Powers v. Standard Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 18 October 1898
• Citation: 31 S.E. 276,53 S.C. 358
• Parties: POWERS v. STANDARD OIL CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

31 S.E. 276

53 S.C. 358

POWERS v. STANDARD OIL CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 18, 1898

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Richland county; J. C Klugh, Judge.

Action by Jerome W. Powers against the Standard Oil Company. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Mordecal & Gadsden, for appellant.

P. H Nelson and W. D. Melton, for respondent.

JONES J.

This appeal is from a judgment on a verdict against the defendant for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff, while in the defendant's employ by reason of defendant's negligence in keeping an unsafe, elevated plankway, along which plaintiff was required to walk in the discharge of his duty as employé, which plankway, being rotten, gave way under plaintiff, causing him to fall some distance to the ground, and resulting in the injuries complained of.

The first exception complains of error in admitting in evidence the tickets, letter heads, bill heads, postal cards, etc., marked Exhibits "A" and "B". These cards, bill heads, etc., were stamped, "Standard Oil Company (of KY.)." One of the issues raised was whether the Standard Oil Company of Kentucky, defendant, or the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, employed the plaintiff; the defendant company contending that it had not employed plaintiff. The plaintiff had testified that he was employed by the defendant, and to show that defendant was conducting the business at Columbia, S. C., where plaintiff was working and was injured, after showing that such or similar cards and bill heads, etc., were used in the conduct of the business in which plaintiff was employed, offered the same in evidence. We think the evidence was competent, being relevant to show who was carrying on the business in which such papers were used. But, even if this were not true, appellant could not complain of the evidence, because the record does not disclose that it objected to the introduction of these papers at the time they were introduced. The record does show that, after the papers were all received in evidence without objection, appellant's counsel asked, "Does your honor rule them competent?" to which the court replied, "Yes, sir; I think they have been sufficiently proved to be offered in evidence for whatever they are worth." If this could possibly be construed as an objection to the testimony, it came too late, since the evidence had already been received without objection. This is not merely technical. It is a salutary rule, which requires an objection to testimony before it is received, in order to base an exception for error.

The second exception assigns error in holding that plaintiff could introduce part of a record from the office of the secretary of state, whereas he should have held that the entire record must be put in evidence. The record referred to was under the act of 1893, declaring the terms on which foreign corporations may carry on business in South Carolina, and consisted of (1) a written declaration designating some place within this state as the principal place of business or place of location of said corporation in this state, at which all legal papers may be served upon any officer or agent found therein; (2) copies of its charter and by-laws; and (3) a sworn statement showing the residence and post-office address of such corporation, the amount of capital stock, and the names and residences and post-office addresses of its president, secretary, and directors. The paper introduced and received in evidence was the sworn statement last mentioned, purporting to be that of the "Standard Oil Co. (of Ky.)." It is common and approved practice in this state, on proof and production of a record consisting of several papers, to introduce in evidence such part thereof as may be deemed relevant to the matter in issue. The part introduced can prove only what it purports to prove on its face, and when a part of a record has been introduced by one party the whole may be introduced by the other party, if he desires. The exception before us does not go to the proof of the record, or its competency and relevancy as a whole, but merely complains that a part was introduced, instead of the whole. We find no error in the ruling complained of.

The third, fourth, and fifth exceptions allege error in not granting the motion for nonsuit, in that no competent testimony had been...