Pratt v. Sloan

• Decision Date: 15 February 1930
• Docket Number: No. 19785.,19785.
• Citation: 41 Ga.App. 150,152 S.E. 275
• Parties: PRATT . v. SLOAN.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

41 Ga.App. 150

152 S.E. 275

PRATT .

v.SLOAN.

No. 19785.

Court of Appeals of Georgia,

Division No. 2.

Feb. 15, 1930.

Syllabus by the Court.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; G. H. Howard, Judge.

Suit by Miss W. S. Pratt against W. P. Sloan. Judgment for defendant, plaintiff's motion for new trial was overruled, and plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

Hooper & Hooper, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Smith, Hammond, Smith & Bloodworth and W. L. Bryan, all of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

BELL, J.

Miss W. S. Pratt, a real estate broker of the state of Florida, sued W. P. Sloan for an amount alleged to be due as commissions on a sale of real estate situated in that state. The defendant, after first answering the suit with a general denial, pleaded by amendment that the brokerage contract was void and unenforceable because the plaintiff had not complied with an act of the General Assembly of Florida approved May 26, 1925 (Laws 1925, c. 10233), regulating the business of real estate brokers and salesmen, a copy of which was set forth as an exhibit to the amendment. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this amendment upon the ground that it failed to set forth any valid defense. The objection was overruled and the plaintiff excepted pendente lite. The counsel then agreed that the case should be tried before the court without a jury. It was tried accordingly, and resulted in a finding and judgment for the defendant. After this the plaintiff made a motion for a new trial, which the court overruled, and the plaintiff excepted.

The defendant made proof of the Florida statute which he had pleaded, and it contained substantially, among others, the fol lowing provisions: That it shall be unlawful

for any person to do business as a real estate broker or salesman until he has first paid a prescribed fee and obtained a license, which can be had only upon application to a designated judicial officer, accompanied by testimonials in proof of the applicant's good reputation for honesty, truthfulness, fair dealing, and competency, and which license the officer may refuse in case of objections filed and a finding by him against the trustworthiness of the applicant; that persons violating the provisions of such statute shall be guilty of crime, and subject to punishment therefor; and that no person shall be permitted to recover for services rendered or claimed to have been rendered in the sale or purchase of real estate, without first having complied with the provisions of the act as to payment of the license fee.

The plaintiff admitted that she had not complied with the act in question, and the evidence tended to show the following facts: That the plaintiff was a resident of the state of Florida and had offices in the city of Miami, from which she engaged generally in the business of selling Florida real estate on a commission or brokerage basis. In the summer of 1925, the plaintiff sought to interest certain persons in the purchase of a tract of land belonging to the defendant and situated in that state. While the defendant was at the time a resident of the state of Florida, he was living temporarily in the state of Georgia. His mother, who was also for the time being in this state, was authorized to represent him, and did represent him, to the extent of listing the property with the plaintiff for sale on a commission basis. The contract of listment was made in Georgia when the plaintiff visited the defendant's mother in this state for the purpose of obtaining such contract It was entered into on September 28, 1925. Willie here, the plaintiff sent a telegram or telegrams to one or more persons in the state of Florida whom she was seeking to interest in the purchase of the property. Such prospective purchasers were also residents of the state of Florida, and the plaintiff had further negotiations with them upon returning to that state. Some time during the month of October, she succeeded in agreeing upon terms of sale with such prospective purchasers, and was enabled to produce them as persons who were ready, willing, and able to buy upon the terms stipulated by the owner. A contract for the purchase of the property was then drawn in the state of Florida, but the purchasers objected to the proposal of the plaintiff to sign it in behalf of the seller, and this necessitated a trip to Atlanta, Ga., to obtain the defendant's personal signature to the contract of sale. Accordingly, the contract of sale was executed between the seller and the purchasers in this state. All negotiations andtransactions between the plaintiff and the defendant, directly or through the defendant's agent, and between the plaintiff and the purchasers, were had in the state of Florida, except the making of the brokerage contract, and the signing of the contract of sale between the defendant and the purchasers, procured by the plaintiff.

We do not think the court erred in allowing the amendment to the defendant's answer, nor in finding in favor of the defendant upon the plea as amended. The only question raised in the motion for a new trial is in reference to the...