself is whether this is a charitable corporation. The original charter of the corporation standing alone, leaves the matter in great doubt. Of course it provides for the maintenance and care of the sick, but that is not necessarily a public charity. There are hospitals for the care of the sick which are private institutions, and are run for private advantage. But the act of 1890 expressly declares this to be a 'charitable corporation,' and that ends the question. We must also recognize the fact that the statutes of Massachusetts, as well as the common law fully recognize charities and charitable uses, and favor them, so that I am not administering simply what I may gather to be the sentiment of the community, but that sentiment enacted into law as fully as though it was printed at large in the statutes of the state. The common law recognizes charities, and favors them, and therefore, in determining the relations of charities, I must consider that the underlying ideas of charitable institutions, and the underlying sentiment which governs the community with reference to them, form a part of the common law, and are to be administered by me accordingly.

The foundation on which the rules must be built up which govern this case is the charter of the defendant corporation, and the effect to be given to it. That is strictly a local question, as to which the courts of the United States are compelled to follow the decisions of the state courts, if clearly in point. The fact that the hospital received a pecuniary sum in this particular case from the patient, or the fact that it generally receives sums from patients, does not, under the laws of Massachusetts, change its nature. That was decided in Gooch v. Association, 109 Association, 109 Mass. 558, 567. The court said:

'The small amount of money and property required to be furnished by those who entered as inmates goes to supplement the charitable fund, and falls far short of being a compensation to the defendants for what the inmates receive. Hospitals and schools generally require some payment of this kind, but are none the less charities on that account.'

I think I would be justified in disposing of the case in behalf of the defendant on the authority of McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. But the reasons given are not satisfactory to my mind. In fact it is difficult to say where that case is rested. Therefore, though I must be careful not to assume anything inconsistent with what I find in the Massachusetts decisions, I prefer to put the case on its true ground. The opinion in 120 Mass. makes some reference to the fact that the funds of a charitable corporation cannot be appropriated to payment for an injury to a patient by the neglect of the officers of the corporation. The funds held by the defendent in this case, and generally by hospitals throughout New England, are not tied up by specific trusts, and may be supposed to be somewhat under the control of the corporation. I certainly would not be willing to accept here a rule of law which would compel me, if hereafter it should turn out that this corporation neglected the interior stairways or other portions of Beck Hall, which it owns, and out of which it derives a profit, to say that it had no funds out of which a payment could be made in case of an injury arising from such neglect. In my view the true rule is that there is no liability on the part of charitable corporations, arising out of the administration of the charity, to those who accept their bounty. And neither the suggestion that there is no fund out of which an execution can be satisfied, nor that made in Railway Co. v. Artist, 9 C.C.A. 14, 60 F. 365, 23 L.R.A. 581, that public policy requires that suits of this sort should not be entertained, nor the contrary suggestion in Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411, that public policy requires they should be sustained, touches the real issue.

This brings me back to the proposition that no person who accepts the bounty of a charitable corporation, or accepts the bounty of any charity, can maintain a suit on account of the method of the administration of the bounty which is accepted. This is putting into the law the homely, but expressive, phrase 'You must not look a gift horse in the mouth. ' It is absolutely inconsistent with the underlying idea of charities as recognized by the law, to hold that the same rule applies to a person employed for compensation to do a certain service as to the distribution of 'charity.' The person who enters a charitable hospital is not a contractor; neither is the hospital a contractor with that person. The person who enters is a mere licensee, like a guest who enters one's house,...