Poythress v. Esurance Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 19 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A05–1509–CT–1363.,49A05–1509–CT–1363. |
| Parties | Ashley POYTHRESS and LaVenita Burnett, Appellants–Plaintiffs, v. ESURANCE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee–Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Brett M. Haworth, David M. Henn, Henn Haworth Cummings, Greenwood, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Rick L. Weil, Reminger Co., L.P.A., Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
ALTICE
, Judge.
[1] Ashley Poythress and LaVenita Burnett (collectively, the Plaintiffs) appeal from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Esurance Insurance Company (Esurance).
[2] Concluding sua sponte that the order from which the Plaintiffs appeal is not a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss.
[3] On July 28, 2013, the Plaintiffs were passengers in a vehicle that was stopped at a red light when it was rear-ended by a vehicle registered to Jonathan Tarter. The driver of Tarter's vehicle fled the scene. Although the Plaintiffs were able to get the license plate number, the driver of Tarter's vehicle was never identified.
[4] At the time of the accident, Poythress held a policy of car insurance issued by Esurance. Burnett is Poythress's mother and lived with Poythress at the relevant time. The Plaintiffs filed a claim with Esurance for damages resulting from the accident, which Esurance denied.
[5] On December 5, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages against Tarter and Esurance. Esurance subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. On August 11, 2015, the trial court entered its order granting summary judgment for Esurance. Although the order did not address the Plaintiffs' negligence claims against Tarter, it contained language purporting to make the order final and appealable. This appeal ensued.
[6] Except as provided in Ind. Appellate Rule 4
,1 this court has jurisdiction in all appeals from final judgments. Ind. Appellate Rule 5(A) ; Whittington v. Magnante, 30 N.E.3d 767, 768 (Ind.Ct.App.2015). “Whether an order is a final judgment governs the appellate courts' subject matter jurisdiction.” Front Row Motors, LLCv. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 757 (Ind.2014) (citing Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind.2003) ). “The lack of appellate subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and where the parties do not raise the issue, this court may consider it sua sponte. ” In re Estate of Botkins, 970 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind.Ct.App.2012).
[7] A final judgment is one that “disposes of all claims as to all parties [.]” Ind. Appellate Rule 2(H)
; see also
Bueter v. Brinkman, 776 N.E.2d 910, 912–13 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (explaining that a final judgment “disposes of all issues as to all parties, to the full extent of the court to dispose of the same, and puts an end to the particular case as to all of such parties and all of such issues” (quoting Hudson v. Tyson, 383 N.E.2d 66, 69 (Ind.1978) ). Because the summary judgment order did not dispose of the Plaintiffs' negligence claims against Tarter, it was not a final judgment within the meaning of App. R. 2(H)(1).
[8] “A judgment or order as to less than all of the issues, claims, or parties in an action may become final only by meeting the requirements of [Ind. Trial Rule] 54(B)
.” Martin v. Amoco Oil Co ., 696 N.E.2d 383, 385 (Ind.1998). Pursuant to that rule, the trial court must, “in writing, expressly determine that there is no just reason for delay and, in writing, expressly direct entry of judgment.” Id. See also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) (); App. R. 2(H)(2) (). This court and our Supreme Court have noted that T.R. 54(B) establishes a “bright line” rule requiring strict compliance. See
Martin, 696 N.E.2d at 385 ; In re Adoption of S.J., 967 N.E.2d 1063, 1065–66 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). “Thus, unless a trial court uses the ‘magic language’ set forth in Trial Rule 54(B), an order disposing of fewer than all claims as to all parties remains interlocutory in nature.” Botkins, 970 N.E.2d at 167.
[9] Here, the trial court's summary judgment order did not satisfy the requirements of T.R. 54(B)
. Although the order contained language providing that it was “a final appealable order”, Appellant's Appendix at 8, this court has noted that “simply labeling an order final and appealable does not make it so.” Botkins, 970 N.E.2d at 167. Because the trial court's summary judgment order did not contain the “magic language” set forth in T.R. 54(B), it was not a final, appealable judgment. See
Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind.2003) (); Botkins, 970 N.E.2d at 167 (); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Davis, 860 N.E.2d 915, 920–21 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) ().
[10] Accordingly, the Plaintiffs cannot appeal unless the order is an appealable interlocutory order pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 14
Botkins, 970 N.E.2d at 168. App. R. 14(A) provides that certain interlocutory orders may be appealed as a matter of right. “Such appeals must be expressly authorized, and that authorization is to be strictly construed.” Id. Because none of the grounds for interlocutory appeals set forth in App. R. 14(A) are applicable to the case before us, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to an interlocutory appeal as a matter of right. Nor have the Plaintiffs satisfied the certification and acceptance requirements of App. R. 14(B) (...
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