Prall v. Prall

• Decision Date: 30 November 1909
• Citation: 58 Fla. 496,50 So. 867
• Parties: PRALL v. PRALL.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

50 So. 867

58 Fla. 496

PRALL v. PRALL.

Florida Supreme Court

November 30, 1909

En Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; J. B Wall, Judge.

Bill by John M. Prall against Emma L. Prall. Decree for plaintiff and defendant appealed. Affirmed, and remanded for further proceedings.

See also, 56 Fla. 521, 47 So. 916.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Where a final judgment or decree has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, it is binding on the parties and their privies; and such final judgment or decree is a bar to another suit or action between the same parties for the same subject-matter. This principle of law is enforced by the courts, so that parties may not be vexed more than once for the same cause, and that there may be an end to litigation.

Where a final judgment or decree is rendered for the defendant on demurrer, the plaintiff is estopped from maintaining a similar or concurrent action or suit for the same cause upon the same grounds that were disclosed in the first suit or action, for the reason that the judgment determines the merits of the cause as presented by the pleadings affected by the demurrer.

Where a demurrer to a pleading is sustained because essential allegations of fact were omitted from the pleading, a final judgment on the demurrer concludes the parties and their privies only as to the sufficiency of the facts as alleged to state a cause of action.

In general, a final judgment on demurrer is not a bar to a second suit or action for the same cause between the same parties as an estoppel by judgment because of the former adjudication, where the pleadings in the second suit or action supply the essential allegations omitted from the first suit or action, though the conduct of the parties in not presenting the case when an opportunity was afforded may under special circumstances operate as an estoppel in pais. Conclusions of law are not admitted by demurrer.

Where the second suit is upon the same cause of action and between the same parties as the first, the final judgment in the first suit upon the merits is conclusive in the second suit as to every question that was presented, or might have been on the pleadings presented and determined in the first suit.

When the second suit is upon a different cause of action, but between the same parties as the first, the judgment in the first suit operates as an estoppel in the second suit only as to every point and question that was actually litigated and determined in the first suit, and the first judgment is not conclusive as to other matters that might have been, but were not, litigated or decided.

The test of the identity of causes of action for the purpose of determining the question of res adjudicata is the identity of the facts essential to the maintenance of the actions. It is of the essence of estoppel by judgment that it be made certain that the precise facts were determined by the former judgment. If there is any uncertainty as to the matter formerly adjudicated, the burden of showing it with sufficient certainty by the record or extrinsically is upon the party who claims the benefit of the former judgment.

Where a suit for divorce is upon the ground of 'habitual indulgence by defendant in violent and ungovernable temper,' it is not a bar as an estoppel by judgment to a second suit between the same parties as plaintiff and as defendant for divorce on the grounds of 'extreme cruelty by defendant to complainant' and of 'willful obstinate, and continued desertion of the complainant by defendant for one year,' where different facts are alleged. The conduct of the plaintiff in prosecuting the divorce proceedings does not appear to operate as an estoppel in pais as to the second suit.

While the welfare of society demands exemption from unnecessary and vexatious divorce litigation, the principles of res adjudicata should not be so applied as to prevent one determination of every distinct cause of action under the statutes authorizing divorces for specific and separate species of misconduct.

Where the appeal is not from a final decree, but only from an interlocutory order or decree, errors assigned on other interlocutory orders not specifically appealed from will not be considered by the appellate court.

Where it appears to the appellate court that a bill of complaint does not state a cause of action, the court may make appropriate orders with reference to such defective pleading, even though the question of the sufficiency of the pleading is not in any way presented to the court for its action.

It is not the policy of the law to grant divorces for postnuptial causes short of marital infidelity when such causes do not in fact render one of the parties incapable of performing the duties incident to the marriage status. The law authorizes the severance of the matrimonial union only when the conduct of one of the parties renders it impracticable for the other to further perform the marital duties.

In a suit for divorce, the bill of complaint should contain allegations of all facts essential to the cause of action and to the plaintiff's right to maintain the suit.

In divorce proceedings in the courts of Florida on grounds other than for adultery committed in this state, the bill of complaint must contain an allegation, and there must be proof, that the plaintiff has 'resided two years in the state of Florida before the filing of the bill'; and, where no such allegation appears in the bill of complaint, the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain the suit.

The extreme cruelty that constitutes the statutory ground for divorce is such conduct by the husband or wife towards the other consort as will endanger his or her life, limb or health, or as will cause a reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt. The injury or danger of injury may be mental or physical, but it must be of such a character as to render it impracticable for the complainant to discharge with reasonable safety his or her marital duties. Mere inconvenience, unhappiness, or incompatibility of temperament or disposition, rendering the marriage relation between the parties disagreeable or even burdensome, will not authorize a decree of divorce for extreme cruelty.

The mere refusal of a wife to accord to the husband the marital privileges lawful only to the husband is not of itself such a desertion of the husband as to authorize him to secure a divorce on the statutory ground of willful, obstinate, and continued desertion for one year.

COUNSEL

M. G. Gibbons, for appellant.

E. B Drumright, for appellee. On December 21, 1908, John M. Prall brought in the circuit court for Hillsborough county, Fla., a suit in equity for a divorce from his wife, Emma L. Prall. In the amended bill of complaint it is alleged: That the couple were married April 3, 1895, at Ft. Dodge, Iowa. That they lived together in Iowa and two children were born to them. That during their married life till he finally separated from her the complainant was a faithful and devoted husband. That during their residence in Iowa the wife 'became enamored with a strange religious sect and a devotee at its altar. * * * That from the time of her conversion to the belief of this sect the defendant began to be estranged from the complainant because of his inability to join her in the adoption of the tenets of this religion.' That to please her he moved to Estero in Lee county, Fla., where the sect was established. That the wife 'further yielding to the doctrine of this sect, which holds as one of its beliefs that the members of the sect or union are married in Christ, and are not properly married to any one, withdrew herself from all marital relations with complainant, abjuring him in every way and telling him that his approaches were obnoxious to her. That she refused to * * * allow complainant the privileges of a husband. That during this time the respondent became more and more undutiful in her relations towards complainant, being enraged with complainant on account of his refusal to submit all of their property to be community property with the said religious society as aforesaid. That she constantly chided him upon his sinfulness, and sought to estrange his children from him. Moreover, complainant says that respondent ceased in every way to render services to him as a wife, and, instead of extending to him courtesy and respect due a husband, maligned him and abused him in the presence of their children, seeking by her conduct to compel complainant to withdraw himself from her. That this state of affairs continued for a period of more than one year, and up to about October 10, 1907, and constituted extreme cruelty on the part of the defendant towards complainant, and constituted willful, obstinate, and continued desertion of complainant by defendant for a period of more than one year, and that the several matters herein charged so prayed upon complainant's mind that he became sick and discouraged with life, and was unable to discharge the duties of citizenship, and his associations with the said respondent became repulsive to him, and that upon the said day aforesaid complainant withdrew himself from respondent and from their home, and that he has not since that time lived or cohabited with her. That at the time of their said separation your orator delivered to said respondent all of the property purchased by them in the said town of Estero and all the fruit of their labors during the year he had lived there, and that the said respondent accepted the same in full discharge of all of his liabilities by way of dower or otherwise to her. That at this time she claimed she never would live with him as his wife again, or cohabit with him, and that he had full...