Pratt v. State
Decision Date | 28 May 1887 |
Citation | 4 S.W. 785 |
Parties | PRATT <I>v.</I> STATE. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
O. W. Watkins, for appellant. Dan W. Jones, Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The defendant was indicted for an assault upon the person of one Oxford with intent to kill him, and was convicted of a simple assault. The evidence tended to prove that there was some ill feeling between the parties; that they met at a country store, the defendant standing on a platform raised thirty inches above the ground, and Oxford being on the ground at the distance of four or five feet from the edge of the platform; that the defendant cursed and abused Oxford, brandishing a Barlow knife, and threatening to cut out his heart; that Oxford was not at all alarmed, but invited the defendant to come down from the platform and fight it out; that this the defendant declined to do, but, advancing to the end of the platform, struck at Oxford, who did not move out of his tracks, although he inclined his body.
We have some doubt whether the defendant had either the intention or the ability to do Oxford any bodily hurt. Nevertheless we should not think of interfering with the judgment, if the jury had been properly charged. The defendant preferred the following requests:
The court refused these prayers, modifying the first two by charging that the jury must be satisfied that the defendant possessed the real or apparent ability to inflict injury, and explaining the last, which is our statutory definition of a criminal assault, to include the idea of an apparent as well as a real ability. Whether the power to do the bodily hurt that was attempted was a necessary element in the crime of assault at common-law is a question upon which text writers and judges are much divided. In 2 Comyn's Digest, "Battery," C, it is said to be no assault if a man strike at another at such a distance that he cannot touch him or put him in fear. This implies that the apparent attempt to strike under such circumstances amounts only to a menace. In 2 Bish. Crim. Law, (6th Ed.) § 23, an assault is defined to be any unlawful physical force, partly or fully put in motion, creating...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Griffin v. State, 5503
... ... 698, 13 L.Ed.2d 614 (1965). Under our law, there must be in every assault an intention to injure, the ability to commit a battery and at least the [248 Ark. 1232] beginning of an attempt to injure. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41--601 (Repl.1964); Anderson v. State, 77 Ark. 37, 90 S.W. 846; Pratt v. State, 49 Ark. 179, 4 S.W. 785. The statute then is not void for failure to state the requirement of intent. Neither is it void for failure to state the requirement of common intent. The words 'assists or assisted by' are indicative of the same meaning as the words 'aids, abets or assists,' ... ...
-
Anderson v. State
... ... to commit a particular crime. Some courts do not sustain this ... view, but we hold that, to constitute an assault, the accused ... "must have intended and have had the power to carry his ... menace into effect." ... [90 S.W. 847] ... Pratt v. State, 49 Ark. 179, 182, 4 S.W ... 785, and cases cited ... Our ... statutes have settled the question in this State. They say: ... "An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with present ... ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of ... another." Kirby's ... ...
- Pratt v. State