Pratt v. State
| Decision Date | 04 March 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. M-79-699,M-79-699 |
| Citation | 642 P.2d 268 |
| Parties | J. C. PRATT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
J. C. Pratt, appellant, was convicted of Keeping a Disorderly House in Pittsburg County District Court, Case No. M-79-699. He was sentenced to six (6) months' imprisonment and a five hundred dollar ($500.00) fine and appeals. AFFIRMED.
Loren McCurtain, McAlester, for appellant.
Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., Michael Scott Fern, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.
The appellant was convicted for Keeping a Disorderly House pursuant to 21 O.S.1971, § 1026, in the District Court of Pittsburg County, Case No. M-79-463. He was sentenced to six (6) months' imprisonment and a five hundred dollar ($500.00) fine.
The sole proposition asserted on appeal claims that the statute upon which the appellant was convicted is unconstitutionally vague. 21 O.S.1971, § 1026 provides:
Every person who keeps any disorderly house or any house of public resort by which the peace, comfort, or decency of the immediate neighborhood is habitually disturbed, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
The appellant contends that the terms "peace, comfort or decency" are subject to multiple definitions and render the statute unconstitutionally vague and totally incomprehensible to a person of ordinary intelligence.
A criminal statute is void only when it is so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. See State v. Madden, 562 P.2d 1177 (Okl.Cr.1979). Further, a criminal statute requires only reasonable certainty and the prohibited act may be characterized by a general term without the aid of definition, if that term has a settled and commonly understood meaning which doesn't leave a person of ordinary intelligence in doubt. This is true even though the definition of the term contains an element of degree whereby reasonable men may differ. Synnott v. State, 515 P.2d 1154 (Okl.Cr.1973). When we apply the foregoing standard to the statute in question, we are of the opinion that the statute is not so vague as to be violative of due process.
In Isaah v. State, 24 Okl.Cr. 174, 216 P. 950 (1923) a "disorderly house" was defined as "(a) house in which people abide and disturb the order and tranquility of the neighborhood."
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DeVooght v. State, F-84-214
...that term has a settled and commonly understood meaning which doesn't leave a person of ordinary intelligence in doubt." Pratt v. State, 642 P.2d 268, 270 (Okl.Cr.1982). We think forcible is such a word. It is a word understood by most people without jurisprudential aid. The charging inform......
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Casady v. State
...A criminal statute requires only reasonable certainty and the prohibited act may be characterized in general terms. Pratt v. State, 642 P.2d 268 (Okl.Cr.1982). A sufficiently definite warning as measured by common understanding and practices is all that is required. Hildahl v. State, 536 P.......
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State v. Thomason
...only when it is so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. Pratt v. State, 1982 OK CR 31, ¶ 3, 642 P.2d 268, 269-70. When the foregoing standard is applied to § 843.1, we find the statute is not so vague as to be violative of due ¶ 8 At the time of the a......