Pratt v. Pioneer Press

• Decision Date: 27 November 1882
• Citation: 30 Minn. 41,14 N.W. 62
• Parties: PRATT v PIONEER PRESS.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

30 Minn. 41

14 N.W. 62

PRATTvPIONEER PRESS.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed November 27, 1882.

Appeal from order of district court, county of Hennepin.

Thomas Kneeland and Boardman & Ferguson, for appellant.

P. M. Bobcock and Babcock & Davis, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

This is an action for libel. The appeal is from an order granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict was not justified by the evidence and was contrary to law. The rules which will govern this court in reviewing the action of the trial court in such cases have been settled by repeated decisions.

In Stillwater Street Ry. Transfer Co. v. Rheiner, 12 N. W. REP. 449, we held “that we would not be warranted in reversing an order of this kind, simply because, if the judge below had refused to grant a new trial, we should have felt bound to sustain him; not because there was evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict; not because, if the motion for a new trial had been made before us in the first instance, we should have, upon consideration of the evidence, denied the motion; but if, upon careful perusal of the testimony and mature reflection, we feel satisfied that the preponderance of the evidence is manifestly and palpably in favor of the verdict, we would then deem it our duty to reverse the order granting a new trial.”

In view of the judicial discretion which a trial court has always possessed and ought to possess in the matter of granting a new trial, we think these rules sound in principle and salutary in practice. In view of the fact that a new trial of this action may be had, it is inexpedient for us to enter into a discussion of the evidence. But, after an examination of the whole case, our conclusion is that while we think there is evidence reasonably tending to support the verdict, and that if the court below had refused a new trial we would have sustained his decision, yet we cannot say that the preponderance of the evidence is manifestly and palpably in favor of the verdict, or that the court below, in granting a new trial, committed an abuse of his reasonable judicial discretion. The order appealed from must therefore be affirmed. This view of the matter disposes of this appeal.

2. But as another trial of the action will probably be had, we deem it advisable to refer to some views expressed by the learned court who tried the action, with which we are unable to fully concur. He expresses the opinion that there is nothing either in the...