Poynton v. Special School Dist. of St. Louis County

• Decision Date: 26 August 1996
• Docket Number: No. 4:95 CV 1813 DDN.,4:95 CV 1813 DDN.
• Citation: 949 F.Supp. 1407
• Parties: Joseph Patrick POYNTON, Plaintiff, v. SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, and Dennis Buhr, Sharmon Wilkinson, and Deborah M. Leahey, in their individual capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

949 F.Supp. 1407

Joseph Patrick POYNTON, Plaintiff, v. SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ST. LOUIS COUNTY, and Dennis Buhr, Sharmon Wilkinson, and Deborah M. Leahey, in their individual capacities, Defendants.

No. 4:95 CV 1813 DDN.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

August 26, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joseph Patrick Poynton, Crestwood, MO, pro se.

Darold E. Crotzer, Jr., Partner, Charles L. Ford, Partner, Crotzer and Ford, St. Louis, MO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

NOCE, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court upon the motion of defendants to dismiss (Doc. No. 21), which the court converted to a motion for summary judgment; the motions of the plaintiff for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 28, 30, 34, 36, 37); the motions of plaintiff for award (Doc. No. 31, 40); and various other motions filed by the plaintiff. The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

Plaintiff Joseph Poynton, who is proceeding pro se, commenced this action on September 27, 1995, alleging that defendants Special School District of St. Louis County (SSD), Dennis Buhr, Sharmon Wilkinson and Deborah Leahey discriminated against him on the basis of sex (male), age (60) and disability (back and lung conditions) when they discharged him as a substitute teacher.

On January 18, 1996, plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint, setting out in concise language each of the claims he is asserting and the factual basis for each claim. He filed an amended complaint on February 7, 1996, in which he alleges violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706; the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; and the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the latter of which the court construes as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court construes his complaints of age discrimination as arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. He also attempts to assert a Bivens claim and invokes the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act, Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 536.010-536.215. He seeks damages plus reinstatement as a substitute teacher.

Because of plaintiff's pro se status, the court has reviewed all pleadings in the file in considering the merits of defendants' motion for summary judgment and the various other motions that are pending.

Based on the record proffered by the parties, the court finds the following facts undisputed:

FACTS

1. Defendant Special School District of St. Louis County (SSD) hires substitute teachers based on the guidelines provided by the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education. (Affidavit of Sharmon Wilkinson, filed March 29, 1996, Exh. A.) Each year, a substitute must obtain a certificate from the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education and submit it to the school district. (Id.) State Board of Education policy provides that a ninety-day non-renewable substitute teacher's certificate will be issued to applicants who have 120 semester hours or more of credit from a regionally-accredited college or university. Substitute certificates must be applied for through a school district. Each certificate is issued to the substitute teacher and can be used in any public school district in Missouri. A duplicate copy of the certificate can be obtained for $5. (Wilkinson Aff. Exhs. A-1, A-2.) Plaintiff had a 90-day certificate. (Amended Complaint, filed February 7, 1996, at 5.)

2. When a substitute teacher is approved by the SSD Board of Education, the substitute's name is placed on a list to be called as needed to substitute within the school district. Substitute teachers are not obligated to work when called by the school district. In addition, a substitute teacher may not be called even if his name is placed on the list. The substitute is paid only for days worked for the district. (Wilkinson Affidavit at ¶ 4.)

3. Plaintiff was employed as a substitute school teacher by SSD for the years of 1993-94 and 1994-1995. (Wilkinson Aff. at ¶ 5.)

4. The SSD Human Resources Department received a complaint about plaintiff's performance concerning an occurrence at Walnut Grove Elementary School in the Ferguson-Florissant School District on September 16, 1993. Specifically, plaintiff allegedly said he would write a telephone number on a student's arm and then "peeled off skin." Also, he allegedly stated, in a student's presence, that the student was on the wrong medication and was acting like a "drunken zombie." It was requested that plaintiff no longer be sent to a particular classroom to work with a particular child. (Wilkinson Aff. at ¶ 6 and Aff. Exh. B; Pl.'s Exh. 18, filed February 26, 1996.)

5. By letter dated November 5, 1993, defendant Deborah Leahey, personnel specialist for SSD, informed plaintiff that the district's Human Resources Office had received complaints about his performance as a substitute during the 1993-94 school year. Specifically, Leahey stated that he made several inappropriate remarks in front of a student and on one occasion had referred to a student as a "drunken zombie" in the presence of the student. Plaintiff was advised that further concerns about his performance would result in removal of his name from the substitute teacher list. (Wilkinson Aff. at ¶ 6 and Aff. Exh. C.)

6. By letter dated November 13, 1993, to Leahey, plaintiff disputed the complaints and asked the district to return his teaching certificate "when you get a chance" because regular school districts had inquired if he was interested in substitute teaching. (Pl.'s Exh. 2, filed October 1, 1995.)

7. The SSD Human Resources Department received a request from the Lindbergh School District on October 11, 1994, that plaintiff not be sent to that school district due to behavior they observed when his daughter was a student in the district. (Wilkinson Aff. at ¶ 7 and Aff. Exh. D.)

8. The SSD Human Resources Department received a complaint about plaintiffs performance resulting from occurrences at Trautwein Elementary School in the Mehlville School District during the week of October 24, 1994. Specifically, he allegedly irritated a student to the point that the student was suspended, did not know about disabilities and belittled students, sat behind a desk instead of performing close supervision, did not follow the district's behavior management system, and confused students with different methods of teaching. It was requested that plaintiff no longer be sent to that school. (Wilkinson Aff. at ¶ 8 and Aff. Exh. E.)

9. The SSD Human Resources Department received a complaint about plaintiff regarding his performance during an occurrence at Oakville Elementary School in the Oakville School District on January 25, 1995. Specifically, he was accused of being verbally and physically aggressive with students. It was requested that he no longer be sent to that district. (Wilkinson Aff. at ¶ 9 and Aff. Exh. F.)

10. In a letter dated February 13, 1995, defendant Leahey informed plaintiff that SSD had received additional complaints about his performance and that his name was being removed from the school district's substitute teacher list. She informed him that SSD was concerned about his handling of students in a physically and verbally aggressive manner and his failure to follow established behavior management system and teaching methods. (Pl.'s Exh. 3, Complaint filed September 27, 1995; Wilkinson Aff. at ¶ 10 and Aff. Exh. G.)

11. SSD policy provides that a conference will be held with a substitute teacher when problems arise with the substitute teacher. (Pl.'s Exh. 6, filed September 27, 1995.) Plaintiff was not given such a conference. (Pl.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. 8, filed November 30, 1995.)

12. In a letter dated March 20, 1995, Max Wolfrum, interim superintendent of SSD, acknowledged receiving plaintiffs letter of March 9, 1995, concerning plaintiff's disagreements with Deborah Leahey. Wolfrum informed plaintiff that management had the prerogative of whether to employ a substitute employee and to determine how to use that employee. (Pl.'s Exh. 17, filed Feb. 26, 1996.)

13. In an affidavit to the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission plaintiff stated that his age and gender were factors in his removal from the substitute teacher list because he was one of the oldest substitute teachers and nearly all of the substitutes and teachers were women. He also stated in his affidavit that SSD was facing layoffs at the time of his removal, that he believes there was a preference to retain "younger ladies" and that defendant Leahey disliked older men. In addition, he stated that he had a back condition and only one lung and therefore would only work in the elementary schools because he would not be able to physically handle older students. He stated that his physical handicap limited his ability to run and lift. He had a lung removed for cancer in 1984 and his back had been broken in the past. On September 23, 1995, the EEOC mailed plaintiff a right-to-sue letter on claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and/or American with Disabilities Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. He brought this action on September 27, 1995.

DISCUSSION

This court must grant summary judgment if, based upon the pleadings, admissions, depositions and affidavits, there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 2806, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982). The moving party must initially demonstrate the absence of an issue for trial. Celotex...