Powers v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 18 November 2008
• Docket Number: 2007-11759
• Citation: 868 N.Y.S.2d 241,2008 NY Slip Op 09057,56 A.D.3d 642
• Parties: RAYMOND A. POWERS, Respondent, v. CATHERINE M. WILSON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

56 A.D.3d 642

868 N.Y.S.2d 241

2008 NY Slip Op 09057

RAYMOND A. POWERS, Respondent, v. CATHERINE M. WILSON, Appellant.

2007-11759

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Second Department.

November 18, 2008.

In a matrimonial action in which the parties were divorced by judgment entered August 29, 2006, the defendant appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Sherwood, J.), dated November 15, 2007, as, inter alia, granted the plaintiff's motion, among other things, in effect, for a clarification of his obligation to support the parties' children to the extent of directing him to pay only 60% of the parties' children's college costs, to pay only 60% of the highest tuition charged by the State University of New York system with respect to those costs, and to provide support for the parties' children only up to the age of 21, and denied her cross motion to compel the plaintiff to reimburse her for certain miscellaneous precollege expenses incurred on behalf of the parties' children.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Prior to the entry of the judgment of divorce on August 29, 2006 the Supreme Court conducted a hearing on the ancillary financial issues raised by the parties. Following the entry of the judgment of divorce, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, in effect, for a clarification of his obligations to support the parties' children. The defendant cross-moved to compel the plaintiff to reimburse her for certain miscellaneous precollege expenses incurred on behalf of the parties' children. In an order dated November 15, 2007 the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the plaintiff's motion to the extent of directing him to pay only 60% of the college expenses for the parties' children, to pay only 60% of the highest college tuition charged by the State University of New York (hereinafter SUNY) system with respect to those costs, and to provide support to the children until they reached the age of 21, and denied the defendant's cross motion. We affirm.

"Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (c) (7), the court may direct a parent to contribute to a child's education [before the child reaches the age of 21], even in the absence of special circumstances or a voluntary agreement of the parties, as long as the court's discretion is not improvidently exercised in that regard" (Matter of Holliday v Holliday, 35 AD3d 468, 469 [2006]). However, a court must give due regard to the circumstances of the case and the respective parties, as well as both the best interests of the child and the requirements of justice (id. at 469; see Cohen v Cohen, 21 AD3d 341 [2005]; Matter of Calvello v Calvello, 20 AD3d 525, 527 [2005]; Saslow v Saslow, 305 AD2d 487, 488-489 [2003]).

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently...