Prashaw v. Titan Mining Corp.
| Decision Date | 24 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 8:20-CV-778 (MAD/CFH) |
| Parties | CASEY G. PRASHAW and LINDSEY R. PRAWSHAW, Plaintiffs, v. TITAN MINING CORPORATION; EMPIRE STATE MINES, LLC; G.L. TILEY & ASSOCIATES LTD; and ABC ENTITIES 1-5, Defendants. TITAN MINING CORPORATION and EMPIRE STATE MINES LLC, Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. DUMAS CONTRACTING USA INC. and CSA GROUP, Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
PORTER, NORDBY LAW FIRM ERIC C. NORDBY, ESQ. MICHAEL SCOTT PORTER, ESQ.
FARRELL, WHITE & LEGG PLLC MICHAEL J. FARRELL, ESQ., JAMES B. SHEPARD, ESQ.
LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP - NEW YORK OFFICE JOHN J. DOODY, ESQ.
BAKER HOSTETLER LAW FIRM - NEW YORK OFFICE MICHELLE N. TANNEY, ESQ.
JAMES C. GROSSO JAMES C. GROSSO, ESQ.
Plaintiffs Casey G. Prashaw and Lindsey R. Prashaw initiated this action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of St. Lawrence, on March 6, 2020. See Dkt. No. 2. Plaintiffs' claims arise from the alleged failure of a mine elevator braking system. See id. at ¶ 34. On July 20, 2020, this action was removed to federal court. See Dkt. No. 1.
On August 13, 2021, Defendants Titan Mining Corporation and Empire State Mines filed a third-party complaint against Third-Party Defendants Dumas Contracting USA and CSA Group. See Dkt. No. 64. Third-Party Plaintiffs Titan and Empire allege claims for common law contribution and common law indemnification against both Third-Party Defendants, and a contractual indemnification claim against Third-Party Defendant Dumas. See id. at ¶¶ 9-34. Presently before the Court are Third-Party Defendants' motions to dismiss. See Dkt. Nos. 74, 95. For the following reasons, Third-Party Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted.
On or about July 27, 2018, Plaintiff Casey Prashaw descended into the Empire State Mine. See Dkt. No. 2 at ¶ 34. The elevator braking system unexpectedly engaged, causing the elevator to abruptly stop and injure Plaintiff. Id. The United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration investigated the incident and determined that the Digital Brake Regulator ("DBR") Panel was not properly installed. Id. at ¶ 36. The brake system was designed and manufactured by Defendant G.L. Tiley. Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 5.
The mine was owned by Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Titan and operated by Titan's subsidiary, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Empire State Mines. Id. at ¶¶ 27, 28. On or about October 19, 2017, Third-Party Plaintiff Empire State Mines and Third-Party Defendant Dumas entered into an agreement entitled "Rehabilitation and Contract Mining Project." See Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 11. The agreement "encompass[ed] a scope of work to be performed by Dumas personnel and employees at the Mine, including but not limited to, development, rehabilitation and maintenance of the Mine." Id. At the time of his injury, Plaintiff Casey Prashaw was an employee of Third-Party Defendant Dumas. Id. at ¶ 10. The contract between Third-Party Plaintiff Empire State Mines and Third-Party Defendant Dumas contains a "General Indemnities" provision. See Dkt. No. 49-7 at 55-56. The General Indemnities provision provides that Third-Party Defendant Dumas will indemnify Third-Party Plaintiff Empire State Mines for the negligence of its own personnel, or for any injury to its own personnel "except to the extent caused or contributed to by the negligent act or omission or willful misconduct" of Empire State Mines. Id. at 55.
The Rehabilitation and Contract Mining Project agreement also includes an arbitration provision. It states, "[i]f there is any Dispute between the Parties concerning or arising out of or in relation to this Contract .. (including any Dispute as to whether any issue or matter is arbitral) then the Dispute shall be referred to and exclusively resolved with finality by arbitration administered by a single arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1991 (Ontario)." Dkt. No. 64-6 at 65. Moreover, the contract also includes a choice of law provision, stating, "[t]his Contract shall be governed by, interpreted and enforced in accordance with the Laws of the Province of Ontario and the Laws of Canada applicable therein." Id. at 67.
Third-Party Plaintiffs and Third-Party Defendant Dumas also signed a settlement agreement on January 14, 2019. See Dkt. No. 95-3. The settlement agreement lists five disputes between the parties that it resolves; none of which relate to the DBR panel malfunctioning on July 27, 2018. See id. at 4-5. The settlement agreement, however, contains a release clause that releases Third-Party Defendant Dumas from "all of Titan Parties' Claims now existing ... which but for this Agreement, the Titan Parties may have maintained against the Dumas Parties under, in connection with or incidental to the Contract, the Equipment Leases, the Disputes, the Dumas Guarantee and the relief claimed in, and subject matter of, the Proceedings." Id. at 11.
Third-Party Defendant CSA Group does not have a contractual relationship with either Third-Party Plaintiff. Third-Party Defendant CSA is a Canadian company that specializes in the "testing, inspection, and certification of third-party products for conformance to applicable standards and requirements, as well as the development of industry standards." Dkt. No. 74-2 at ¶ 2. In 2006, twelve years before the incident, Third-Party Defendant CSA evaluated and tested the DBR panel that allegedly failed. Dkt. No. 64 at ¶ 27. Third-Party Plaintiffs allege that "CSA should have identified the improper installation of the subject wires through its evaluation and testing" prior to the braking system's shipment to the mine. Id. at ¶¶ 27-29.
In 2006, Third-Party Defendant CSA entered into an Application/Service Agreement with Defendant Tiley, the designer and manufacturer of the brake system. See Dkt. No. 74-6. Following a test of the brake system, Third-Party Defendant CSA provided a sticker for the product, which stated "that the electrical product was tested and met the certification and regional installation requirements for products used in Canada." Dkt. No. 74-2 at ¶¶ 11-12. This sticker indicates that the brake system was "in accordance with SPE-1000, the Canada Model Code for Field Evaluation for Electrical Equipment." Id. at ¶ 12. Based on this certification, Third-Party Plaintiffs allege that Third-Party Defendant CSA is liable for the injuries of Plaintiff Prashaw based on common law contribution and common law indemnification claims. See Dkt. No. 64 at ¶¶ 23-34.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the party's claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering the legal sufficiency, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the pleading and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. See ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption of truth, however, does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
Although a court's review of a motion to dismiss is generally limited to the facts presented in the pleading, the court may consider documents that are "integral" to that pleading, even if they are neither physically attached to, nor incorporated by reference into, the pleading. See Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002)).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead "a short and plain statement of the claim," See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual "heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief,'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (quotation omitted). Under this standard, the pleading's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level," see id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are "plausible on [their] face," id. at 570. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief."'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Ultimately, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has "not nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed," id. at 570.
Third-Party Defendant Dumas moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) because of the existence of an arbitration clause. The Second Circuit has held that a motion to dismiss, rather than a motion to compel arbitration, is a proper procedural vehicle in such circumstance. Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir. 2016) ().
Third-Party Defendant CSA moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "'A plaintiff...
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