Pratt v. St. Christopher's Hosp.

• Decision Date: 19 January 2005
• Citation: 581 Pa. 524,866 A.2d 313
• Parties: Sharon PRATT, Mother, Michael Nesmith, Sr., Father, Individually and in Their Own Right as Parents and Natural Guardians for Michael Nesmith, Jr. v. ST. CHRISTOPHER'S HOSPITAL, Ronald Souder, M.D., Margaret Fisher, M.D., Covenant House Health Services, Covenant House, Inc., Germantown Hospital Emergency Physician(s) Associates, Inc., Stephen Raphael, M.D. and Nellie Novak, M.D. Appeal of: Ronald Souder, M.D. and Margaret Fisher, M.D.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

866 A.2d 313

581 Pa. 524

Sharon PRATT, Mother, Michael Nesmith, Sr., Father, Individually and in Their Own Right as Parents and Natural Guardians for Michael Nesmith, Jr. v. ST. CHRISTOPHER'S HOSPITAL, Ronald Souder, M.D., Margaret Fisher, M.D., Covenant House Health Services, Covenant House, Inc., Germantown Hospital Emergency Physician(s) Associates, Inc., Stephen Raphael, M.D. and Nellie Novak, M.D.

Appeal of: Ronald Souder, M.D. and Margaret Fisher, M.D.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued October 18, 2004.

Decided January 19, 2005.

Charles A. Fitzpatrick, Esq., William C. McGovern, Esq., Philadelphia, for Ronald Souder, M.D. and Margaret Fisher, M.D.

William F. Sutton, Esq., Philadelphia, for St. Christopher's Hospital for Children.

Gayle Lewis, Esq., Philadelphia, for Sharon Pratt and Michael Nesmith, Sr.

BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN, and BAER, JJ.

OPINION

SAYLOR, Justice.

Appeal was allowed in this case to consider the application of the "no-impeachment rule," governing the admissibility of post-verdict testimony by jurors.

The civil case underlying the appeal is a medical malpractice action in which Appellees, on behalf of their minor son, sought to recover monetary damages from Appellants based on an alleged failure on their part to timely diagnose a rare but pernicious infection, which ultimately led to brain damage.¹ At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a defense verdict, with polling confirming that ten of the twelve jurors supported the verdict. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5104(b) (providing that in civil cases a verdict rendered by at least five-sixths of the jurors has the same effect as a unanimous verdict). Approximately two weeks later, the trial court received a letter from one of the jurors (Juror 10) indicating that, during deliberations, she had learned from several other jurors that they had discussed the case with outside medical professionals, who were friends, relatives and/or personal physicians.² In the letter, Juror 10 also expressed her belief that such improper contacts had influenced the verdict.

The court provided copies of the letter to counsel. Plaintiff's counsel then filed post-trial motions, nunc pro tunc, which the trial court permitted,³ limited solely to the question of whether a hearing and/or a new trial was warranted on account of the allegation of taint relative to the jury deliberations.

Subsequently, the trial court denied the post-trial motions without a hearing and entered judgment on the verdict. In its opinion under Appellate Procedural Rule 1925(a), the court relied on Carter by Carter v. United States Steel Corp., 529 Pa. 409, 604 A.2d 1010 (1992)

(plurality), and Orndoff v. Wilson, 760 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super.2000), as reflecting a common law "no-impeachment" rule precluding jurors from testifying about their mental processes connected with deliberations. Accord Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of NY, 493 Pa. 96, 100, 425 A.2d 383, 385 (1981) ("Pennsylvania follows the majority rule in providing an evidentiary prohibition against the admissibility of testimony of a discharged juror as to what occurred among jurors in the jury room."). The court recognized that this general precept does not foreclose jurors from testifying about the fact or existence of outside influences, see Carter, 529 Pa. at 415,

604 A.2d at 1013 ("[I]n order to accommodate the competing policies in this area, a narrow exception has been recognized ... [which] permits `post-trial testimony of extraneous influences which might have affected the jury during deliberations.'" (quoting Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank,

493 Pa. at 101,

425 A.2d at 386)), and therefore, that Juror 10 was not necessarily incompetent to testify concerning the contents of her letter. Nevertheless, the trial court determined that the letter did not contain a sufficient indication of prejudice to warrant a hearing or new trial. See Carter, 529 Pa. at 420,

604 A.2d at 1016 ("Once the existence of a potentially extraneous influence has been established by competent testimony, the trial judge must assess the prejudicial effect of such influence."). In this regard, the court found it significant that Juror 10's letter did not convey specific knowledge concerning how the ex parte discussions influenced jurors, and that, under the no-impeachment principle, the jurors could not testify as to this aspect. Furthermore, the court indicated that, since the information discussed in the extraneous communications was amply covered in the presentation of the parties' respective cases at trial, it was not prejudicial.⁴

Cf. Friedman v. Ralph Bros., Inc., 314 Pa. 247, 171 A. 900, 901 (1934) (holding that a jury foreman's unauthorized view of an accident scene, coupled with his taking of distance measurements "could not have influenced the jury, for it appears the distances were all in evidence and all the facts which the jury may have reported were properly before the jury"). The trial court also expressed substantial misgivings about broadening the availability of post-trial attacks upon jury verdicts. See, e.g., Pratt, slip op. at 4 ("To allow a less restrictive rule would mean that no jury verdict would ever be safe from attack. A juror who may have had a change of heart could, at a subsequent time, return to court stating how and why some outside influence had governed his or her decision.").

On appeal, in a divided opinion, the Superior Court determined that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a hearing and reversed and remanded for accomplishment of the hearing. See Pratt, 824 A.2d at 305. Writing for the majority, President Judge Del Sole agreed with the trial court's recitation of the governing standards, namely, the prevailing no-impeachment rule foreclosing, as a general proposition, juror testimony concerning deliberations, and the exception permitting post-verdict testimony regarding the fact or existence of extraneous influences that might have prejudiced the deliberations (but not the effect that such influence may have had on the deliberations). President Judge Del Sole also emphasized that the testimony that Appellants sought to develop by way of a hearing fell squarely within the exception. See id. at 302 ("Testimony that jurors sought outside information regarding the standard of care to be followed by health professionals and discussed it during deliberations is not testimony of the jury's reasoning processes; rather it is testimony of overt conduct."). The majority departed from the trial court, however, on the question of potential prejudice arising from the alleged, extraneous communications. In this regard, the Superior Court majority relied on Carter's advancement of an objective test for prejudice, taking into account the facts and circumstances of the particular case and focusing on how a typical juror would be affected by the influence. See id. at 303 (citing Carter, 529 Pa. at 420-22,604 A.2d at 1016-17). Further, the majority endorsed Carter's suggested guidelines entailing consideration of:

(1) whether the extraneous influence relates to a central issue in the case or merely involves a collateral issue; (2) whether the extraneous influence provided the jury with information they did not have before them at trial; and (3) whether the extraneous influence was emotional or inflammatory in nature.

Pratt, 824 A.2d at 303 (citing Carter, 529 Pa. at 421-22, 604 A.2d at 1016-17).

Applying these considerations to the present circumstances, President Judge Del Sole framed the central question that was before the jury as whether Appellees were negligent in failing to timely order a CAT scan. See id. at 303, 824 A.2d 299. Since Juror 10 asserted that there had been improper juror solicitation of extraneous information going directly to this central issue, see supra note 2 (reflecting Juror 10's description of the outside information gathered by jurors as pertaining to "whether a CAT scan should have been performed at the same time and whether this was the [appropriate] standard of care"), the majority concluded that potential prejudice was implicated under prong one of the Carter guidelines. With regard to Carter's prongs two and three, the Superior Court majority recognized that, during trial, both sides presented extensive expert testimony relative to the question of whether and when a CAT scan was implicated. The majority found it significant nonetheless that the jurors were alleged to have obtained extraneous information from individuals in whom they placed particular trust, explaining:

The jurors, by seeking an opinion from an outside source, sought an opinion from someone whom they found to be personally credible, on the core issue in the case. In essence, the jurors at issue sought out a third party's opinion on which testimony presented at trial to accept. Human experience dictates that an individual will more heavily weight an opinion from an individual known to them, than an opinion given by a complete stranger. In this case, the two jurors in essence sought out their own expert testimony, which necessarily served to support one of the two sides at trial.

Pratt, 824 A.2d at 305. President Judge Del Sole also distinguished decisions of this Court and of the Superior Court which have found no prejudice on the ground that the information improperly obtained by jurors already had been presented at trial, because, in the present case, the jurors purportedly consulted outside sources for opinions bearing on the trial testimony. See Pratt, 824 A.2d at 304 (distinguishing Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 493 Pa. at 96, 425 A.2d at 383, Friedman, 314 Pa. at 247, 171 A. at 900, and Orndoff, 760 A.2d at 1). Thus, the Superior Court majority found it appropriate to remand for an evidentiary hearing on the juror misconduct claim to determine whether the jurors in fact received opinions from outside sources regarding the appropriate, medical standard of...